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INTRODUCTION

As one of many troubling New Deal issues brought to the
Supreme Court, the question of the limits on government's power
to impose conditions on receipt of its benefits has received primarily technical attention. The Court, at first eagerly but recently
more grudgingly, has invalidated benefit conditions on statutory
grounds I and has partially ameliorated such conditions by requiring due process protections such as written standards for benefits 2 and rights to a hearing. 3 However, the Court has rarely
1. The Court consistently invalidated most conditions on the receipt of
AFDC benefits in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See, e.g., Youakim v. Miller, 425
U.S. 231 (1976) (invalidating exclusion of foster children in relatives' homes
from AFDC-Foster Care benefits); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975)
(invalidating exclusion of intact families from AFDC-UP benefits because of father's eligibility for unemployment benefits); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575
(1975) (upholding exclusion of unborn children and their mothers from AFDC
benefits); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972) (invalidating exclusion of
military dependents from AFDC coverage); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971) (invalidating eligibility distinction between school children attending vocational schools and those attending college); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968) (invalidating requirement that recipients not reside or have sexual relations with an able-bodied man, whether he is childrens' father or not). But see
Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184 (1985) (upholding federal interpretation of
consolidated work incentive disregard, which included mandatory payroll taxes
as part of lump sum disregard); Quern v. Manley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978) (upholding state's limited Emergency Assistance Program); Batterton v. Francis, 432
U.S. 416 (1977) (upholding exclusion of strikers from AFDC assistance).
Between 1976 and 1980, however, the Court overturned 19 of 24 successful
lower court challenges to welfare rules. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.
682 (1979) (due process does not require notice and oral hearing before recoupment of benefits); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)
(group does not have standing merely because dedicated to promoting access of
poor to health services). The grudging response of the Burger Court to constitutional claims in welfare cases has been documented by at least one commentator. See Binion, The Disadvantaged Before the Burger Court: The Newest Unequal
Protection, 4 LAW & POc'v Q. 37, 52-58 (1982).
2. See, e.g., White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (welfare recipients have right to eligibility determinations based on written standards); BakerChaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976) (same).
3. See, e.g., White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (welfare recipients have right to written denial/termination, notice of rights to hearing, and
pretermination hearing); Brooks v. Center Township, 485 F.2d 383 (7th Cir.
1973) (same); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (AFDC recipients have
right to due process hearing); accord, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,
436 U.S. 1 (1978) (customer has right to hearing prior to curtailment of service).
But see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (due process provided by Social Security Administration sufficient; pretermination hearing not required).
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elaborated a doctrine for distinguishing among such conditions, 4
nor has it coherently articulated the values at stake in conditions
statutes.
Two of the first major attempts to create a constitutional doctrine for judging benefits conditions in New Deal programs
emerged in Maher v. Roe 5 and Harris v. McRae, 6 decided by the
Court in 1977 and 1980. While Maher and Harrismight have been
distinguished on their facts from some of the earlier conditions
cases because they involved a unique public debate about the
moral and legal rights of pregnant women and fetuses, 7 the Court
has not chosen to distinguish them. In fact, the Court has employed parts of the Maher/Harrisdoctrine in other contexts, most
recently in Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group8 and Bowen v. Roy. 9 Selective Service System is notable for its
4. Even equal protection challenges to federal or state statutory welfare
schemes have not produced coherent results. See Samford, The Burger Court and

Social Welfare Cases, 57 U.

DET. J. URB.

L. 813 (1980).

5. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). For discussion of the facts and holding in Maher,
see infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
6. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). For a discussion of the facts and holding in Harris,
see infra notes 41-48.
7. Since the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the federal
courts have been faced with continuing abortion controversies over state procedural restrictions on abortions. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (requirements that abortions be performed in
hospitals, that fetal remains be disposed of and that there be a waiting period
prior to abortion); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (requirement that
parents be notified of pending abortions of minor); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (requirement that parents of minor consent prior to
abortion); Friendship Medical Center v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); Women's Health Servs. v.
Maher, 482 F. Supp. 725 (D. Conn. 1980) (requirement that life of mother be in
jeopardy), vacated and remanded, 636 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1980).
8. 468 U.S. 841 (1984). In Selective Service System, an amendment to Title IV
of the Higher Education Act of 1965 declared ineligible for Title IV assistance
any person required to register under the Selective Service Act who failed to do
so. Id. at 844 (citing Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1113(2), 96 Stat. 718 (1982)). A
regulation, issued thereunder, required that registrants attest to their compliance with, or exemption from, draft registration requirements in writing prior to
receipt of college financial aid. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 668.24(a) (1983)). Students who failed to register as required challenged the amendment, arguing unsuccessfully that § 113(2) constituted a bill of attainder in violation of U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, in that it punished non-registrant students as a class for
past conduct without the protection of a trial. Id. at 846-47.
More importantly for this article, plaintiffs also claimed that the statute
forced them to confess to the fact that they were not registered in the Selective
Service System if they were in need of financial aid to attend college, thereby
violating their privilege against self-incrimination as protected by the fifth
amendment. Id. Although the district court found in favor of the non-registrants
on both issues, the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 859.
9. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986). In Bowen, Native Americans sued the secretaries
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apparent expansion of the Maher/Harris doctrine,' 0 because it
portends a major shift from the protection which the Court had
of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, the Department of Health
and Human Services, and the Department of Agriculture. Id. at 2150. They
sought to enjoin these departments from providing their daughter, Little Bird of
the Snow, with a social security number and from using that number in connection with benefits she received under the aid to families with dependent children
and food stamp programs. Id. Plaintiffs argued that provision or use of such a
number would violate their religious beliefs by robbing their daughter of her
spirit and her ability to protect herself against evil from the use of the number.
Id. The Court split on whether the controversy was moot because the child had
already been assigned a social security number. Id. at 2149. A plurality agreed
that plaintiffs could not force the government not to use the number for her. Id. at
2153. A majority, however, appeared to believe that the government could not
force plaintiffs to use the number in their applications and other communications with the welfare department. Id. at 2152.
Significantly, in part III of the plurality opinion, which follows the Maher
argument, Justice Burger was joined only by Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Id.
at 2149. Four Justices, including Justice O'Connor who wrote one of the concurring/dissenting opinions, repudiated this argument in several respects. Id.
For a discussion of the plurality opinion, see infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's opinion; see infra notes 62-63
and accompanying text.
10. Maher, Harris,Selective Service System and cases following Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), present somewhat different factual dilemmas. In
Maher and Harris, government benefits were withdrawn because a woman was attempting to exercise her right to abort, in order to prevent, discourage or make
it difficult for her to exercise that right. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 303; Maher 432
U.S. at 467. In Sherbert and its progeny, the government attempted to withdraw
benefits despite the fact that such withdrawal would burden or prevent a person
from exercising his right in a certain way, not in order to prevent such exercise.
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401. For a discussion of Sherbert, see infra notes 12 & 18
and accompanying text. For a discussion of cases following Sherbert, see infra
note 11.
In the suspect classification cases (i.e., those that fall within a limited category of disadvantaged classes, such as that in Harris), the Court has distinguished prohibited from nondiscriminatory choices on precisely this basis. See
Harris,448 U.S. at 312-14. One can assume prohibited purpose if the legislation
was chosen in whole or part because of adverse effect on the protected class rather
than in spite of that effect. See, e.g., Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
274, 279 (1979) (absolute lifetime employment preference to veterans upheld).
Curiously, the Court in Sherbert appears to give more protection to the rightsexerciser when the state selects its course of action in spite of its adverse effect on
the exercise of the right. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 297; Maher, 432 U.S. at 464; see
also Selective Serv. Sys., 448 U.S. at 862-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Selective Service System is in some ways different from either of these lines of
cases because the need for the individual to exercise his fundamental privilege
against self-incrimination arises only because the government has withdrawn his
benefits; but for that withdrawal, he probably would not have had to choose to
exercise his right. However, as in the Sherbert line of cases, government chooses
to withdraw benefits to discourage an unprotected activity, knowing that the
consequence of that choice will be to compel the affected individual to choose
between having the benefit and exercising his fundamental right as he would
otherwise choose. See Alexander v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 766 F.2d 630, 632
(1st Cir. 1985) (draft registration certificate not ultra vires or violation of free
exercise clause).
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previously accorded recipients impeded in exercising fundamental constitutional rights by conditions imposed upon the receipt
of their government benefits.''
11. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(person may not be compelled to choose between first amendment right and
otherwise available public program); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)
(same); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (government may not force public
employee to relinquish right of free association in order to keep job); Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (restriction on right to nonemergency medical care based on durational residency requirement not permitted); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (state may not deny student right to
prove residency); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (may not deny public
employment on basis of constitutionally protected free speech rights); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (residency requirement for welfare benefits violates fundamental right to travel); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (disqualification for unemployment benefits due to refusal to accept work in
violation of religion imposes unconstitutional burden on free exercise of religion); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (invalidating discriminatory denial of law exemption as limitation on free speech); see also Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Kempiners, 700 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1983) (act disqualifying all agencies
that counsel or refer for abortion from grants imposes unconstitutional penalty);
Valley Family Planning v. North Dakota, 489 F. Supp. 238 (D.N.D. 1980) (invalidating criminal statute preventing government funding for family planning by
person or agency that performs, refers or encourages abortion; state cannot indirectly inhibit exercise of constitutional right nor require recipient to surrender
right to obtain benefit); see also Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833, 836 (11 th Cir.
1982) (police captain cannot be demoted for off duty epithets); Owens v. Rush,
654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981) (dismissal of undersheriff for assisting wife in
pursuing sex discrimination claim constitutes penalty); Robinson v. Reed, 566
F.2d 911, 913 (5th Cir. 1978) (requirement to attend race relations seminar constitutes violation of right to privacy); Lewis v. Delaware State College, 455 F.
Supp. 239, 249 (D. Del. 1978) (refusal to renew dorm director's contract because of her illegitimate child violates constitutional rights since it is well established that "conditions and qualifications upon governmental privileges and
benefits that tend to inhibit constitutionally protected activity are invalid") (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 n.6, 405-06 (1963)); see generally Simson, Abortion, Poverty and the Equal Protectionof the Laws, 13 GA. L. REV. 505 (1979)
(arguing that welfare scheme upheld in Maher violates equal protection).
The doctrine that government may not condition benefits on a requirement
that one exercise his fundamental rights in a particular way has been applied in
unusual settings. See, e.g., Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1045 (D.D.C.
1979). In Gavett, the court invalidated a federal statute requiring those who
wanted the "government benefit" of purchasing Army rifles at cost to exercise
their freedom of association in a particular way-by joining the National Rifle
Association. Id. at 1051. The court held that requiring an individual to associate
violated the fifth amendment. Id. at 1049. In a footnote, the court noted that
"the denial of a public benefit may not be used by the government for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve that which it may not command directly." Id. at 1045 n.22 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361
(1976)).
The courts have also generally prohibited government's exaction of fees
before persons can exercise fundamental rights unless such fees were necessary
to pay for a legitimate permit system. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d
619 (5th Cir. 1981) (invalidating permit fee for religious solicitation in public
airport), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982); Bayside Enters. v. Carson, 450 F.
Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (invalidating excessive license fee for adult en-
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This article criticizes the Maher/Harrisconditions doctrine on
two levels. At the first level, it suggests that the Maher/Harrisdoctrine cannot justify the Court's decisions to uphold government
withdrawals of funding from rights-exercisers. Contrary to the
Court's claims, the doctrine fails to follow previous precedents on
benefit conditions beginning with Sherbert v. Verner.12 In those
cases, the Court zealously guarded the exercise of fundamental
rights even when that exercise was indirectly jeopardized by the
state's conditions on receipt of public benefits.' 3 In this first section, definitional distinctions employed by the Court are discussed, such as what kind of recipient's right is at stake; what
"property" is; what it means for the government to "act"; what it
means to "penalize" an individual; and what is an "obstacle" in
the path of exercising a right. In addition, the article explores
possible justifications for conditioning public benefits in general
and applies them to the Maher and Harris cases, suggesting that
these justifications, given the larger jurisprudence into which they
fit, cannot explain Maher and Harris.
At the second level, after exposing and contrasting the definitional presuppositions of the Court in Maher and Harris with previous cases, the article suggests that the Maher/Harrisdoctrine is a
failure because it uses utterly inadequate rights theory to resolve
emerging issues of conflicting human need and conscience, issues
which are mediated by government action. Specifically, the Court
insists on viewing the relationship of citizen to government as
based on liberty-rights theory and it assumes that the only possible outcomes when conflicts among individuals arise are victories
or losses. This precludes satisfactory resolution of all parties'
compelling concerns in important government benefits cases such
as the abortion funding cases. While this critique focuses on the
abortion funding cases, the article is primarily concerned with the
tertainment business); see also Blasi, PriorRestraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 1481, 1527-32 (1970) (prior restraints on demonstrations should be subject to strict constitutional scrutiny).
12. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the government withdrew benefits despite the fact that such withdrawal would prevent a person from exercising their
constitutional rights in a certain way rather than to prevent such exercise. Id. at
401. For cases following Sherbert, see supra note 11.
13. See supra note 11. Not all indirect burdens on the exercise of fundamental rights, especially financial ones, are prohibited. See, e.g., Califano v.
Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 177 (1978) (upholding right of government to suspend social security payments during international travel); Valencia v. Blue Hen
Conference, 476 F. Supp. 809, 820 (D. Del. 1979) (upholding association rule
excluding Catholic school basketball team from public school league), aff'd mem.,
615 F.2d 1355 (3d Cir. 1980).
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implications of these decisions for all situations in which government conditions and fundamental rights potentially conflict.
With this critique, I hope to pave the way for discussion of a
new framework for adjudicating the role of government when it
acts as intervenor among citizens through public benefits choices.
This framework, which the article refers to as the "counter-ethic
of responsibility," accords rights-talk an appropriate place. It
goes farther, however, by insisting that government and its citizens may be called on even in legal forums to respond to individual needs within the human community.
The issue of abortion rights is among the most legally and
ethically troubling of our time. Unless the traditional rights
framework is discarded in favor of a new one, such as the counterethic, the prospect of reconciling the needs, hopes and values of
those who categorically oppose abortion and those who support it
(in some or all circumstances) seems particularly dim.1 4 Unless
society can achieve significant reconciliation on this issue, and on
the general question of government's relationship to the individual in distributing benefits, the role of government in all social
efforts to seek a more just and compassionate society becomes
ambiguous and perhaps irrelevant.
I.

THE MAHER/HARRIS CONDITIONS DOCTRINE: THE CASES AND

THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

When the Maher/Harris conditions doctrine was first announced in Maher v. Roe, 15 the Supreme Court opinion denying
women a right to government funding for abortions was carefully
written to suggest congruence with previous public benefit conditions/fundamental rights cases which the Court had decided,' 6
14. The close division in public opinion on whether abortion should be allowed has been repeatedly noted. National Opinion Research Center surveys
show that, between 1965 and 1980, support for legalizing abortion rose significantly. That increase was registered not only for more "acceptable" reasons
such as protecting the mother's health (change from 73% to 90%) or to prevent
bearing of defective children (from 59% to 83%), but also simply for the
mother's convenience (from 15% to 47%) or because of social factors such as
poverty of the family (from 22% to 52%) or the mother's unmarried status
(from 18% to 48%). The rapidity of the change was especially dramatic among
Catholics. See generally F. JAFFE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS 99109 (1981) [hereinafter cited as F. JAFFE & B. LINDHEIM].
15. 432 U.S. at 469-79.
16. Id. at 474-75 & n.8. The Maher Court went to some length to distinguish the facts before it from those justifying the "penalty" analysis employed in
earlier cases. Id. The Court refused to extend these earlier cases to hold that
the mere refusal by the state to payfor a woman's abortion in any way penalizes
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such as Shapiro v. Thompson 17 and Sherbert.1 8 In both Maher and
Harris, which upheld states' right to withhold Medicaid benefits
necessary for poor women to obtain abortions, the Court reiterated that a state may not punish those exercising their constitutional rights, including the right to decide to have an abortion.' 9
The Court suggested in footnotes that withdrawal of all Medicaid
benefits to women who sought abortions might be a prohibited
"penalty" for exercise of constitutional rights,2 0 but held that
her decision to have an abortion. Id. The Court suggested, however, that a denial of welfare benefits to all women who had obtained abortions and were
otherwise entitled to the benefits would justify use of such "penalty analysis."
Id.
17. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro, indigent women successfully mounted
an equal protection challenge to state statutes which required one year of residence in the state before the women were eligible for AFDC benefits. Id. at 63031. Rejecting the state's proffered interests in planning, administration, prevention of fraud, encouragement of work, and saving money as justification for the
regulation, the Court held that the durational residency requirement, the state's
method of achieving those goals, was irrational because it was overbroad. Id.
The Court further held that a state may not legitimately seek to "fence out"
welfare recipients from its borders, regardless of the means it employs to do so.
Id.
18. 374 U.S. 398. In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist challenged a South
Carolina statute which provided that persons must be available to work in order
to receive unemployment benefits. Id. at 399-400. South Carolina construed
this "availability" requirement to mandate that Sherbert accept Saturday work in
violation of her religion. Id. at 401. The Court held that the requirement impermissibly infringed on her fundamental right to freely exercise her religion. Id. at
403-06. The Court was unwilling to extend its holding to all persons unemployed and unavailable due to religious convictions, but it did suggest that the
interference with the fundamental right at stake, rather than the amount of
"harm," was crucial to the decision. Id. at 408-10.
The Court has since reaffirmed Sherbert. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981). In Thomas, the Court held that an employee who refused to be
transferred to the munitions-making part of employer's plant because of religious beliefs could not be denied unemployment benefits on the basis that he
quit "without good cause." Id. at 709. More recently, the Court invalidated a
Connecticut statute which required private employers to grant employees their
individually designated Sabbaths as holidays. Since this statute was invalidated
because it violated the establishment clause, it did not undermine Sherbert. See
Estate of Donald E. Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
19. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-18; Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-76.
20. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8. This is the
Court's "unrelated benefits" distinction which the district court relied on to determine that the strict scrutiny test requiring a compelling state interest is not
appropriate where a state required that parents transfer custody of their emotionally ill children to the Department of Social Services before they could be
treated in a residential treatment facility. See Joyner v. Dumpson, 533 F. Supp.
233 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983). The district court did,
however, apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to the foster care law and determined that the transfer of custody requirement infringed upon the plaintiffs'
exercise of their fundamental right to family integrity, yet served no important
state interest justifying such infringement. 533 F. Supp. at 242. The court of
appeals reversed, noting that, contrary to the contention of the district court, "a
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withdrawal of the means to obtain the abortion itself was not punitive.2 1 This "unrelated benefits" distinction between imposing
a penalty and withholding benefits has been subsequently used to
justify other government failures to fund means useful to the ex22
ercise of fundamental rights.
However, it was not until Selective Service System that the Court
23
clearly retrenched even on its "unrelated benefits" distinction.
While it is unclear whether the elimination of the "unrelated benefits" distinction is a return to old doctrine or an elaboration of
new theory, the Court's move is clearly significant for recipients
of basic needs benefits who wish to exercise their fundamental
rights.
Before discussion of the Maher/Harrisconditions doctrine, a
brief review of the facts and context of these cases may illuminate
the concerns which the Supreme Court attempted to meet in
Maher and Harris. The Maher decision was the culmination of
widespread efforts by pro-choice advocates and the attorneys of
poor women to extend to recipients of AFDC benefits the abortransfer of 'custody' pursuant to ...[the] foster care statutes [at issue] does not
result in parents' wholesale relinquishment of their right to rear their children."
712 F.2d at 778. The court concluded that "[r]ather than infringing family integrity, the self-proclaimed policy of the ... foster care program is to enable 'a
child to return to his family at an earlier time than would otherwise be possible,
or reducing the likelihood that a child who has been discharged from foster care
would return to such care.' " Id. at 780 (quoting N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 409
(McKinney 1982); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18 § 430.10 (1982)).
21. For further discussion of this proposition, see supra note 16.
22. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461
U.S. 540 (1983). In Regan, the Court upheld denial of plaintiffs' tax exempt
status because their activities violated tax regulations. Id. at 551. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, distinguished Speiser v. Randall in which discriminatory denial of tax exemption to veterans who refused to sign a loyalty oath was
found to be unconstitutional because the benefit withheld in Regan was directly
related to first amendment activity. See id. at 545 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 518 (1958)). In Regan, Congress "merely" withdrew public support
for exercise of the right by withdrawing the tax exemption; it did not deny a
benefit to the group because they exercised their constitutional rights. See id. at
546-49; see also Bowen, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (government not required to further religious views of individual); cf. Maryland Pub. Interest Research Group v. Elkins,
565 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1977) (university's reduction on use of student funds for
litigation did not violate first amendment, as university had no duty to affirmatively protect that exercise), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1008 (1978); Valencia v. Blue
Hen Conference, 476 F. Supp. 809, 821 (D. Del. 1979) (state has no duty under
free exercise clause to provide secular benefits to children attending non-public
schools, although it may do so without violating establishment clause), aff'd
men., 615 F.2d 1355 (1980).
23. 468 U.S. at 841. For a discussion of Selective Service System, see supra
notes 8 & 10 and accompanying text.
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tion choice created by Roe v. Wade. 24 In Maher and its companion
cases, AFDC recipients challenged state statutes and regulations
which prohibited payment for abortions under the Medicaid program. 2 5 Essentially, those statutes and regulations gave welfare
mothers with unwanted pregnancies several unpleasant choices.
They could carry their children to term and receive the minimal
extra per-child payment which state welfare programs would provide them; 2 6 they could attempt to abort themselves; 27 they could
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see, e.g., Wulffv. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir.
1974) (state statute excluding nontherapeutic abortions from reimbursement
under payments program violated equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment); Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974) (state policy precluding
indigent pregnant women from receiving abortions paid for with public welfare
funds unless abortion was necessary to save life or prevent damage to physical
health, regardless of trimester, violated fourteenth amendment); Doe v. Westby,
383 F. Supp. 1143 (W.D.S.D. 1974) (denial of Medicaid benefits to women electing nontherapeutic abortions created classification violative of equal protection
clause of fourteenth amendment), vacated and remanded, 420 U.S. 968 (1975), on
remand, 402 F. Supp. 140 (1975), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 901 (1977); see
also Maher, 432 U.S. at 484 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing additional cases in
which AFDC recipients argued for abortion choice).
25. In Maher, Connecticut's regulation, which provided state Medicaid
Funds only medically necessary abortions in the first trimester, was challenged
on due process and equal protection grounds. 432 U.S. at 467. The district
court upheld the plaintiffs' challenge on both bases, holding that the state violated equal protection by withholding subsidies from those who choose to terminate their pregnancies while providing them to those who choose to bear their
children. Id. at 468. The district court further required that procedural standards for both abortion and childbirth payment be similar, invalidating prior
authorization requirements and the rule requiring that a woman give her prior
written consent to abortion. Id. at 469. On the same day that the Court decided
Maher, the Court also held that states were not required to fund abortions under
Title XIX of the Social Security Act. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977).
The Court also held that a city's refusal to provide nontherapeutic abortion services for indigents at public hospitals under the same conditions as other hospital
services did not violate the equal protection or due process clauses of the Constitution. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
26. In 1979, just prior to the Harris decision, AFDC grants for a family of
four in fourteen midwestern and northeastern states (which traditionally have
paid higher grants than other areas of the country) ranged from $350 in Illinois
(about 74% of the federal poverty level) to $531 in Michigan. ILLINOIS RELIGIOUS COMM. ON WELFARE REFORM, THE CONTINUING ILLINOIS WELFARE SCANDAL

8 (1981). In 1981, the grant for a fourth person in the household ranged from
$24.00 per month in Mississippi to $90.00 per month in California. CENTER ON
SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAw, MEMORANDUM TO WELFARE SPECIALISTS 1 1

(January 5, 1981). As current examples, the per person payment for every child
beyond the first is limited to a maximum of $60.00 in Indiana. IND. CODE § 121-7-3 (1984). In Minnesota, the payment is between $37 and $64, depending on
the number

of persons in the

household.

12

MINN.

CODE AGENCY

R.

§ 2044(l)(c) (1984).
27. The Center for Disease Control found little increase in self-induced
abortions after the Hyde Amendment, but found that welfare women in illegal
states or states where funding has been cut off are obtaining them at later stages,
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attempt to get a physician to perform an abortion for free; 28 they
could use AFDC money for an abortion instead of for rent or
food; 29 or they could borrow money from a friend or relative for
an abortion, repaying it gradually from their subsistence
30
benefits.
Plaintiff welfare mothers were initially successful in lower
courts in obtaining rulings that state law prohibiting Medicaid
payments, even for non-therapeutic abortions, violated their
rights under Roe v. Wade.3 1 Others won rulings that states were
required, under Title XIX,32 to pay for medically necessary physician's services, defined by the courts to include abortions.3 3 In
Maher and Beal v. Doe,3 4 however, the Supreme Court rejected
welfare mothers' statutory and constitutional claims to Medicaid35
funded non-therapeutic abortions.
In Maher, the Court made several observations about the
right at stake, and the validity of the state's action affecting that
right. First, the Court claimed that Roe v. Wade did not recognize
a fundamental affirmative right to have an abortion, but only the
right to be free from "governmental compulsion" when making
causing an increase in complications and death. See F. JAFFE & B. LINDHEIM,
supra note 14, at 144.
28. Prior to the Hyde Amendment, only about 85,000 abortions were provided nationwide by health facilities at reduced or no cost. Id.
29. See id. at 142. In the average state, at least as of 1979, an abortion
would have cost about $285, or $44 more than the average total monthly welfare
payment for an entire family. Id. at 143. In Mississippi, an abortion cost about
four months' welfare payments; and in Texas, three months' benefits. Id. In
only 13 states was the average abortion cost less than the monthly AFDC allotment. Id. In cases in which hospital care was necessary, the average cost would
be significantly higher-about $500. Id.
30. For a discussion of the ramifications of this option, see infra notes 14648 and accompanying text.
31. For a list and discussion of such decisions, see cases cited supra note 22;

see also F.

JAFFE

& B.

LINDHEIM,

supra note 14, at 129-36.

32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-p (1982 & Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. III 1985).
33. See, e.g., Doe v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140 (W.D.S.D. 1975) (state may
not deny medical benefits to women electing nontherapeutic abortions while
providing benefits to other pregnant women), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 901
(1977). But see Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975) (Medicaid Act does
not forbid state regulations limiting payments to abortions which are therapeutically necessary); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975) (statute prohibiting Medicaid payments for performance of elective abortions was not in conflict
with Social Security Act), revd sub nom. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
34. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
35. Ivaher, 432 U.S. at 474; Beal, 432 U.S. at 445. The Beal Court noted:
"Although serious statutory questions might be presented if a state Medicaid
plan excluded necessary medical treatment from its coverage, it is hardly inconsistent with the objectives of the Act for a state to refuse to fund unnecessar3though perhaps desirable-medical services." 432 U.S. at 444-45.
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"'certain kinds of important decisions,' " such as the decision to
abort. 36 The Court held that government "compulsion" occurs
when the state puts obstacles in the path of abortion, and that the
state's withholding of Medicaid benefits was not such an obstacle. 3 7 In the Court's view, the state did not create the condition,
i.e., indigency, which prohibited the indigent woman from obtaining an abortion. Therefore, the Court reasoned, the state had
not created any obstacle which it was obliged to remove. 38 The
state's "encouragement of [the] alternative activity" of childbirth
by removing the indigent woman's financial means to get an abortion was not considered a penalty like those in Shapiro and other
cases which invalidated public benefit conditions interfering with
39
the exercise of fundamental rights.
1
Harris v. McRae40 followed the lead of Maher and Beal,4
36. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600
& nn.24, 26 (1977)). The Maher Court then went on to note:
As Whalen makes clear, the right in Roe v. Wade can be understood
only by considering both the woman's interest and the nature of the
state's interference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitutional right to abortion," as the District Court seemed to think.
Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a state to make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement
that judgment by the allocation of public funds.
Id. at 473-74 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 & nn.24, 26 (1977)).
37. Id. at 473.
38. Id. at 474. The Court noted that:
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind from the
laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. The Connecticut
regulation places no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant
woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision
to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private
sources for the service she desires. The State may have made childbirth
a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision,
but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not
already there. The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some
cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is
neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.
We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not impinge upon
the fundamental right recognized in Roe.
Id. (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 474-75 n.8. For a discussion of the circumstances under which
the Court would apply "penalty" analysis, see supra notes 16 & 21 and accompanying text.
40. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
41. While the Harris Court continued to use the "obstacle" test of .1aher,
the Court also drew on Mobile v. Bolden for the proposition that a state statute or
regulation must impinge on a liberty interest protected by the Constitution
before strict scrutiny is appropriate. Id. at 312 (citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446
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although both the statutory and constitutional questions were
somewhat different. 4 2 In Harris, welfare mothers challenged the
Hyde Amendment, 43 an appropriations act rider which prohibited
the use of federal funds to pay for any abortions unless they were
caused by reported rape or incest, or by pregnancy which would
endanger the life of the mother. 44 The Hyde Amendment withdrew Medicaid funding for abortions from a significant class of
women not excluded by the Maher and Beal cases: those whose
abortions were medically necessary, including those who would
suffer significant, permanent physical or mental damage should
45
they carry their fetuses to term.
U.S. 55, 76 (1980) (plurality opinion)). The "impingement" test may have considerable relevance for future Court decisions regarding the impact of legislation on citizens. See Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The
Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the
Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1981).
42. In Beal, plaintiffs challenged Pennsylvania's requirement that a woman
desiring an abortion must present a medical necessity certificate. 432 U.S. at
442. Plaintiffs argued this was essentially an additional condition of eligibility
for provision of a physician's services, a mandatory Title XIX service, and that
this requirement contravened the purposes and explicit mandatory language of
Title XIX. Id. The Court held that states were free to set some conditions on
even mandatory services and that Title XIX covered only "medically necessary"
physician's services. Id. at 444-45.
In Maher, plaintiffs challenged a similar Connecticut statute which limited
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to those which are medically
necessary. 432 U.S. at 466. The Connecticut statute likewise required the performing hospital or clinic to submit a certificate of necessity from the patient's
physician. Id. The Court, relying on Beal, concluded that a state participating in
the joint federal-state medicaid program is not required by the Constitution to
pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for childbirth. Id. at 480 (citing
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 438). For a further discussion of Maher, see supra notes
35-39 and accompanying text.
In Harris, plaintiffs' statutory argument was that the Hyde Amendment,
withdrawing federal funding from abortions other than for pregnancies resulting from rape, incest, or those threatening the mother's life, did not obviate the
state's duty to provide "medically necessary" services with its own funding. Harris, 448 U.S. at 307-08. Plaintiffs in Harrisused equal protection and due process
arguments which failed in Maher. See 448 U.S. at 312-18, 321-26; Maher, 432
U.S. at 469-80. Additionally, the Harrisplaintiffs claimed that the Hyde Amendment violated the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment
by establishing a religious view of life which precluded other women who
wanted abortions from obtaining them in violation of their rights of conscience.
448 U.S. at 318-19 (citing the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 118, 93
Stat. 962) (1980)). Plaintiffs' establishment clause claims failed and their free
exercise claims were dismissed for lack of standing. Id. at 319-22.
43. Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 118, 93 Stat. 962 (1980).
44. For the history and language changes in the Hyde Amendment, see
Hams, 448 U.S. at 302-03.
45. Hamis, 448 U.S. 297 at 339-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Hyde
Amendment exerted a statistically significant effect on abortions, even given the
fact that approximately 133,000 medicaid-eligible women who wanted abortions
prior to the Hyde Amendment were unable to attain them because of state re-
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In Harris,the Court used the Maher argument that the federal
government had not placed obstacles in the path of exercise of
the right to decide for an abortion, this time focusing on the concept of "impingement" on a fundamental right. 46 Reasoning that
the government was not responsible for creating the poverty
which prevented these women from realizing their choices, the
Court further suggested that the government had not impinged
on their rights because AFDC mothers had the same choice they
would have had if there were no Medicaid program at all. 4 7 The
Court claimed that recognition of the right to choose does not
imply that the government must make the means available for the
48
woman to exercise the choice made.
In Selective Service System, 4 9 in which plaintiffs challenged the
requirement that college students must attest that they had registered for the draft as a condition of receiving federal educational
assistance, the Court went a step further. 50 As in the Maher and
strictions. See F. JAFFE & B. LINDHEIM, supra note 14, at 142-43. Within 19
months after the Hyde Amendment regulations became effective, the number of
publicly funded abortions fell by about 99%. Id. It was expected that if all states
adopted Hyde restrictions, government-financed abortions for the poor would
fall to fewer than 3000 per year, with approximately 80% of those being for
women whose lives were endangered by their pregnancy. Id.
46. Harris, 448 U.S. at 312-17.
47. Id. at 318. The Court analogized Harris to the decisions in Griswold v.
Connecticut and Pierce v.Society of Sisters, arguing that the government was not required to ensure that all persons have the means to obtain contraceptives or go
to private schools just because government may not prohibit the use of contraceptives or the sending of children to private schools. Id. (citing Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 518
(1925)).
48. 448 U.S. at 318. Indeed, the Court noted: "To translate the limitation
on governmental power implicit in the Due Process Clause into an affirmative
funding obligation would require Congress to subsidize the medically necessary
abortion of an indigent woman even if Congress had not enacted a Medicaid
program to subsidize other medically necessary services." Id.
49. 468 U.S. 841. For a discussion of the facts in Selective Service System, see
supra note 8.
50. 468 U.S. at 858. The Court found that § 1113 of the Defense Authorization Act of 1983, conditioning assistance on draft registration, did not violate
the fifth amendment. Id. at 859. However, most of its opinion focused on the
bill of attainder claim made by the students. Id. at 852-59. The Court held that
§ 1113 was not a bill of attainder because it did not impose a "punishment"
historically associated with bills of attainder, such as bars to employment, imprisonment, banishment, or confiscation of property. Id. at 852-53. Thus, as in
the abortion cases, the Court distinguished between an affirmative prohibition
or sanction imposed by government and the mere withdrawal of a benefit. See id.
The Court also held that the statute served nonpunitive goals of"encouraging"
students to register, and fairly distributing limited government resources to
those who were worthy because of their willingness to meet their obligation of
defending their country. Id. at 849-50. "1'he majority chose to ignore the
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Harris cases, the plaintiffs, recipients of public educational benefits, wished to exercise a fundamental right which was controversial and carried much public stigma: the privilege against selfincrimination. 5' Plaintiffs argued that by being forced to register
late for the draft or lose their school loans, they would be admitting their guilt to the crime of nontimely registration. 5 2 Moreover, the parallel with the Maher/Harris "unrelated benefits"
53
distinction was clear. In each case, a recipient of public benefits
was presented with the choice of keeping his benefits and waiving
his fundamental right, 54 or waiving the benefits and exercising the
right. 55 Moreover, in both the Maher hypothetical and in Selective
either/or choice which the statute imposed upon the student, suggesting that
students were not "compelled" to confess to a criminal act. Id. at 856-57. Thus,
according to the majority, they were not forced to waive their fundamental right
not to incriminate themselves. Id. at 857. The students were not required to
confess their untimely registration to college officials, which, if done willfully,
amounted to a felony; all they had to do was forego applying for financial aid.
Id. at 856. Nor were they required to confess to the crime of nonregistration if
they registered late with the Selective Service System. Id. at 857. According to
the majority, school forms did not require disclosure of the date the student
registered, and the individual plaintiffs had not attempted to register and determine whether the Government would grant them immunity for disclosing their
late registration. Id. The Court thus reasoned that § 1113 did not force college
students to acknowledge their late registration. Id. at 858. But see 468 U.S. at
862-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (late registration does create hazard of incrimination because, by registering late, student has "confessed" to three items of
evidence needed to prove the crime: birthdate, late registration, and knowledge
of the duty to register); see also Garrity v. NewJersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (invalidating condition requiring police officer to testify and give up privilege against
self-incrimination or be fired); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (disbarment cannot be used as penalty for invoking privilege against self-incrimina-

tion); G.

GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1448-57

(10th ed. 1980) (citing additional relevant cases).
51. 468 U.S. at 856. In Maher and Harris, plaintiffs wished to exercise their
fundamental right to decide to have an abortion. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 303;
Maher, 432 U.S. at 467.
52. 448 U.S. at 856.
53. In Maher and Harris, the public benefit was receipt of welfare payments.
See Harris, 448 U.S. at 300-01; Maher, 432 U.S. at 466. In Selective Service System,
the public benefit was educational loans and grants. See 468 U.S. at 849.
54. For the fundamental rights implicated in Maher, Harris and Selective Service System, see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
55. It is not clear that the Court in Selective Service System realized the parallel
with the abortion funding case. The Court does not specifically refer to the
Maher and Harris footnotes, citing Harris only for the proposition that the statute
must meet the "rational basis" test. Selective Service System, 468 U.S. at 859 n. 17
(citing Harris, 448 U.S. at 322-24). Yet the parallel with Maher/Harrisis clear.
See Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8. Recall that in those
footnotes, the Court claimed that if a state denied general medicaid benefits to all
women who had obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, strict scrutiny might be appropriate under either the penalty analysis or the
analysis it has applied in its previous abortion decisions. Id.
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Service System, the behavior which the government attempted to
compel 56 was wholly unrelated to the type of benefit withheld or
the purpose of the benefit. However, in Selective Service System, the
Court held that the government could force a student to incriminate himself as a condition of obtaining benefits, using many of
the same arguments found in Maher and Harris.5 7 By doing so,
the Court essentially abrogated the Maher footnote's implication
of protection against government removal of unrelated benefits
to compel waiver of a fundamental right.
Bowen also follows Maher and Harris in two important respects. First, the plurality affirms that government is not affirmatively responsible for assisting a government-dependent citizen in
exercising his or her fundamental rights, at least in the free exercise area. 5 8 Second, the plurality opinion distinguishes between
conditions on public benefits and compulsion generated by penal
sanctions. 59 Bowen is significant precisely because of the plurality's emphatic distinction between the denial of benefits and the
use of penal sanctions which affect exercise of fundamental rights.
As the plurality suggests, "government regulation that indirectly
and incidentally calls for a choice between securing a government
benefit and adherence to religious beliefs is wholly different from
governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find objectionable for religious reasons." 60 In fact, the plurality points
out that the "nature" of the burden may make a difference in the
61
government's burden of justification.
On the penalty/denial of benefits distinction, Justice
O'Connor's concurring/dissenting opinion strikes the hardest.
She argues that constitutional restraints on government must be
the same, whether the government acts to provide or withdraw
benefits, or to exact penalties. 6 2 In claiming that traditional first
56. In Maher and Harris, the government hypothetically attempted to compel the women to bear children. See Harris,448 U.S. at 317 n. 19; Maher, 432 U.S.
at 474 n.8. In Selective Service System, the government attempted to compel students to register for the draft. See Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 844.
57. See id. at 858-59; Harris, 448 U.S. at 315-17; Maher, 432 U.S. at 476-77.
58. 106 S. Ct. at 2153-54. As previously noted, only Justices Powell and
Rehnquist concurred in this part (Part III) of the Court's opinion. For a further
discussion of Bowen, see supra note 9.
59. 106 S. Ct. at 2154-55.
60. Id. at 2155.
61. Id.at 2156.
62. Id. at 2168 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice O'Connor concurred with Parts I and II of ChiefJustice Burger's opinion
but she disagreed with Part III, the plurality opinion.
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amendment heightened scrutiny should be applied to the government's justifications for the Social Security number rule,
O'Connor's opinion notes that the Constitution "places express
limits upon governmental actions limiting the freedoms of that
society's members. The rise of the welfare state is not the fall of
63
the Free Exercise Clause."
Selective Service System and Bowen suggest that Maher and Harris
are not anomalies, but rather the beginning of a new doctrinal
stance by the Court on the relationship between exercise of fundamental constitutional rights and provision of public benefits.
Indeed, it is yet difficult to tell whether the Maher/Harrisline of
cases is cut from new cloth, or whether it is a reprise to the days
prior to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 6 4 or the old
right/privilege doctrine which was repudiated by the Court in the
early 1960's. 65 Yet the doctrine potentially affects the ability of
anyone who receives public benefits to exercise his or her fundamental rights, particularly if he or she is dependent on government for livelihood or life necessities.
Adoption of the
Maher/Harrisrationale could sanction withholding of many types
of governmental benefits: medical benefits to those exercising
sexual privacy rights, educational benefits to those exercising
63. Id. at 2169 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. The Court held in the 1920's that government could not condition the
receipt of benefits, even those which were mere privileges, on the recipient's
agreement not to assert fundamental rights. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 510 (1978). Yet, the Court distinguished some public employment
positions which were considered privileges, arguing that public employees could
choose to work elsewhere if they did not like restrictions on their employment
which implicated fundamental rights. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
188 (1952); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). In later years,
however, the Court invalidated loyalty oath requirements and restrictions on organizations to which public employees could belong. See L. TRIBE, supra, at 510
(discussion of "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine). See generally J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 960-65 (2d ed. 1983) (denial of
public employment on basis of political affiliation violates first amendment).
65. The right/privilege distinction resulted in the denial of due process
protections, particularly to persons whose public benefits were not a matter of
contract or right, but instead a matter of governmental largesse. See L. TRIBE,
supra note 64, at 514-55. However, as early as 1960, the Court rejected the distinction between "earned rights" and "gratuities," even while it found that recipients had no "property right" in Social Security in the sense that deprivation
of expected benefits would violate the fifth amendment's due process clause. See
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609-10; see also Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U.S. 78 (1971) (reduction in disability benefits pursuant to provision in Social
Security Act was not violative of Constitution). The right/privilege distinction
was essentially abandoned in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), when the
Court adopted Charles Reich's notion of a public benefit which was properly the
subject of a recipient's expectation. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social 1Welfare:
The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255-56 (1965).
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political or associational rights, or welfare benefits to those exercising religious beliefs.
The Maher/Harris doctrine raises a compelling issue central
to evolving American legal and political doctrine: what responsibility does government have to ensure that its citizens are able to
exercise the rights which government has recognized as fundamental? The Maher and Harris decisions provide one answer to
this question in cases where exercise of these rights is impeded
solely because of the rights-exercisers' poverty, and where the
public has taken responsibility to provide them with financial
assistance. The Maher/Harrisanswer proceeds from traditionalist
norms, which hold that government's primary duty is not to interfere with the free action and freely acquired property of individual rights-exercisers, norms which recognize neither property
rights in government benefits nor positive rights of citizens to
compel the state to act.
II.

THE MAHER/HARRIS CONDITIONS DOCTRINE-DEFINITIONAL
AsSUMPTIONS

Is the Maher/Harrisdoctrine a viable one for adjudicating the
rights of benefit recipients against government when they exercise fundamental liberties? One can first test the doctrine by exploring its definitional assumptions. In its distinction between
punitive and withholding action by the state, 66 the Court presupposes several things, none of which may be sufficient to justify
that distinction. First, the Court assumes that the fundamental
rights which recipients would exercise are essentially libertyrights, not claim-rights. 67 That is, recipients have only the right
to choose and implement their decision free from government interference or compulsion. They may not claim that government
has the duty to assist in implementing their choice. Second, the
Court assumes that government benefits are not always "property" in all senses, perhaps based on when and how they are acquired or from whom they are acquired. 68 Third, the Court
assumes that there is an inherent difference between state "action" punishing a rights-exerciser and action withholding benefits

to prevent, or respond to his or her actions. 6 9 Finally, the Court
66. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8. For a discussion of this distinction, see supra notes 16, 21 & 55 and accompanying text.
67. See 448 U.S. at 316; 432 U.S. at 473-74.
68. See 448 U.S. at 317-18; 432 U.S. at 473-74.
69. See 448 U.S. at 317 n.19; 432 U.S. at 474 n.8. For a discussion concern-
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assumes that the Constitution does not prohibit the state's action
unless it has the legally relevant effect of placing an obstacle in the
path of exercise of rights, much as one might place an obstacle in
70
the road in front of a car.
A.

Claim Rights or Liberty Rights?

The Maher/Harrisdistinction between punishing a rights-exerciser and withholding benefits from him is clearly rooted in the
philosophical, and perhaps pragmatic, distinction between liberty
rights and positive claim-rights on the state. 7' Just as it makes
sense for the father to say to his child, "I won't stop you from
smoking, but I'm not going to pay for you to ruin your lungs," it
initially seems plausible that government should be able to
choose not to subsidize abortions even if it may not prevent them
or punish women for having them. In essence, recognition of
choice is recognition of the woman's liberty-right to abortion, her
right to act free of restraint if she is able on her own power to take
advantage of her right. By contrast, if the woman has a positive
claim-right, then the government has a duty to assist her in exercising that right.
When considering rights whose exercise depends on one's
ing this "difference," see supra notes 16, 21 & 55 and accompanying text. This is
the state's side of the liberty right/claim right question.
70. See 448 U.S. at 316; 432 U.S. at 474.
71. There is a theoretical distinction between negative and positive rights,
and liberty and claim-rights, although it is not clear that this distinction makes a
difference in the government benefit cases. Wesley Hohfeld, an American legal
theorist, distinguished between claim-rights, which he defined as rights which
carry a duty in someone else to do or refrain from doing something, and libertyrights, which give one the "right" to do what he wishes, but do not impose a
duty on someone else to aid one in the exercise of that right. See BECKER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, in AND JUSTICE FOR ALL, 201-20 (T. Regan, D. Van DeVeer ed.
1982). Negative rights are claim-rights to which duties of noninterference or
restraint from action attach, positive rights are those to which duties of affirmative action attach. Id. at 202. Therefore, it is perhaps most accurate to suggest
that the right to have an abortion is a negative claim-right, in that government
has a legal duty not to interfere with one's action in deciding to abort and implementing that decision. It is not a positive claim-right because one has no right
to state affirmative action in implementing that decision, according to Maher and
Harris. See 448 U.S. at 316-18; 432 U.S. at 473-74. However, at least one commentator argues that the right to have an abortion is actually a liberty-right, as
no one, including the government, has a duty on the other side. See BECKER,
supra, at 201-02; see also Childress, Negative and Positive Rights, 10 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 19 (Feb. 1980); STICH, The Many Rights to Health and Health Care,
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN MODERN MEDICINE 15-30 (Series on Ethics, Humanism, and Medicine No. 2, 1981) (discussing whether the right to health care
is a liberty or claim-right). This article generally uses the term "liberty right" to
include negative claim-rights types of rights. For a cogent criticism of the dichotomy, see Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1392-94 (1984).
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having the means to exercise them (e.g., to obtain a safe abortion)
as opposed to those rights which a person in her "natural" state
can exercise, (e.g., to speak), it is not clear that American jurisprudence would recognize these former "dependent" rights as
strong liberty-rights rather than strong positive claim-rights.
Before this article deals with how definition of terms suggest the
Court's position on the rights at issue in the Maher/Harris doc-

trine, it attempts to illustrate this ambiguity in the following
discussion.
Proponents of a positive, fundamental claim-right would argue that government must act to ensure that people may exercise
their fundamental rights in the ways they choose, even if cost is
involved. In the strongest version of this claim-right, government
would have the duty to fund a trip for a welfare mother who wants
to exercise her constitutional right to association by attending a
welfare rights convention in Acapulco. Government could also
be called on to finance a pilgrimage to the Holy Land or to Mecca
for a poor person whose religion calls for such a ritual; or asked
to provide printing presses for one who wishes but can't afford to
exercise his right to freedom of the press; or even called on to pay
for postage for the grievant who wants to petition the government
for redress.
While requiring the state to provide significant financial
assistance to ensure that these rights can be exercised may seem
uncontrollable, 72 it is far from clear that we never impose duties
72. Perhaps the most common argument leveled against any positive claimrights (hereafter, claim-rights) against the state, particularly when they involve
government duties to provide financial assistance, is that there is simply no way
to measure the extent of those rights. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified,

413 U.S. 756 (1973) (challenge to New York statute relating to aid to public
schools). However, many have argued that a claim right such as the right to the
means to life is susceptible even to scientific measurement. See, e.g., A. SEN. POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION 24-38 (1981)
(arguing that poverty and the right to the means of life may be defined by the
minimum needs which are necessary to prevent starvation). Moreover, through
its poverty guidelines, the federal government has regularly come up with means
of measuring the relative level of need in the United States. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R.

§ 1060.2-2 (1984) (Community Services Administration poverty guidelines).
While many claim-rights involving affirmative action by the state may be difficult
to measure, this claim-right is not. Nor need a claim-right to subsistence necessarily implicate issues of equality, even if inequalities are perpetuated under the
guise of enabling us to meet such demands for subsistence. Cf Los, The Concept
ofJustice and Welfare Rights, 1982J. OF Soc. WELFARE L. 4 (discussing theories of
"justice" and "equality" in social welfare context); see also ROSEN, Basic Needs and
Justice, MIND 88, 88-94 (Jan. 1977) (right to basic needs not right to increasing
standard of need).
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of assistance on government for rights-exercisers. For instance,
one can make a good case for requiring government to provide
minimal police protection which would enable a religious sect to
evangelize door to door, or allow peace protestors to march on
the capitol without bodily abuse. Given the relatively small cost
of enabling the exercise of such rights, the importance of the
right, and the probability that expenditure would allow the recipient to exercise a fundamental right he would not otherwise be
able to exercise, it is not implausible for a legislature, or even a
court, to require positive state action. For example, if it cost the
government only $100 to ensure that everyone who wished to
vote and needed transportation was able to go to the polls, few
would be willing on principled grounds to suggest that government had no obligation to provide transportation. Yet, this is
very much the case which appeared in abortion funding for the
poor: the state's total financial expenditures for abortion were
minimal in comparison to the asserted importance of the abortion
right to poor women, and in consideration of the likelihood that
the availability of government funding would determine whether
most poor women could exercise that right.
A staunch liberty-right proponent would conversely argue
that government has no obligation whatsoever to act in a way that
makes possible a person's ability to exercise her fundamental
rights. The consequence of the extreme liberty-right position is
clear: if we do not posit some obligation on government to act so
that exercise of one's right is at least possible, those rights are
illusory. We cannot imagine, much less condone, a democratic
government taking no steps to prevent, for example, lynch mobs
from waylaying citizens' groups on their way to Washington to
present their grievances; or sheriffs from jailing blacks who belong to the NAACP; or violence to itinerant Jehovah's Witnesses;
or doctors from performing forced abortions. We would expect
government to act responsively to safeguard such constitutionally
protected activities at least by giving us a private, civil cause of
action against the wrongdoers. Similarly, it is difficult to think of
a democratic government refusing to maintain courts; requiring
civil or criminal litigants to fund their own judges; pay for an enforcer to compel attendance of witnesses; and barter for the time
of witnesses and jurors so the defendant could exercise his right
of cross-examination, as these rights are protected by the fifth and
sixth amendments.
In the government benefits context, the liberty-right position
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apparently presumes that only those rights which inhere in one's
humanness can be "fundamental." This position would suggest
that a fundamental right must not only be important to one's
daily life, but it must also be a right which a human being is naturally capable of exercising on her own unless she is prevented
from doing so. For example, the right to speak or to procreate
would clearly be fundamental. By this definition, a state does not
disparage fundamental rights unless it actively interferes with the
"natural," non-supported actions of human beings. Therefore,
under this theory, denial of a fundamental right by failure to financially empower a person to exercise it is a non-sequitur.
Such a position is belied by our law and experience. Many
rights considered "fundamental" in American jurisprudence cannot be exercised by people alone in a "state of nature" because
they require a community of cooperation, 7 3 or that money be
spent.7 4 Moreover, many fundamental criminal rights (speedy
trial, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process, and assistance of counsel) require affirmative government expenditure to
make them available at all. Thus, it is not clear that the libertyright position, however philosophically appealing, can be squared
with the jurisprudence of fundamental constitutional rights.
If all fundamental rights are not "state-of-nature" rights, it is
not clear why the fundamental rights involved in public benefit
cases, such as the right of privacy in abortion cases, must be
judged by whether a "natural" act is interrupted rather than
whether a valued act is not supported by the state. Furthermore,
if fundamental rights are defined as those rights important to
one's ability to be fully human, then, logically, government
should be required to remove, rather than simply refrain from
placing, obstacles in the path of exercise of these rights. To do
otherwise would be to impede the individual's path to full human
development.
It seems most plausible to say that our jurisprudence recognizes some need to require governmental response to preserve
fundamental rights which are neither pure liberty nor pure positive claim rights. Apparently, government has some affirmative
responsibility to provide both tangible and intangible benefits to
enable its citizens to exercise such rights. But under current no73. For example, the right of association requires that there be others with
whom to associate.
74. For example, the right of interstate travel would require expenditure of

funds.
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tions of rights theory, government may delineate what rights will
be protected and what benefits may be provided. It may even require citizens to do or refrain from doing certain things in exchange for such benefits. In this intermediate position, however,
rights theorists must concern themselves with the impact of benefit conditions upon citizens' ability to exercise those freedoms
which comprise the quid pro quo for their compact with organized
society: freedom to raise a family, pursue a calling, to organize,
and to speak and think. The concern about benefit conditions is
not only for those individuals directly affected, but also for the
continued viability of the state itself, which depends on the initiative, imagination and support of its citizens.
How such concern can engender legal rules for judging benefit conditions is, however, a problem. One view would prohibit
government action which has the effect of significantly influencing
the citizen's decision whether and how to exercise these most crucial rights. That position, espoused by abortion funding advocates, makes no distinction between punitive state action, such as
jailing or capital punishment, and rewarding action, such as payment of money. It is only concerned with whether citizens can
make free choices and implement those choices as they desire. In
another view, adopted by the Supreme Court in the abortion
funding cases, the form of government action, the form of the
benefit conferred, and the initial position of the potential rightsexerciser all determine whether government has acted unconstitutionally. 7 5 The Maher/Harris conditions doctrine further posits
that, except in extreme cases, the impact'of government action on
the actual ability of the citizen to exercise her rights is not rele76
vant in testing the legality of the action.
In testing the validity of the Maher/Harrisview, some definitional presuppositions must be acknowledged. First, the Court
presumes that the penalty/withholding distinction encompasses
public benefits but not personal property, without clearly distinguishing between the two. 77 Second, the Court presumes that
there is, in the abortion cases, a real difference between penalizing a citizen and withholding a benefit from him, even though the
basis for that presumption is unclear. 78 After exploring these def75. See Harris, 448 U.S. 297; Alaher, 432 U.S. 464; Beal, 432 U.S. 438. For a
discussion of these cases, see supra notes 25-48 and accompanying text.
76. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 314-15, Aaher, 432 U.S. at 474.
77. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-17; Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74.
78. See Harris. 448 U.S. at 317 n.19: Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8. For a dis-
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initional premises, the article will discuss the bases for conditioning benefits, and what valid purposes might legitimize such
conditions.
B.

Is a Government Benefit Really Property?

The Maher/Harrisdoctrine and its predecessors have usually
been applied in cases involving monetary or in-kind transfers
from the government treasury to individual citizens or their service providers. Thus, welfare and Medicaid are considered "benefits" in the sense that tangible property is being conveyed from a
donor to a donee. It is not clear why we should think of a benefit
in this way, since the word suggests merely that the recipient derives some value, use or advantage from it.
To take a crucial example, why isn't a person's private "property" a government benefit? Many have suggested that property
is merely a form of benefit bestowed by government since the
government provides protection for the property-holder against
theft or intrusion by others, and protection for the holder's dominion, control and use of such property.7 9 If the government
will protect the use of a privately owned car as against any other
attempted user, why isn't that government-conferred benefit subject to the Maher/Harris doctrine? That is, Maher/Harris would
seem to justify the government's withholding of protection for
private property, when the owner speaks against politicians in office or when she has an abortion, if the government wishes to discourage exercise of those rights. Would the Court find
government's withholding of police protection unobjectionable if
a mob of Pro-life activists forcibly took a privately owned car because of the owner's political positions? If not, why should the
government be able to withhold welfare benefits because a woman exercises her right to have an abortion?
The natural law objection to viewing "private property" as a
"government benefit" seems unpersuasive. An advocate of natural law might argue that "private property" is not conferred by
government as a benefit because it is not created by government,
but rather, is a God-given due, or a natural reward, because its
owner has mixed her labor with it, or has discovered it, or has
cussion of the Maher and Harris Courts' views on this subject, see supra notes 3739 & 46-98 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., M. COHEN, Property and Sovereignty, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER:
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 45-47 (1982).
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asserted her will over it.80 Excluding Divine intervention, however, these theories simply limit the kinds of property that might
be considered "private". Under the labor theory, an auto worker
may have "property" in the car he makes but not in his paycheck,
except as a sort of exchange of goods. Similarly, most real property, not the subject of discovery, assertion of will, or labor, loses
this "natural law" protection and becomes simply another form of
public benefit. While one might include the right to dispose of
property as a natural law right, thus accounting for ownership of
land by inheritance or gift, 8 ' such a theory cannot adequately account for all of the law-sanctioned acquisitions of private property
which our legal system recognizes today.
Even if the argument that there is no difference between
one's "private property" (home, car, bank account) and one's
"public property" (welfare, Medicaid, social services) seems intuitively wrong, it is still unclear why anything which benefits an individual because of government action or even inaction is not to
be treated as a public benefit, subject to Maher/Harrisrules. For
instance, if the free market is the "natural" way of accumulating
property, then manufacturers who benefit from tariffs and import
quotas and homeowners who receive low-interest governmentbacked mortgage loans must admit that these benefits can be
withheld to discourage them from exercising fundamental rights.
Indeed, both consumers who receive better products for their
money because government regulates food production and drug
manufacture, and financiers who aren't swindled in the sale of securities because of government regulation, must be the recipients
of the same government largesse and should logically be subject
to the same rules as the Medicaid recipient. In each of these
cases, the public treasury pays a price to put its citizens in a better
position than they would have "naturally" been in without it, even
if that price is only the cost of its own bureaucracy.
Finally, even if a "benefit" is defined in the most narrow way,
as a transfer of cash or immediate in-kind benefit directly from
government to an individual, it is far from clear that indigent benefit-holders will be treated equally with other benefit-holders
under Maher and Harris, even if theoretically, they should be. If
the doctrine is applied consistently, government should be
80. For a concise discussion of this concept, see R. CUNNINGHAM, W.
D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 1-3 (1984).
81. For a discussion of ways in which inherited or gift property may bejustified under natural law theories, see R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
150-82 (1974).
STOEBUCH AND

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 3

858

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3 1: p. 833

equally guilty or innocent if it withdraws a welfare check, a PIC
subsidy, a solar energy credit, or an oil lease from an individual
because she has attempted to exercise her right to free speech or
to obtain an abortion. Yet, it is not clear that the Court will apply
the doctrine with a neutral hand. The Court has generally treated
supposedly "earned" or middle class benefits such as Social Security and unemployment benefits similarly to welfare benefits for
purposes of some protections, such as due process.8 2 Yet, conditions imposed in benefit programs thought to be "earned," even
if they are not, have often been seen as very different from those
in programs thought to be "charity." 8 3 What would be the
Court's response if the federal government withdrew a PIC subsidy so that a recipient could not afford to attend the Scientology
church meeting, or withdrew veteran's benefits in order to prevent a Vietnam veteran from organizing friends to file an Agent
Orange suit?
If private property, like welfare, is a public benefit, then perhaps the Court would make some other distinction between property acquired from government and that acquired from private
parties to justify the Maher/Harris doctrine. 4 However, that
would seriously depart from modern precedent. Beginning with
Goldberg v. Kelly, s5 the Court has recognized certain governmentprovided benefits, such as welfare benefits, as a species of property, commonly referred to as entitlements.8 6 At least for proce82. In fact, sometimes recipients of these so-called "earned benefits" have
not received as much due process protection because their benefits are not
thought to be necessities. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(AFDC benefits) and White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (welfare
benefits) with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (social security disability
decisions) and Rastetter v. Weinberger, 379 F. Supp. 170, 175 (D. Ariz. 1974)
(Medicare reimbursement), aff'd, 419 U.S. 1098 (1975).
83. See, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 96 n.10 (1971) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (worker who is forced to pay social security tax on earnings has
contract interest in benefits); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 622-23 (1960)
(BlackJ., dissenting) (right to social security benefits is "earned" in some sense
even though not a property right).
84. As Professor Appleton notes, the plaintiffs in Haris were being deprived of something which was theirs-not property, but their health-a deprivation which should be considered sufficiently grave to constitute a penalty. See
Appleton, supra note 41, at 733. Professor Appleton believes the Maher plaintiffs
paid other prices but that the "negative right/positive right model" resolves the
"health-penalty" problem. Id. at 737.
85. 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
86. See Reich, supra note 45, in which this terminology was popularized.
Significantly, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Bowen reiterates the entitlement
concept in rejecting the penalty/conditions distinction. See 106 S.Ct. at 216468.
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dural due process purposes, the Court has refused to provide
different levels of protection for entitlements and privately acquired property. Congress has similarly recognized the property
nature of such benefits by creating open-ended budgets for such
programs,8 7 and by requiring that states pay benefits to all persons who are financially and categorically eligible, regardless of
88

the cost.

Alternatively, the Court may not be distinguishing government benefits from property on the basis of their sources, but
only distinguishing among different kinds of government benefits, some "earned" and others "unearned." This theory would
suggest that those legitimately claiming that they expended effort
for their benefits or provided consideration of some sort in performance of a "benefit contract" made with government8 9 remain
entitled to argue that government is punishing them if it withholds their benefits when they exercise fundamental rights. By
contrast, those who receive mere "charity" benefits without consideration are not being punished if the government withholds
benefits for exercise of rights. Such a doctrine would have serious implications. First, insofar as property is necessary to provide
security to the individual, this doctrine would abrogate such security for most government benefit recipients. Since most bene87. See, e.g.,
Needy Families with Children Aid and Services Acts (AFDC),
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982), Medicare and Medicaid Amendments of 1980 (Medicaid), 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a) (1982). A recent threat to erosion of the openended entitlements was the conservative attempt in 1977 to "cap" the Food
Stamp program to curb excessive costs. See S. REP. No. 236, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 939, 941-43. However,
the more common method of reducing welfare expenditures without abrogating
entitlement is to alter eligibility requirements, as President Reagan succeeded in
doing with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. See Act of Aug. 13,
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012-2029 (1982
& Supp. 1986)). Projected savings in food stamps due to these changes were $6
billion over 3 years and $3.25 billion in AFDC in over five years. See K. AULETrA,
THE UNDERCLASS

283-84 (1983).

88. See 42 U.S.C. § 602a(10)(A) (1982) (state plan must provide all individuals with opportunity to apply for aid to families with dependent children); 45
C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1) (1984) (state may specify groups that will be included in
program); id. § 233.10(B)(1) (1984) (compliance with state plan provisions is
prerequisite to federal financial participation).
89. If indeed the state has contracted with a citizen, the Contract Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 10, cl. 1, may provide somewhat greater protection for that
United
person, at least as to later modifications of her right to benefits. See, e.g.,
States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1977) (repeal of NewJersey
and New York joint convenant limiting the ability of Port Authority of those
states to subsidize rail passenger transportation from revenues and reserves held
unconstitutional under Contract Clause when neither necessary nor reasonable
under circumstances).
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fits are not technically "earned," these recipients would be unable
to plan use of such benefits even for basic necessities, causing potential economic chaos for them and those who meet their needs.
Moreover, as the Social Security cases dramatically point out, the
problem ofjudicially defining appropriate "consideration" or distinguishing between "earned" and "unearned" benefit programs
is a thorny one.9 0 How does one apply the "earned-unearned"
distinction to a subsidy program that pays farmers not to plant
certain crops as against a welfare program which requires recipients to work off assistance? Third, even if benefits are otherwise
like private property, the Court's Maher/Harris test may presume
that there is some difference between government's action in taking away one's already acquired property and refusing to extend
previously promised property to one who does not control or
possess it.91 The former is apparently impermissible; the latter is
not.
Yet, the Court makes no mention of any basis on which it
could decide that some property is already acquired and belongs
to an individual, as opposed to something which he or she does
not yet possess, own or control. A Medicaid recipient may legitimately argue that he was given a property right in Medicaid benefits when eligibility was determined. Although that right is
subject to his continuing financial and medical eligibility for the
program, it does not become his property at the moment medical
services are rendered. Like a contract right or a bank account, the
right given was the right of payment for medical expenses whenever appropriate, subject only to the condition that the right be
exercised to obtain medically necessary services, just as the contract right is given subject only to its terms. If the state may later
revoke a "part" of that intangible right because it will be used for
constitutionally protected purposes of which the government
does not approve, then, logically, the government may confiscate
"part" of an individual's bank account to prevent it from being
used to finance a libertarian candidate, a trip to Washington, or
even an abortion. A fourth option is to suggest that the Court is
looking at the type of benefit at a different level of generality than
90. See, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (expectation of public benefits does not confer contractual right to receive expected amounts);
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (defeasance of "accrued" interests not
necessarily violative of due process clause); Bernstein v. Ribicoff, 299 F.2d 248
(3d Cir.) (person who established eligibility for benefits had no vested property
rights which could be impaired), cerl. denied, 369 U.S. 887 (1962).
91. See .1aher,432 U.S. at 472-74.
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those who claim they are being penalized for the exercise of their
rights. The welfare mother who cannot obtain an abortion after
Maher and Harris would argue that government has taken away
"part" of her Medicaid right, just as the libertarian saver would
argue that the government took away "part" of his bank account.
The easy answer to the welfare mother is that Medicaid is different in kind from a reduction in a bank account because Medicaid
is a bundle of services, each discrete. Government has not taken
away "part" of the mother's Medicaid right, but only refused to
extend to her the right of payment for abortions while continuing
to provide her with a right to payment for hospital care, a right to
payment for nursing assistance, a right to receive dental services,
etc. Since the state can initially refuse to provide such a service
for any reason unrelated to the exercise of her rights, the welfare
mother has not lost anything if the state refuses to provide that
92
service in order to prevent the exercise of those rights.
Admittedly, Medicaid itself is structured so that states, with
federal money, provide a discrete number of services to indigents,
some of which can be given and taken away prospectively at the
state's discretion. 93 Thus, there is some difference between reduction of a bank account by X dollars and discontinuation of a
discrete Medicaid service. Yet, three problems with this argument remain. First, not all government welfare programs are broken down into such separate services: AFDC and Food Stamps,
for example, are lump sum benefits paid monthly and therefore
could not be refused on this basis. 94 Second, the overriding pol92. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-18; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
93. For a list of mandatory and optional services provided by states, see 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1982). For lists of mandatory and optional groups covered by Medicaid, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(l)-(18).
94. While this argument might be used to justify denial of benefits for future months as discrete benefits, both programs are apparently c6nstructed
under the assumption that applicants remain eligible until their situation
changes. For instance, applicants need not file separate monthly applications,
but must report changes affecting their eligibility for continued receipt of benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(14)(A) (1982 & Supp. 1986). This statute provides:
(a) Contents
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children
must ...

:

(14) with respect to families; in the categories of recent work history or
earned income cases (and at the option of the State with respect to
families, other categories) provide that (A) the State agency will require
each family to which it furnishes aid to families with dependent children
(or to which it would provide such aid but for paragraph (22) or (32)) to
report, as a condition to the continued receipt of such aid (or to continuing to be deemed to be a recipient of such aid), each month to the
State agency on-
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icy of the Medicaid program is that, within any single category of
services (e.g., nursing home care), the physician's judgment that
particular forms of treatment are medically necessary is essentially inviolate. 9 5 It is true that states are increasingly able to intrude into that process. 96 Yet, within each category of medical
assistance, such as nursing home services, the paramount and, ostensibly, exclusive criterion for review is whether given the alternatives, the treatment is medically necessary. Third, abortion
procedures fall within the discrete category of physician's services, which are not only highly protected from state review, but
are also mandatory services for state Medicaid programs. 97 Unlike opthalmological, prosthetic, or home health care services, the
state must provide these services as the indigent recipient needs
them. 9 8 Thus, prohibiting physicians from being paid for performing abortions is not the same as eliminating a type of service,
but instead is more analogous to telling physicians they will not
be paid if they prescribe Treatment A rather than Treatment B
for some disease.
Moreover, the "level of generality" argument will not explain
(i) the income received, family composition, and other relevant
circumstances during the prior month; and
(ii) the income and resources it expects to receive, or any changes
in circumstances affecting continued eligibility or benefit amount, that
it expects to occur, in that month (or in future months);
except that (with the prior approval of the Secretary in recent work history and earned income cases) the State may select categories of recipients who may report at specified less frequent intervals upon a
determination that to require individuals in such categories to report
monthly would result in unwarranted expenditures for administration
of this paragraph....
Id.
95. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(13)(B); 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1982).
96. For example, the requirement of prior approval gives the agency some
veto power over a doctor's services. Prior approval is normally used with optional services, e.g., dentures, wheelchairs, eyeglasses, cosmetic surgery, or expensive treatment modalities. It is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)
(1982). Some courts have also sanctioned limits on determination of medical
necessity so long as they are reasonable and defined. See, e.g., Rush v. Parham,
625 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (5th Cir. 1980) (physician required to operate within
such reasonable limitations as state may impose); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp.
1326, 1330-31 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (state medical plan required to provide to "eligible persons" certain services as minimum). Conditions must also be nondiscriminatory. Curtis v. Taylor, 625 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.) (state may not
discriminate on basis of kind of medical condition occasioning medical necessity), modified on oiher grounds, 648 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980). Rush v. Parham, it
should be noted, still puts the primary duty of choice on the physician. See 625
F.2d at 1156.
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a)(l)-(5) (1982).
98. Id.
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the Court's decision in Selective Service System, 9 9 which is not analogous in that way to the abortion payment cases. In Selective Service
System, the government did not withhold educational benefits
solely because they were going to be used for purposes contrary
to federal policy.10 0 Nor could government argue that it had only
withheld part of, or even a separate type, of educational benefit. If
it is impermissible for government to take away one's already-acquired property in response to his exercise of a fundamental
right, then Selective Service System must be explained in one of four
ways. The first three have been previously suggested: either the
educational benefits which plaintiffs sought were not "property"
because they were not earned or not received from private
sources; or arguably, because these benefits were not yet acquired, as they were not yet "received" or controlled by the students. One might also argue that plaintiff students had no
property right because they had not yet been declared eligible for
benefits through the application process. This latter option does
not seem helpful. As Maher and Harrissuggest, it is not simply the
determination of eligibility which creates an entitlement.' 0 ' The
Maher and Harris plaintiffs were both financially and categorically
eligible for benefits, and they had been determined eligible by the
welfare department and even by the physician whose responsibility it was to determine "medical necessity." 1 0 2 Yet, their property
rights were not recognized.
The Maher/Harris doctrine suggests that the Court may be
abandoning the concept of entitlements and reviving the
right/privilege distinction rejected in Flemming v. Nestor10 3 and
throughout the Court's welfare benefit cases. That is, the Court
may be suggesting in Maher and Harristhat when government creates expectations that a citizen will have the use of public funds
for a stated purpose because he meets certain eligibility guidelines, those expectations create no property right, or at best, a
revocable right. That would be an ultra-positivist view of property, one which suggests that federal or state statutory law at the
99. 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
100. See id. at 842. For a discussion of Selective Service System, see supra notes
8, 10, 49 & 50-57 and accompanying text.

101. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-18; Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74.
102. Harris, 448 U.S. at 304; Maher, 432 U.S. at 467.
103. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). In Flemming, the social security benefits of an
alien who was deported for having been a member of the Communist Party were
terminated pursuant to a provision of the Act. Id. at 605-06. The Court refused
to characterize those benefits as accrued property rights and held that termination of those benefits under the Act did not offend due process. Id. at 608.
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time one makes a property claim controls whether the benefit is
property without regard to even implicit understandings, orjusti04
fied reliance on created expectations.
C.

Punishment vs. Withholding Benefits: Viewing Government Action

Assuming the Court has not changed its definition of benefits
as property, can the Maher/Harris conditions doctrine rest solely
on a distinction between punitive action and withholding action
by government? To test this hypothesis, it is helpful to stand
Maher and Harris on their heads. Imagine that "Bob" and "Ann"
decide to exercise their constitutionally protected right to bear
children. If Ann conceives, they will bear their third child, contrary to legislative policy against increased population as represented in programs educating people regarding birth control.
Government can take a number of actions to respond to this
decision:
a) it can take away their liberty by putting them in jail;
b) it can impose a financial disincentive, such as a fine or tax
which comes directly from already-acquired property (excluding
government benefits here);
c) it can impose a physically intrusive disincentive, such as flogging; a stigmatic penalty, such as publishing their names with derogatory remarks in the newspaper; or an indirect disincentive
which has a significant effect on their decision, such as blacklisting
them from government-related employment, requesting that people not sell homes to them, discouraging their children's school
teachers from giving them attention, etc.;
d) if they are poor, it can provide a "poverty disincentive" in the
104. The positivist view of property was suggested in Board of Regents v.
Roth, in which a non-tenured teacher whose contract was not renewed was
found not to have a property interest in continued employment. See 408 U.S.
564, 578 (1972). But even Roth did not go so far as to argue that only explicit
statutory language could create a property right; and, in another case which was
handed down the same day, the Court reiterated that property rights could arise
from mere rules or mutual understandings. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593, 601 (1972) (citing Roth at 577). However, the positivist approach survives
injustice Rehnquist's discussions concerning how due process should be determined when the property right is created by government. See Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974). justice Rehnquist argues that the state may dictate due
process protection for any property which it confers. As he puts it, the litigant
must "take the bitter with the sweet." 416 U.S. at 154-55. Recently, a majority
of the Court rejected this approach. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532 (1985). But see Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2164-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting part) ("government must accommodate a legitimate
free exercise claim unless pursuing an especially important interest by narrowly
tailored means").
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form of no payment for childbirth expenses for Ann or her baby
should she choose to have it; or a financial disincentive, such as
withholding all welfare benefits;
e) it can "reward" them by providing a direct financial incentive
to not procreate, such as a tax break, a direct monetary payment,
or some in-kind services; or, it can provide incentives, such as encouraging their employers to give them a better job;
f) finally, it can provide a combination of incentives and disincentives, such as no medical care for Ann or her baby if she
chooses to have it; but all medical care for her, including contraception and abortions, if she chooses not to have it ...that is, the
05
Maher footnote in reverse.1
The Maher/Harrisdoctrine suggests that jailing Ann and Bob,
imposing a direct financial disincentive such as a tax, or the nonfinancial direct disincentives listed in (c) above would clearly be
unconstitutional. 10 6 Moreover, each of the Justices in Maher and
Harris would apparently allow the state to provide a financial incentive to Ann and Bob for giving up their right to procreate
since the state may legitimately encourage "an alternative activity
consonant with legislative policy."' 0 7 So long as the financial incentive does not harm those who opted against it, either in theoretical or in real terms, both the majority and the dissent in Maher
and Harris would appear to be in agreement thus far.10s The options which are troublesome are imposition of the "poverty financial disincentive," such as the refusal to extend benefits or the
withdrawal of benefits necessary for the safe exercise of that right
of choice, or, a combination of poverty disincentives with incentives for those who make the opposite choice. These are the options which as Justice Brennan put it, "make ...an offer that the
105. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8. For a discussion of the Maher footnote, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
106. See 448 U.S. at 316-17 & 317 n.19; 432 U.S. at 474 & 474 n.8. This is
so because such actions would influence the procreation decision through the
imposition of obstacles that were not in existence prior to regulation. See id.
107. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 315 (citing Maher, 432 U.S. at 475-76).
"[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation.
Indigency falls in the latter category." Harris, 448 U.S. at 316. As in the abortion funding cases, the Supreme Court would no doubt consider constitutional
the state's provision of a financial incentive to give up the right to procreate
since such financial constraints are the product not of government restriction on
access to procreation, but rather of the parents' indigency.
108. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 315-18; id. at 329-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 337-48 (Marshall,J., dissenting); id. at 348-49 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); id.
at 349-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-76; id. at 482-90
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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indigent woman cannot afford to refuse."' 0 9 Yet these are options
which the majority characterizes not as "direct state interference
with a protected activity" but as "state encouragement of an alternative activity."' I1
What distinguishes the poverty disincentive/incentive choice
from other impermissible state choices? Four interrelated claims
are made at this point. First, the government's choice to withdraw a benefit, or even its refusal not to grant a benefit in the first
place, is not the equivalent of action and therefore cannot be
judged in the way we judge moral acts. This argument assumes
that there is no real difference between government's failure to
extend benefits where no such benefits are sought, its choice to
deny benefits where they are sought, and its choice to eliminate
already extended benefits. Second, even if the government's
choice is an "action," it is not blameworthy because it does not
have the requisite effect: there is no abstract effect on exercise,
the action does not make the rights-exerciser "worse off" than
before, it is not the same kind of effect as a criminal penalty, or it
occurs before, rather than after, the exercise has occurred. A variation on this theme is the Court's "obstacle" test. This test allows state withdrawals which do not create an obstacle to exercise
since they do not result in the inability to exercise the rights."'
Finally, one might argue that the state's decision is not blameworthy simply because there was no affirmative state duty to act in the
first place. Thus, removal of a previously granted gratuity is the
moral equivalent of nonaction.
1. Is Withholding Benefits Non-Action?
Without explicitly so arguing, the Maher/Harriscases appeal
to the fundamental distinction between legal and moral responsi109. Harris, 448 U.S. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
noted:
It matters not that in this instance the Government has used the carrot
rather than the stick. What is critical is the realization that as a practical
matter, many poverty-stricken women will choose to carry their pregnancy to term simply because the Government provides funds for the
associated medical services, even though these same women would
have chosen to have an abortion if the Government had also paid for
that option, or indeed if the Government had stayed out of the picture
altogether and had defrayed the costs of neither procedure.
Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 315.
111. See id. at 312-17; 432 U.S. at 474. This is so because their impact upon
the exercise of rights is indirect. There are other alternatives available to ensure
exercise or there is lack of intent to affect exercise.
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bility for one's action and one's failure to act. The difference between imposing a penalty and withholding a benefit may be
analogous to the difference in responsibility we ascribe to the person who affirmatively acts or gets involved in a situation, versus
the responsibility of the passive person who sits on the sidelines
and awaits an outcome. Legal examples abound: absent statutes,
those who sit and watch another drowning," 2 or fail to aid a
stranger who is bleeding to death," 3 or doctors who do not answer the call of one who is dying and might be saved are not held
legally responsible," 4 while those who assist but do so negligently are subject to liability. 155 Restaurants or shops are not required to open their doors to the general public, but once they do
so, they are responsible for nondiscriminatory treatment of their
customers.' 16 Those who abuse family members are generally
treated much more harshly than those who neglect their children
or spouses. Although government is not obligated to provide
certain benefits, if it affirmatively acts to do so, it takes on clear
responsibilities, such as fairness and equal treatment in the administration of those benefits."t 7 In the abortion funding cases
112. See, e.g., Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928) (failure of
dependent to respond to deceased's outcries immaterial); Yania v. Bigan, 397
Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959) (defendant under no legal obligation to rescue
person in peril).
113. See, e.g., Allen v. Hixson, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810 (1900) (no liability
imposed for failure to perform act of humanity); Riley v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 160
S.W. 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (railroad under no legal obligation to call physician for trespasser injured on train). But see MINN. STAT. § 604.05 (1984) (imposing duty to go to aid of imperiled person).
114. See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901)
(physician not liable for refusing to respond to call, even if no other physician is
available); Randolph's Adm'r v. Snyder, 139 Ky. 112, 159 S.W. 562 (1910) (physician not liable in tort for refusing to visit when sent for, even though contract
existed between physician and plaintiff).
115. See, e.g., Lejuene Road Hospital v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. App.
1965) (once hospital admits patient, it must not unreasonably discharge patient
against his will); Nelson v. Schultz, 170 Misc. 681, 11 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Sup. Ct.
1939) (property owner who undertakes removal of snow and ice must do so in
reasonable and prudent manner); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 at
139 (1965) (one who takes charge of another must act reasonably and not leave
injured person in worse position than when actor took charge).
116. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(e) (1982) (prohibiting discrimination or
segregation in places of public accommodation); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298,
301 (1969) (Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination at places
of public accommodation whose operations affect commerce).
117. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404-06 (unemployment compensation);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (tax exemption); Westberry v.
Fisher, 297 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (D. Me. 1969) (aid to families with dependent
children); L. TRIBE, supra note 64, at 1006-07, 1102 (discussing equal voting
opportunity and equal access to state court review).
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then, the decision by government not to provide funding benefits
is equivalent to non-action or a passive decision, which does not
make government responsible for the consequences of the
decision.
But such an analysis is problematical. First, what government has done in the Maher and Harris cases can scarcely be
termed "non-action" in any scientific or practical sense of that
word. Even if Maher and Harris are thought of as cases where the
state refused to extend a previously nonexistent benefit, government has not, like the man on the bank watching a child drown,
made a choice for passivity. Government has acted in the sense
that it has made a decision, a process which involves collective discussion, introduction of bills, lobbying, deliberation and voting.
Since "property" rights stand or fall on this process, it is facile to
argue that the state has not acted.
In addition, as in the abortion situation, if a woman has already been extended a "right" to medical care by the government
with no significant limitations on that care, withdrawal of such
services by the political process, even to a limited extent, does not
constitute non-action. For example, if a city reduces its fire prevention budget, or a state repeals its day care services program, it
cannot be said that government has not acted. Could a state in
that situation say to the recipients of such services, "the government did not really act toward you because it only withdrew a
benefit, your fire protection, but left you police, sanitation, and
highway services?" Could it say, "even though we took away your
day care, we did not act because we left you mental health counseling and handyman services which you did not have in the beginning?" Or if a state provided a worker with $100 per week in
unemployment benefits to be used at his discretion so long as he
met all the conditions to qualify for unemployment insurance,
and then cut that amount back to $50 per week without changing
the underlying eligibility conditions, can the state argue that the
cutback is equivalent to non-action that eliminates state
responsibility?
Yet, that is precisely what is at stake in Harris.' 18 It is clear
that, prior to the Hyde Amendment, women who sought abortions for medically necessary reasons were theoretically eligible
118. In Harris, the legislation abrogated a right to certain medically necessary physician's services which had been an integral part of the Medicaid program. In Maher, one could argue that the abortions sought were not covered by
Medicaid in the first place since they were, by definition, non-therapeutic and
hence not medically necessary.
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under the federal statute.' '9 Between Roe v. Wade 120 and Maher,
most state Medicaid programs routinely covered abortion. 12'
Though some states refused to pay for "medically necessary"
abortions, the case law predominantly held these refusals to be
illegal under the Social Security Act. 12 2 Moreover, after Maher,
women in many states obtained payment for medically necessary
abortions; in other states, women received both state and federally funded Medicaid abortions even if not therapeutically indicated.1 2 3 In a very real sense, then, the Hyde Amendment
involved government action rather than non-action because it was
a withdrawal of already extended benefits rather than a decision
in the first instance not to provide them. 2 4 The fact that a previ119. The Hyde Amendment, originally passed in September 1976 to prohibit federal funding of abortions except where the mother's life was endangered, was immediately enjoined by U.S. District Court Judge John F. Dooling.
Hyde's second amendment banning all abortion funding was introduced June
17, 1977, just a week before Maher was decided, and was adopted on December
7, 1977 after modification to allow payment for abortions if the mother's health
would be severely impaired. See F. JAFFE & B. LINDHEIM, supra note 14, at 12832.
120. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a discussion of Roe v. Wade, see supra notes
24 & 31 and accompanying text.
121. In 1977, approximately 295,000 women were obtaining Medicaid
abortions, constituting /4 of all abortions performed. F. JAFFE & B. LINDHEIM,
supra note 14, at 128.
122. Thirteen states between 1973 and 1975 had limited Medicaid abortion
funding, but most statutes and regulations were invalidated by federal courts.
See id. at 132-35. By the end of 1979, 40 states restricted Medicaid abortions,
including 23 which did so through executive or administrative decree. Id. At
least 12 states were ordered by the Court to provide funding for medically necessary abortions, and 3 ordered to pay if there was federal reimbursement. Id.
At least one state, Missouri, did not provide assistance even after being ordered
to do so by the federal court. Id.
123. In McRae v. Califano, the first remand of the Harris case, the district
court found that federal funds paid for between 250,000 and 300,000 abortions,
principally under Medicaid, between Roe v. Wade and the Supreme Court's vacatur of the Harris Court's preliminary injunctions. McRae v. Califano, 491 F.
Supp. 630, 639 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Moreover, the district
court noted that between 1970 and 1975, Medicaid funded almost half of the
112,029 abortions performed in municipal hospitals for New York city residents
and approximately I/ of the 293,713 abortions performed for New York residents in non-municipal hospitals. 491 F. Supp. at 639.
124. Similarly, in Selective Service System, the government withdrew previously granted benefits, not only from students who otherwise would have been
entitled to them, but also from students who had already begun to receive them.
This is not the same as refusing to provide educational assistance benefits initially. See 468 U.S. at 841 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Bowen, this withdrawal of
benefits was even more explicit. The Government, which had been providing
Little Bird of the Snows with AFDC, medical, and Food Stamp benefits under its
self-provided Social Security numbers, terminated these benefits to the child
when the parents refused to furnish the agency with the child's number. Bowen,
106 S. Ct. at 2148.
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ous status quo was restored does not nullify the "action" of the
state.
2.

Penalties and Withdrawals: An Effects Test

The second distinction between the "poverty disincentives"
and other actions by government in the childbirth example may
be in their effects on our hypothetical couple's ability to decide
whether or not to exercise their right to bear children. As the
Court made clear in Maher and Harris, that distinction will not be
based on the actual effect on the recipient of the government's
decision to impose a jail term or fine, or merely to provide positive or negative financial incentives. 25 If actual effect is measured, it is not at all clear that even for most people, loss of
subsistence payments or medical care is less harsh than being
jailed for any period of time. Moreover, the subsidiary effects of
the government's financial action on government-dependent citizens may be much more long-lasting and telling than the effect of
a criminal fine or even a jail sentence, even considering the stigmatic harm which must naturally attend these "punishments." If
government punishes exercise of a fundamental right by withdrawing welfare benefits, the withdrawal may result in loss of a
home, break-up of a family, mental illness, and, conceivably, starvation. The effects of withdrawing abortion funding are concededly mixed: the blessing of another child may well be outweighed
by the child's detrimental impact on a family's life. The responsibility of raising a child may drastically affect the mother's chances
for future employment and career growth, and thus her entire
125. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 325-26; Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74. The Court
has concerned itself with actual effect where the criminal rights of indigents are
concerned. The Court has protected criminal defendants by requiring not only
that states eliminate financial barriers to court access, but also that states provide the financial means for indigent criminal defendants to exercise certain fundamental rights. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (absent
intelligent waiver, person may not be imprisoned for any offense without representation of counsel at trial); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (state must
provide indigents with free transcript of preliminary hearing); Long v. District
Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (state must pay for transcripts necessary for appeals
by indigents); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (states must provide
financial means for indigents to exercise right to counsel on criminal appeals);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (states must provide financial means
for indigents to exercise right to counsel in felony trial).
Indeed, the Court has recognized that imprisoned defendants have a fundamental right of access to the courts which requires the state to provide counsel,
law libraries, assistance with preparation of legal papers or other substitutes. See
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); see also Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.
3d 908, 914-19, 553 P.2d 565, 570-73, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 410-13 (1976) (right
of access to court for imprisoned civil defendant).
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economic situation for the duration of her life, not to mention
adding psychological, physical, and social stresses. 126 Studies
suggest that placing such a child for adoption may diminish, but
does not eliminate, such stresses. The current inadequacy of this
solution is attested to by evidence that many pregnant women
prefer committing suicide to bearing and giving up unwanted
12 7
children for adoption.
The Court seems to distinguish between penalties and withdrawal of benefits by questioning whether the rights-exerciser is
any "worse off" than she was before the government responded
to the potential or actual exercise of rights by restricting benefits.
If the rights-exerciser is worse off because of government action,
then the Court may call that action a penalty. If the plaintiff's
legal challenge were to "alternative activity" (incentive (e) in the
Ann and Bob hypothetical), the Court would be on firmer ground
making this distinction. If Ann decides to bear a child and the
government, to discourage that action, offers $1,000 to people
who forego having any more children, it has some argument that
Ann is not in any worse position than she was previously. Her
position is not as good as it would have been had the government
given $1,000 to everyone regardless of their childbearing proclivities. In that sense, Ann may complain that the government is
influencing her choice to bear a child and treating her unequally.
126. Indeed, the McRae v. Califano trial court made extensive findings
about the impact of unwanted pregnancy on mental health, both for those who
had existing problems and others who were not mentally ill but were under significant stress. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 674-76 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
448 U.S. 297 (1980). The evidence also indicated that children whose mothers
were denied abortions showed higher incidences of physical and mental illness,
more emotional and social problems (especially boys), more educational
problems, earlier marriages and a greater incidence of welfare recipients than
"wanted" children. 491 F. Supp. at 677-78. Physical problems such as cardiovascular disease, gastrointestinal disease, ulcerative colitis, renal hypertension,
multiple sclerosis, tuberculosis, diabetes, and even cancer have been exacerbated by pregnancy. See NISWANDER, Abortion Practice in the United States: A Medical liewpoint, in ABORTION, SOCIETY AND THE LAW 199, 202-10 (D. Walbert andJ.
Butler ed. 1973).
127. See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 683 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 448
U.S. 297 (1980); NISWANDER, supra note 126, at 208-09; cf C. GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 108-12
(1982).
By contrast, most studies show that whatever their moral complications, women do not suffer severe psychiatric or emotional problems from abortions unless they are forced to abort by someone else or it is against the woman's
religious convictions. FLECK, A Psychiatrist's V1iew on Abortion, in ABORTION, SOCI-

174 (D. Walbert andJ. Butler ed. 1973); SCHWARTZ, Abortion on
Request: The Psychiatric Implications, in ABORTION, SOCIETY AND THE LAW 134, 144ETY AND THE LAW

52, 183-87 (D. Walbert andJ. Butler ed. 1973).
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But in other senses, she is no worse off than she was before the
government's incentive program.
However, if the criterion of being "worse off" is equated
with prohibited state punishment but not with withholding or
withdrawal of benefits, this "worse off" argument is problematical. In a withholding situation where no benefits have ever been
extended, there is a sense in which Ann can say she is no worse
off, but it is limited to the sense that she did not have that benefit
or opportunity before the government decided to withhold it
from her. The form that state action or inaction takes (e.g., imprisonment or withholding benefits) does not determine whether
Ann is better or worse off. For what it means to be "worse off" is
itself a matter of debate. Chuck Colson may well feel that he is
better off psychologically, morally and financially for the government's having thrown him in jail. Ann may become worse off
even if there is only a financial incentive and no disincentive for
child bearing, because she may erroneously calculate that she can
make money to pay her rent and become happy by not having a
child. Even the government's withholding of or refusal to extend
childbirth benefits after Ann requests them might make her
"worse off" because it might create unexpected anxiety, disappointment, resentment and injury to her sense of equality. In addition, if the government states, in denying her benefits, "you
have done a bad thing by getting pregnant," the effects may be
unforeseeably deleterious. Others may stigmatize Ann as a disloyal American or immoral person in the same way that withholding Social Security benefits from ex-Communist Nestor
stigmatized him beyond the mere loss of money. 128 The Court
concedes that stigmatic harm, not just financial loss, is real harm,
whether in the context of segregated schooling or loss of one's
29
reputation.
Moreover, as has previously been pointed out, the potential
recipients in the benefits cases were not being affected merely by
a "withholding" of benefits, that is, a government decision not to
provide previously non-existing benefits. In the abortion funding
cases, Medicaid services, at least for therapeutic abortions, were
128. For discussion of the holding in Flemming, see supra note 103.
129. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (notice
and hearing required when government action affects person's good name and
reputation); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (separation creates feeling of inferiority as to status in community). But see Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) (reputation alone is not a constitutionally protected
interest).
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theoretically available in most states before the Hyde Amendment. The Hyde Amendment withdrew benefits; it did not withhold them. Thus, many women were worse off because they had
fewer options after the Hyde Amendment and similar state statutes were passed. The same is true of restrictions on public benefit programs such as those for education benefits in Selective Service
System, 3 0° or for welfare benefits in Bowen.13 1 Yet, despite the fact
that previously granted benefits were taken away, the Court approved the state's action in those cases.
Nor can criminal penalties validly be distinguished from withholding or withdrawing government benefits solely because they
involve different deprivations. Even acknowledging that throwing
a rights-exerciser in jail is in a sense different from dealing him a
financial blow (since loss of liberty is arguably the most devastating, intrusive effect the state can have on a person's life), for our
purposes, that does not necessarily distinguish a criminal proscription from the withholding of a government benefit. Many
criminal proscriptions and "punishments" by the government are
merely financial. 1 32 It is unclear how fining a person differs in
effect from taking away previously available benefits with monetary value unless one understands the fine, but not withdrawal of
benefits, to take away "property." Indeed, if Ann and Bob are
wealthy, their loss from a fine for having children is not comparable to the loss of medical benefits, even if only childbirth benefits,
to an indigent Ann and Bob.
However, criminal penalties of all kinds, including financial
penalties, may arguably be different because of their indirect or
nontangible effects. One might argue that to make an act criminal is not only to discourage it but to condemn it in most ardent
terms as an anti-social act; to refuse to pay for an act is a milder,
more indirect judgment on its utility. Yet, both are negative judgments on such an activity with significant consequences. It seems
130. See 468 U.S. 841. For a discussion of Selective Service System, see supra
notes 8, 10 & 49-57 and accompanying text.
131. See 106 S. Ct. at 2168. For a discussion of Bowen, see supra notes 9 &
58-65 and accompanying text.
132. For instance, tax penalties and federal crimes for which only fines are
payable do not result in imprisonment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1982) (fine for
exclusion ofjurors on account of race or color); id. § 244 (fine for discrimination
against persons wearing uniform of armed forces); id. § 291 (fine for purchase of
claims for fees by court officials); id. § 432 (fine for making contracts with members of Congress). By contrast, federal law imposes a prison term for improper
use of the name or character of Smokey the Bear and Woodsy Owl for profit. See

id. §§ 711, 711a.
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curious that if we preciously guard the activity as a fundamental
constitutional right, we can condemn its exercise mildly and indirectly but not strongly, particularly when the indirect, "mild"
condemnation may have a more devastating real impact than the
direct one. While it may seem appropriate to withdraw benefits
when a person engages in unprotected anti-social activity, e.g.,
distribution of child pornography films, it seems anomalous to argue that exercise of a protected right is so anti-social that we may
use legal means to prevent it by making the rights-exerciser worse
off than before the attempted exercise. Surely if an activity is so
highly protected we must see some utility in it, if only on an abstract level. While near-obscenity may not be important, the right
of speech is; while abortion may be counter-productive to social
aims, the right of privacy is not.
Finally, the difference in effect between penalties and withdrawing benefits might, for purposes of the effects test, be in the
timing. That is, a state penalty is proscribed precisely because it
occurs after the right is exercised, for example, when an individual
is sent to jail for advocating the overthrow of government. At
that point, the penalty serves no purpose except to punish a person, not for a fault or offense but for a protected action: exercise
of his constitutional right. It does not serve to deter a socially
obnoxious action since that action has already occurred. By contrast, withholding or withdrawing benefits occurs prior to the exercise of the constitutional right: however otherwise blameworthy
such withdrawal may be, it at least prevents socially obnoxious
behavior from occurring and may therefore be justified.
First, as has been argued, this position raises the problem of
claiming that exercise of one's fundamental right is socially obnoxious in itself. Second, if that behavior, however obnoxious, is
protected as a fundamental right, the timing of the state's action
should not alter the balance between the right and the state's interest. If the state interest must be compelling to overcome a fundamental right, it should be so after the exercise as well as before.
Third, the Court has traditionally made the opposite judgment in
the free speech and free press areas when prior restraints by government are compared to criminal sanctions. It has held that
prior restraint is more odious precisely because it does not give
the rights-exerciser any choice between exercising the right (and
3
perhaps facing a later sanction) and not exercising the right.' 3
133. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature invalid); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-17
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Similarly, action of the state, such as a funding denial, which effectively prevents an indigent woman from choosing a non lifethreatening abortion, should be more suspect than action which
allows her a choice between abortion with potential punishment
or a live birth with no punishment.
3.

Penalties vs. Withdrawing Benefits: The Obstacle Test

If the effect of state action on the opportunity for exercise of
a right is not the Court's concern in Harris and Maher, one might
turn to the Court's discussion about what it means to place obstacles in the path of exercise of such rights.1 34 By an "obstacle,"
the Court apparently means that state's action essentially must be
the primary "cause" of the individual's inability to exercise her
right to have an abortion. The action need not entirely block exercise of the right to be condemned; the Court specifically uses
the term "unduly burdensome interference" to isolate those actions considered improper.1 35 But, apparently, there must be
some significant causal connection. What the Court means by
"cause" can be graphically illustrated: a woman proceeds to her
doctor's office to have an abortion, only to be prevented or significantly slowed by a state law that, for example, requires her to
(1931) (statute prohibiting publication of defamatory newspaper unconstitutional as prior restraint on press); see also New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (government failed to meet burden of showing justification for prior restraint).
134. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 316; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. Other commentators have emphasized the "direct interference" aspect of the Court's discussion
in Maher and Harris. See, e.g., Note, Indigent Women and Abortion: Limitation of the
Right of Privacy in Maher v. Roe, 13 TULSA L.J. 287, 299 (1977). As the note
points out, Justice Powell's "direct interference" test was previously rejected by
the Court in Singleton v. Wulff. Id. (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 107, 11828 (1976)). While it is unclear whether the "obstacle" test differs significantly
from the "direct interference" test, the "obstacle" test seems to invalidate only
government interference with individual choice which is more intrusive than the
"direct interference" test appears to require. But see Murillo v. Bambrick, 681
F.2d 898,903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982). In Murillo, the court of
appeals found that a $50 direct filing fee does not significantly interfere with the
right to get a divorce which the Supreme Court had protected in Boddie v. Connecticut, 681 F.2d at 903 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)).
This direct interference or impingement test has been used to validate an agency
decision to restrict sterilization as a family planning service to persons over
twenty-one. See Peck v. Califano, 454 F. Supp. 484, 487 (D. Utah 1977).
135. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 479; Cf West Side Women's Serv. v. City of
Cleveland, 573 F. Supp. 504, 517 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that zoning ordinance banning abortion clinic in certain area constituted substantial burden on
exercise of right to abortion); accord Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 336 (5th Cir. 1981) (denial of license for abortion
clinic places "significant burden on a woman's abortion decision").
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have the operation in a hospital or to wait twenty-four hours after
her physician's visit before aborting. The state has placed an obstacle in her path. In an analogous situation, the indigent woman
in Harris or Maher whose benefits are withheld may claim that as
she proceeded to the physician's office with her Medicaid card,
the state law stopped her at the cashier's office. But the Court's
test is a clever one: it is not then the state, but the physician or
the woman herself who is placing the obstacle. The state has not
prevented (as primary cause) the abortion but only discouraged the
physician who expects payment.' 3 6 In effect, the woman's physician or her own indigency become the intervening obstacles to, or
the cause of, her inability to obtain an abortion.
The obstacle test seems to rest on the notion that withholding welfare benefits only indirectly impacts upon a woman's ability to exercise her right because she can always find other means
of exercising it. One must ask, however, what it really means to
place obstacles in the path of the exercise of rights.' 3 7 If one
analyzes the preferred end-that people be able to exercise such
rights-then the government's action affects that ability. If the
question is whether, and to what extent, each of these choice-influencing actions affects the ability of people to exercise their
rights, the penalty/withholding benefits distinction is of questionable validity where government-dependent citizens are concerned. It is not intuitively obvious that a person will be more
deterred from exercising a fundamental right by the threat of a
fine or jail term than by the loss of subsistence benefits or the loss
of the financial means to exercise the right.' 3 8 If a woman has no
money to pay for an abortion, her only alternative to live birth is a
self-induced abortion. If abortion is a crime, she merely takes a
risk that she will suffer punishment if she has an abortion. Given
the practice under criminal statutes prior to Roe v. Wade, ' it is
far from clear that the risk of criminal prosecution would significantly deter, or create an absolute obstacle to exercise. Moreover, the "indirectness" of the impact was not a significant factor
136. See Altman, Abortion and the Indigent, 1IJ. Soc. PHIL. 5, 6-8 (1980) (arguing that withdrawal of funding cannot be considered cause of woman's inability to obtain abortion).
137. See id. at 7-8. Altman argues that mere action to influence the woman's
choice on abortion cannot be condemned as unconstitutional and that when
such action includes withholding assistance, it cannot be termed coercive. Id.
138. It is this loss of financial means to exercise the right that is at the heart
of the abortion cases.
139. 410 U.S. 113. For a discussion of Roe v. Wade, see supra notes 24 &
31 and accompanying text.
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in Sherbert, 140 and other cases involving withdrawal of benefits
where fundamental rights are exercised.
As a practical matter, Justice Powell's assumption in Maher
that the state has not deprived a woman of her rights because
"she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for
the service she desires" 1 4 1 is generally unsupportable. Privately
funded abortions for indigents are not widely available.' 4 2 Reliance upon an "underground" of family and friends to meet basic
needs or expenses, if the government programs do not, is not a
viable alternative for many welfare recipients. For them the cost
of abortion will come from subsistence benefits such as AFDC.
Since many AFDC payment levels amount to less than half of the
minimal standard of living in the United States,' 43 rights-exercisers will necessarily place themselves further below the poverty
line by choosing abortion. The means used to exercise their
rights will be money which government-dependent citizens were
provided to buy their children's shoes, pay their rent, or buy their
food. 14 4 Such benefits do not include slack for unexpected ex140. 374 U.S. 398 at 403-04. The Sherbert Court specifically suggested that
the indirectness of impact on exercise was only the beginning of the inquiry into
whether there was a burden on exercise of rights. Id. The Court likened discouragement caused by withdrawal of benefits to imprisonment and fines in its
impact. Id. at 404 n.5. In Bowen, most members of the Court apparently agreed
with Sherbert in this respect. The majority opinion stated that "[a] governmental
burden on religious liberty is not insulated from review simply because it is indirect ... ." 106 S. Ct. at 2155-56.
141. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. Justice Powell continued: "The State may
have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was
not already there." Id.
142. Private charity for health services generally declined in the years just
before the Maher and Harris cases from 2.9 percent in 1960 to 1.1 percent in
1975. See F. JAFFE & B. LINDHEIM, supra note 14, at 143-44. With respect to
abortion, health facilities performed about 85,000 at no or reduced cost to indigents before the Hyde Amendment. Id.; see also McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp.
630, 660 (E.D.N.Y.) (citing additional facts and figures), rev'd, 448 U.S. 297
(1980).
143. Compare U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Characteristics of
State Plans for Aid to Families With Dependent Children 335 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Characteristics] (listing the benefit standards for all states ranging
from $80 to $513 per month for a family of three) with the CSA poverty standards, 45 C.F.R. § 1060.2-2 (1984) (CSA Income Poverty Guidelines). According to the Food Research and Action Center, as of 1979, no state paid a cash
AFDC grant equal to the Bureau of Labor Standards poverty level. See FRAC's
Guide to Welfare Reform (1979).
144. For a general discussion of state delineations of basic needs, see Characteristics, supra note 143. Basic needs reflect the state's judgment about the
minimum amount of money needed to assure economic security. See Gardenia v.
Norton, 425 F. Supp. 922, 926 (D. Conn. 1976). If'grants are not spent for these
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penses such as car repairs or evictions, much less for abortions. 4 5
The damage which unexpected expenses cause goes beyond the
temporary loss of income for a month; it begins a chain reaction
with devastating consequences. The woman who must pay for an
abortion cannot then pay the heat bill, and, as a result, her children may become ill. She then might stay home and lose her
part-time job. Of course, she would then be unable to pay the
rent, perhaps be evicted with sick children, and the cycle would
continue to spiral downward, a typical scenario in a below-poverty level family.
Ironically, forcing indigent women to seek money elsewhere
for a need such as abortion creates the very dilemma that the
Court seeks to avoid by banning criminal sanctions which infringe
on fundamental rights. The Court does not allow a state to require a person to choose between exercising a fundamental right
and committing a crime, or foregoing a fundamental right to stay
within the law. Yet the Court's Maher/Harrisdoctrine may force
the welfare recipient who wants to exercise her right to abortion
to commit the crime of welfare fraud. If she gets money for her
abortion from a friend or family member, she is normally required to report it to the welfare department as income. 146 In
most states, that money is assumed available to meet other subsistence needs, such as food and clothing, even if it is not actually
available for that purpose. 14 7 The woman's public assistance
award is reduced commensurately-her $200 abortion costs her
$200 in AFDC benefits meant to go for rent or food. If a recipient fails to report the income, she can be criminally prosecuted
purposes, the state may pay through a third party. See, e.g., 6 MINN. CODE
AGENCY R. § 9500.0240 (1983).
145. Some states provide assistance for a limited number of enumerated
special needs. Compare Massachusetts (medical transportation, infant help, funeral and burial expenses, school clothing allowance) and Minnesota (home repairs, appliances, special diets and furniture) with Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas
and others (no special needs) and Characteristics, snpra note 143, at 70-71.
States also have broad discretion to choose to participate in the Emergency
Assistance Program and define eligibility for aid. See Quern v. Mandley, 436
U.S. 725, 734 (1978). The trend since 1967 has been to eliminate or reduce
special needs provisions. See Memorandum, "l'hat isAFDC", Center ot Social lWe/fare Policy and Law, June 1977, at 9.
146. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(13)-(14) (1982) (reporting income is condition to receipt of aid); MINN. STAT. § 256.73(6) (1984 & Supp. 1986) (recipient
must complete income reports requested by local welfare department); see also
MINN. CODE AGENCy R. § 9500.0010 (excluding as income only loans that are
obtained under conditions that preclude their use for current living costs).
147. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1982) (providing that all income not
specifically disregarded must he applied to determine familv's need and therefore its welf[are payment); MINN. STAT. § 256.73(6) (1984 & Supp. 1986) (same).
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for welfare fraud.14 8
Furthermore, as illustrated by the abortion cases, in deciding
whether an obstacle is created, the Court has never asked whether
the rights-exerciser has actual alternatives which ameliorate the
impact of the state's decision not to assist her. Rather, the test
employed by the Court has been whether the restriction has made
it unduly burdensome for the woman to make and exercise her
choice,' 49 and whether it has intruded into the physician-patient
sanctuary where such choices are made.' 5 0 There is no obvious
reason why the Court should decide whether alternatives exist for
avoiding the burden of the state's action in this case, when it did
not do so in cases involving regulation of abortion clinic procedures, waiting periods, disclosure forms and other less burdensome state actions.
One might also argue that a state action "creates an obstacle" to exercise of a fundamental right when the intent and effect
of the action is to prevent exercise.1 51 If that were the Court's
148. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 256.98 (1984) (punishing as theft intentional
concealment of material fact in attempt to obtain greater assistance than that to

which recipient is entitled); 6

MINN. CODE AGENCY

R. § 9500.0270 (1983) (pro-

viding for recovery of fraudulently obtained welfare benefits).
149. See Appleton, supra note 41, at 726-27. The author notes that only an
unduly burdensome interference by the state has warranted a more exacting
standard of review by the Court. All other types of state interference with the
freedom to decide to terminate a pregnancy have been examined under the rational relation test. Id.
150. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64 (physician and patient must
be free in early stages of pregnancy to consult and decide whether pregnancy
should be terminated).
151. For example, in Selective Service System, the intent of Congress not to
punish students but to encourage them to register was crucial to the Court's
determination that the educational conditions statute was not punishment within
the meaning of the bill of attainder clause. 468 U.S. at 854-55.
In Bowen, the plurality also suggested as much when it argued that the Social
Security number requirement was not an attempt "to discriminate invidiously or
any covert suppression of particular religious beliefs" and that it was not "suggesting antagonism by Congress toward religion generally" and is "facially neutral." 106 S. Ct. at 2153-57. While the religious antagonism issue is particularly
significant in free exercise claims, because of the establishment clause's claimed
requirement of neutrality in favoring or disfavoring religion, it is not clear that
this plurality would apply the intent requirement only to free exercise cases. But
see Gross v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 736 (11 th Cir. 1983) (arguing
that in religious conduct cases, the relevant question is not whether there is an
imposition of a criminal penalty or denial of a benefit, but whether the government action focuses on the protected conduct itself), cert. denied, 105 U.S. 108
(1984). For a discussion of Selective Service System, see supra notes 8, 10 & 49-57
and accompanying text.
The plurality in Bowen also attempts to distinguish Sherbert and its progeny
in a curious way. The plurality suggested that these cases involved an attempt to
discriminate against religion because, in Sherbert and Thomas at least, the state
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standard, then it would be compelled to reverse its decisions in
the Sherbert line of cases along with those in the Maher line. In
those cases where the state has acted for reasons unrelated to the
fundamental right endangered, and merely because of circumstances the stated action endangered that right, we would expect
to see no protection provided to the benefit recipient. In Sherbert, 152 for example, the "availability for work" requirement was
applied across the board to every unemployment benefit action,
regardless of religious affiliation, and it was merely coincidental
that the only work available in the Sherberts' hometown happened to include Saturday shifts. 153 If the state's motives determined whether an obstacle was created, the state would be
blameless for infringing on a Sabbatarian's right to rest on the
Sabbath because the state did not set out to achieve that result.
In fact, the state's motive in Sherbert was deemed irrelevant. 154 By
contrast, if the state's motive determined whether obstacles were
placed in the path of exercise in the abortion funding cases, the
Maher/HarrisCourt would be compelled to find that the government was placing obstacles in the path of a woman's fundamental
right to choose. The unambiguous legislative intent of both the
Hyde Amendment and state statutes was to prevent as many indigent women as possible from choosing to exercise their abortion
had provided for an exemption for those who quit or refused work with "good
cause." 106 S. Ct. at 2156. Since the state did not include religious hardship as
good cause, the plurality argues, it must have intended to discriminate against
religion. Id. By contrast, since the statute in Bowen exempted no one from the
requirement, it cannot be deemed discriminatory. Id. at 2156-57. Since Sherbert
and Thomas explicitly did not rest on the state's discriminatory intent, this distinction seems ironic. For a discussion of Sherbert and Thomas in this regard, see
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Moreover, it seems odd to suggest that a good cause exemption must be
discriminatory for failing to include religious hardship, unless all other types of
hardship are protected by the statute. Indeed, many otherwise "good" causes
for terminating employment, such as family responsibilities, have not been considered "good" for purposes of receiving unemployment benefits. See, e.g., Kantor v. Honeywell, 286 Minn. 29, 175 N.W.2d 188 (1970); 81 C.J.S Social Security
and Public Welfare § 230 (1977).
152. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For further discussion of Sherbert, see supra notes
10, 12 & 18 and accompanying text.
153. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 419-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra
note 134, at 300 (discussing application of "direct interference" test).
154. See 374 U.S. at 405. But see Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980)
(discriminatory motive is necessary element of fifteenth amendment violation).
Of course, one can also argue that Sherbert reached the right result for the wrong
reason because plaintiffs should have won under the establishment or equal protection clauses since the state statute specifically protected Sunday worshippers
from having to violate their Sabbath if work was resumed on Sunday due to
national emergency. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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4.

Penalties and Withdrawals: State vs. Individual Duties of Action vs.
Non-Action

Finally, the Maher/Harrisdefender may argue that it does not
matter a great deal whether the state has "acted" in some practical sense or what the effect of the state's action has been. The
state simply cannot be said to be interfering with or affecting exercise of a right in a blameworthy way when it withholds or withdraws a benefit which enables that exercise when the state was not
required to provide such benefit in the first place. Or, in the language used previously in this article and which the Court accepts,
the state has no duty to provide (and the recipient no claim-right
to receive) Medicaid benefits which enable exercise of the abortion right, whereas the state has a duty to not physically restrain
exercise of the abortion right (a liberty-right not to be restrained).
That is, the reasoning about penalties and obstacles is evidence of
the Court's acceptance of two liberty-rights notions: first, that the
state has no, or few, affirmative duties to its citizens and second,
that in areas in which it has no such duties, any subsequent affirmative assistance which the state provides can be revoked for any
reason whatsoever.
As has been partly suggested, these definitional assumptions
of the Court are not only inherently flawed but inadequate to explain the differences in the Court's holding in the Sherbert line of
cases and in the Maher/Harriscases. Yet the Court in Maher argued that the Maher/Harrisdoctrine was consistent with the conditions cases following Sherbert.15 6 To substantiate its assertion,
the Court would be forced to claim in each case that the right
involved, if any, was a liberty-right such as to exercise one's religion, to travel, or to have an abortion. In each of these cases, the
Court would have to recognize the benefit at issue as the same
kind-either as non-property, unearned property, or government-acquired property-since the benefits at issue were all welfare-related benefits. In fact, in the Shapiro/Sherbertline, the proof
of actual effect on exercise is considerably more remote than in
Maher/Harris.157 In each, the state or federal government clearly
155.
U.S. 297
123.
156.
157.

See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 641 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 448
(1980). For a further discussion of McRae v. Califano, see supra note
See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-75 & 475 n.8.
See Note, supra note 134, at 300-01.
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acted to withdraw previously acquired benefits158 which had an
actual effect on the exercise of the recipient's rights. In each, the
rights-exerciser was "worse off" for the withdrawal of benefits.
At least the plaintiff in Sherbert could collect welfare benefits if unemployment compensation was unavailable. But the Harris plaintiffs had nowhere else to turn to prevent the physical or emotional
harm caused by an unwanted pregnancy. In all cases, benefits
were withheld prior to exercise of the recipients' rights; all recipients could be said to have private alternatives (if any did) to the
benefits the state was withdrawing, which would enable them to
exercise their rights.
In summary, if the Court had neutrally decided these cases
based on the criteria previously discussed, it would have been
compelled either to decide all of the cases the same way or to
deny the claims of Thompson, 159 Sherbert 160 and their succes16 2
16
sors, and uphold the claims of Roe ' and McRae.
This article has previously discussed, by example, the argument that a government has no affirmative duties for which there
are claim rights toward its citizens. I will not attempt to argue
that the state has the specific duty to provide basic needs for
which there is a corresponding right to welfare. But it is suggested that it is important to reflect a moment on the analogy
being implicitly drawn between an individual's duty (or lack
thereof) to assist other people in securing their rights and the
state's duty. Earlier in this article, it was noted that liberal traditions commonly accept the notion that a person's failure to assist
another in exercising his or her right is less blameworthy than a
direct interference with the exercise, if it is morally wrong at
all. 163 Furthermore, if a person begins to assist another gratui158. For a discussion regarding rights to welfare, see Michelman, Foreword:
On Protecting the Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 13-18,
35-39 (1969). For a further discussion of Michelman, see infra note 216.
159. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618. For a discussion of Shapiro, see supra note
17.
160. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398. For a discussion of Sherbert, see supra notes
10, 12 & 18.
161. Maher, 432 U.S. at 464. For the facts of Maher, see supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
162. Harris, 448 U.S. at 297. For the facts of Harris, see supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. By contrast, some
have argued that if one person has a right, all others, not just the "losers" in the
rights battle, are morally required to take steps to defend these rights, even to
the point of violent revolution. See Hawk, Must We Do What Rights Require?, 17J.
VALUE INQUIRY 241 (1983). This argument may result from the intuitive perception that responsibility to others is at least equally as important as rights and it
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tously, his or her subsequent withdrawal of help is not wrong unless there was some expectation or reliance created that the help
would continue. Withdrawing help is essentially a failure to act,
as much as if there had never been help initially. Some then conclude that if government provides a benefit which it has no duty
to provide, it may withdraw that benefit without compunction;
withdrawal, like initial failure to provide, is tantamount to nonaction.
However, the reasons for which the common law has chosen
not to impose affirmative duties of assistance on private individuals may not be transferable to government. If one argues that
individuals have no legal duty to secure the rights of others, because they are autonomous beings whose first responsibility is to
themselves, the analogy fails. It is illogical to say that democratic
government has the right, much less the duty, to take care of its
own needs first and, like an individual, is an entity whose right to
free choice of action is paramount to the claim-rights or needs of
its citizens. To be concerned that the state will be used as a
means rather than an end if it is not granted the power to decide
whether to act affirmatively, and its existence therefore denigrated, is ludicrous given the explicit and implicit purposes of
democratic government to act affirmatively in securing the welfare of others.
If one argues that we do not impose on individuals an affirmative duty to help, as a matter of efficiency and practical enforcement, the analogy is again not firm. We might argue that
imposition of affirmative duties on individuals is not realistic. We
won't be able to decide when someone has broken the duty, we
won't be able to enforce the duty against all who have broken it,
and we can't in hindsight judge whether a person could reasonably foresee that he would breach the duty or cause himself harm
if he fulfilled it. For instance, we might argue that a "duty to rescue" statute is unworkable because an individual will not be able
to predict whether harm will come to himself if he follows the
statute. We won't be able to tell how much he has to do to rescue
an individual and we won't be able to catch people who don't fulfill their duties. Similarly, if we impose a duty that those more
fortunate must individually support the poor, we will not know
when that duty has been fulfilled or when imposition of the duty
clearly constricts rather than frees others in the community to seek their own
ends under liberalism's autonomy theory.
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will harm the duty-bound. 64 Perhaps as importantly, we usually
can't expect to make a rule which is definite enough for people to
follow and which can be enforced given the resources available
for sanctioning violators.
Yet, none of these arguments legitimately carries over to government. To a large extent, government has the ability to predict
what will happen to itself or to its citizens' lives if it fulfills affirmative duties. It has the power to define those duties in a way that
they are possible to meet. One could argue that choices about the
funding and eligibility requirements of public benefits are the exercise of those predictive powers in such a way as to prevent substantial harm to governmental or societal functioning. Moreover,
there are ways to quantify and define affirmative obligations to
assist the exercise of certain fundamental rights, particularly the
right to choose whether or not to have a child. Finally, the enforcement problems are insignificant. If government has
breached its affirmative duties, there are well-established ways of
discovering that and making government comply. Battles over
the political question doctrine exception and the eleventh amendment are not about whether government has complied or should
be made to comply with its duties, but about whether the courts
are the appropriate vehicle for ensuring compliance.
Thus, even if Maher and Harris are right in suggesting that
requiring the government not to withdraw benefits necessary for
the poor to exercise fundamental rights is equivalent to requiring
government to supply such benefits as an affirmative duty, the
real question is not whether government has affirmative duties toward government-dependent citizens, but what those duties are,
and who should decide what they are. Once the government has
undertaken to assist, as in the welfare cases, the crucial question
becomes not what the affirmative duties of government are but
whether the reasons it gives for imposing conditions on assistance
recipients are just.
164. For example, an individual who had a duty to support the poor might
be concerned about how much of his paycheck would have to be spent to help
starving children in Ethiopia. And what would constitute harm to the more fortunate? Not being able to educate their children at expensive schools or only
being unable to educate their children at all? Not being able to buy jogging
shoes or not being able to buy any shoes? What about not being able to buy a
color television? Would settling for black and white television be a harm? Is
even no television a harm given that children are starving? What if one can
afford to buy food, but not the natural health foods one prefers? As one can see,
the list of possibilities is endless and imposition of such duties would be anathema to American capitalist values.
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JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONDITIONING BENEFITS

If these preliminary observations expose some flaws in the
Maher/Harristest, perhaps one can justify the results in Maher and
Harris by looking more broadly at the basis upon which a state
might legitimately condition a public benefit. This article uses the
term "legitimately" to reflect some consensus, at least in theory,
that the government may not place just any conditions on benefits. 1 65 Why should a state wish to condition benefits at all? If the

state has determined that there is some social responsibility to
provide such benefits to those in financial straits, or that provision
of these benefits would serve a social function, then no purpose
would appear to be served by imposing further requirements for
receipt of these benefits.
A.

Types of Conditions On Public Benefits

At this juncture, it might be helpful to distinguish between
the types of conditions imposed on receipt of benefits. Generally,
such conditions may be classified as either status conditions or
responsibility conditions. 1 66 The AFDC program, for example,
does not provide monetary benefits to everyone who requests
them. Rather, in keeping with the purpose of the program to provide a stable environment for children deprived of parental support, 16 7 the program creates eligibility requirements based on a
person's family, income and resource status. 68 If, for instance, a
woman with one child and an income of less than $363 per month
is deserted by her husband, she is primafacie eligible for AFDC in
Indiana. 69 It is thus the woman's status as a person with a specified income level (financial eligibility) and family situation (categorical eligibility) which make her eligible for benefits, and not
primarily the effort she makes to get such benefits (a responsibil165. For example, government could not legitimately force a person to cut
off his hand in order to collect welfare payments, or to give up her children to
collect Medicaid.
166. A third type of condition may be termed a benefit condition. That is,
even if one meets the status of indigency, the type and amount of benefits he will
receive is limited by the purpose for which the state implemented the program,
just as his status was defined by that purpose. Thus, theoretically, if the AFDC
program is to provide minimal financial support for broken families, the state
conditions or restricts the benefits it will offer to those which provide such support: it provides benefits for food, clothing, shelter, medical care, etc.

167. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
168. See id. § 602; Characteristics, supra note 143.
169. See Characteristics, supra note 143, at 89-93, 335.
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ity condition).1 70
In most cases, the fundamental rights problem we are studying does not arise with status conditions, since clashes between
recipients' exercise of their rights and state withdrawals of benefits usually involve the recipients' past or future activity, not their
current status or situations. Invidious status requirements are
most often judged under the "suspect class" branch of the equal
protection doctrine.' 7 ' For example, the Court has invalidated
worker's compensation classifications which unfairly excluded
children of an insured worker based on their illegitimate status
while providing benefits to his legitimate children. 72 Occasionally, the Court has invalidated these conditions using the "irrebuttal presumption" doctrine of the due process clause. 17 3 For
instance, in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 174 and
United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 175 the Supreme
Court invalidated Food Stamp status conditions which excluded
households with unrelated members and households containing

tax dependents of a non-eligible individual. 176 On some occasions, however, a status condition can be directly tied to the exer170. There are, however, some responsibility conditions attached to an
AFDC grant, although in the 1970's, they did not play a major part in the administration of the AFDC program.
171. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (New York statute
forbidding permanent certification as public school teacher of any non-citizen
unless person has manifested intention to become citizen did not violate the
equal protection clause); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state statute denying welfare benefits to non-citizens violates equal protection clause
since classification is inherently suspect and demands strict judicial scrutiny).
172. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (state statute disallowing recovery by illegitimate children for wrongful death of mother contravenes
equal protection clause since status of child has no relation to nature of wrong
inflicted upon mother).
173. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (requirement that public school teachers take mandatory, non-paid leave of absence upon reaching particular stage of pregnancy violates due process clause of
fourteenth amendment since requirement established irrebuttable presumption
of physical incompetency).
174. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
175. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
176. In Moreno, the Court invalidated a federal statute aimed at hippie communes which disqualified households containing any non-relatives from food
stamps, finding that the classification of the "unrelated person" provision was
"wholly without rational basis," and thus invalid under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538.
In Mury, the Court held that Congress could not exclude from food stamps
persons who were taken as tax deductions by a noneligible person, regardless of
their actual need for support Murry, 413 U.S. at 514. The Court concluded that
whether a parent took a tax deduction for a child was not a rational measure of
the need of the household in which the child was living. Id.
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cise of a fundamental right. In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 177 for instance, the "status" required as a condition of eligibility was that of residence for one year.' 78 Yet, that "status"
was dependent on whether recipients exercised a fundamental
right, i.e., the right to travel from state to state.' 79
Responsibility conditions, by contrast, are those which require the recipient to act, or more occasionally, refrain from acting, in a particular way to receive benefits. For example, in order
to be eligible for AFDC, a mother must not only continue to hold
an eligible financial and marital status as of the date of application, but she also must take some affirmative steps to remain eligible. For instance, she must enter the AFDC work program 80
unless, in some circumstances, she has small children.' 8 ' She
must cooperate in obtaining support from the children's father 82
and she must report changes in her situation. 18 3 An unemployed
177. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
178. Id. at 252. The Court found that the durational residence requirement
created an invidious classification that "imping[ed] on the right to interstate
travel by denying ... basic necessities," i.e., non-emergency medical care. Id. at
269. Finding no compelling state interest, the Court concluded that the requirement could not be sustained under the equal protection clause. Id.
179. Id. The line between status conditions and responsibility conditions is
admittedly often hazy. For instance, in Shapiro and Maricopa County, one might as
easily say that the one-year residency requirement was a responsibility condition
for welfare recipients either not to travel (a direct conflict with their rights), or, if
they did travel, to get ajob for a year to support themselves (indirectly conflicting with their rights). See Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 250; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at
618. Similarly, one is hard-pressed to categorize the abortion funding cases: is
the abortion ban better characterized as a status condition-pregnant women
who will bear their children (who are eligible) vs. pregnant women who will
abort their children (who are ineligible), or a responsibility condition-to remain eligible for all Medicaid benefits, one must agree not to abort except for
the stated reasons?
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) (1982). The statute requires that, as a condition of eligibility for AFDC benefits, persons must register for manpower services, training, employment, and other employment-related activities. Id.
181. See id. § 602(a)(19)(A)(v).
182. See id. § 602(a)(26)(B). The statute requires a recipient of AFDC benefits to cooperate with the state in obtaining support payments for a child with
respect to whom such aid is claimed. Id.
183. See id. § 602(a)(14). This provision requires recipients to report their
income and living conditions, as well as any anticipated changes therein, as a
condition of continued receipt of aid. Id.; see also 6 MINN. CODE AGENCY R.
§ 9500.0050(9) (1983) (requirement of reporting all changes in status within ten
days of change).
In addition, since 1981, recipients are required to make a monthly report of
their living situation, even if they have properly reported changes or lost their
benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(13), (14) (1982). The Bowen requirement of furnishing a social security number is also such a condition. See 106 S. Ct. at 2147.
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worker must accept offered work' 8 4 and be available to work to
receive unemployment compensation. 85 In terms of prohibitions
on action, in some states, AFDC recipients may not quit a job
without good cause. t 86 Indeed, at one time, they could not in
some states have sexual relations. 8 7 In addition, they cannot
spend their AFDC checks for "frivolous" purposes without losing
control over them.' 88 Similarly, a Medicaid recipient cannot give
away a resource, 89 especially a residence which later may be subjected to a probate lien for services rendered.' 9 0
Naturally, because responsibility conditions usually impose
action requirements on recipients, it is more likely that a recipient's action in exercising fundamental rights will conflict with
those conditions and such exercise will then be discouraged.' 9 '
184. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-4-14-3 (1984) (requirement to accept offered
employment).
185. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400 n.3. The statute in dispute in Sherbert
required, as a condition of receipt of unemployment benefits, that an unemployed worker be able and available to work and to accept suitable work when
offered. Id.
186. See, e.g., Stanton v. Price, 178 Ind. App. 685, 383 N.E.2d 1091 (1978).
In Stanton, the state had denied AFDC benefits to a recipient who had quit her
job in order to obtain a nursing degree. Id. at 686, 383 N.E.2d at 1092. The
recipient, however, had a child under six years of age and therefore was exempt
from the federal work requirement. Id. at 689, 383 N.E.2d at 1094. The court
found that the state regulation conflicted with federal law and was, therefore,
invalid under the supremacy clause. Id. at 691, 383 N.E.2d at 1095. For discussion of exemption from the federal work requirement, see supra note 127.
187. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating Alabama regulation which denied AFDC benefits to children of mother who has sex with
"able-bodied man" or "substitute father" on grounds that such regulation defines parent in manner inconsistent with federal law); see also Van Lare v. Hurley,
421 U.S. 338 (1975) (more recent version of "substitute father" requirements);
Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) (same).
188. The federal statute and most state laws provide that when the parent
does not spend the AFDC check according to the purposes for which it was
given, the state may pay it to a third party (protective payee) for the children's
benefit.
189. See, e.g., Buckner v. Maher, 424 F. Supp. 366 (D. Conn. 1976) (invalidating Connecticut statute because "reasonable consideration" is not permissible criterion to deny welfare benefits under federally funded program), af'd,
434 U.S. 898 (1977).
190. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 12-5-3-3(6) (1984) (prohibiting transfer of assets
for purpose of meeting eligibility requirements for medical assistance for aged).
191. See, e.g., Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980). In Van
Ooteghem, a county assistant treasurer was required to work during certain hours
which would prevent him from discussing gay rights with the county commissioners. Id. at 490. In order to retain his benefit, i.e., his job, he was required to
be at work during those hours; in order to exercise his free speech rights, he
would necessarily have to absent himself during those hours because they were
the only times at which the commissioners met. Id. Van Ooteghem was dismissed after refusing to agree to a work schedule which would have prevented
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For instance, in Sherbert, the plaintiff-Sabbatarian was excluded
from benefits by a responsibility condition that she accept a job
involving work on Saturday, a condition which would cause her to
19 2
violate her religious beliefs about work on her Sabbath.
These distinctions help us decide how closely to scrutinize
conditions on benefits. Status conditions are most often imposed
for economic purposes directly connected with the goals and limitations of the program. Although we recognize that intact families as well as broken families may need assistance in obtaining
the capacity for independence and self support, if government
cannot afford to subsidize everyone, it creates the "status" of"dependent child ... deprived of parental support" as an eligibility
criteron. The reason a single parent is eligible for AFDC only if
she makes less than $375 per month is that we arguably cannot
afford to provide such benefits to all single-parent families who
93
might "need" them in some sense.
Responsibility conditions, by contrast, often serve not a fiscal
but another state purpose, such as a moral purpose. Admittedly,
many responsibility requirements, such as AFDC requirements
that recipients cooperate in obtaining support and seeking employment, are clearly meant to reduce the state's fiscal liability by
generating other funds to support the recipient or getting her off
of benefit rolls. However, many of these requirements, most notably the work requirements, are also designed to prevent recipients from falling into a government dependent lifestyle, which is
considered morally and economically abhorrent, and to teach
conforming social skills necessary for them to "mainstream"
themselves into the dominant economy. Responsibility conditions may also be used not only to influence the behavior of the
recipient who is on assistance, but to discourage those who are
him from speaking with the commissioners. Id. While the lower court found
that Van Ooteghem could have been fired for no reason whatsoever, it nonetheless concluded that his firing was a violation of his first amendment right to address a public body on the subject of the civil rights of homosexuals. Id. at 49293.
192. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399 & 399 n.1.
193. Similarly, the Supreme Court has accepted the state's argument that
benefit conditions are directly related to the state's legitimate fiscal concerns and
are therefore beyond challenge regardless of their impact. See, e.g., Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (sustaining disparities in grants between Social
Security Programs for the aging, blind and those for AFDC recipients); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (sustaining AFDC grant maximums).
But see Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974) (invalidating state imposed ceiling on amount AFDC recipient could deduct from income as employment related expense).
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not being assisted from coming on to public rolls. 194
Because responsibility conditions more often implement considerations unrelated to objective need or resources, they are the
most troubling of the conditions imposed on recipients, simply
because they embody moral or social judgments which are most
likely to clash with recipients' autonomy. I do not here argue that
the state's interest in a recipient's right to, and use of, benefits
may only be economical. Yet, the more conditions on benefits
influence recipients' future behavior rather than limiting benefits
by status factors such as need, the more it is likely the state will
compel a behavior at odds with a highly protected behavior of
choice, such as bearing children or free speech. Maher and Harris
involved just such responsibility conditions. Maher and Harris
were not denied benefits on the basis of their situations, but on
what they did and what they intended to do. The abortion funding proscriptions warn women that it is their duty not to become
pregnant, or if they do, to bear their children. If they refuse, the
state will remove at least one choice of medical care for their
conditions.
B.

What Can Justify the Conditioning of Benefits?

In addition to introducing a disturbing new doctrine testing
the legitimacy of responsibility conditions, Maher and Harris
muddy the precedential waters considerably. Since these cases do
not purport to overrule Sherbert or subsequent cases, one must
seriously question whether the Court is taking new directions or
whether the abortion funding cases are an aberration. As previously noted, in most of the cases in which public benefits conditions even indirectly infringed on fundamental rights (e.g., the
rights to travel, association, free speech, and free exercise of religion), the Court has granted at least limited protection for the
rights involved.' 9 5 Maher and Harrisare the major cases to depart
194. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618. If one views Shapiro as a "responsibility
conditions" case, then the major purpose of the requirement that new residents
support themselves for a year was to defer travel by people into the state. Id. at
631-32. It appears that the 1981 monthly reporting requirement has similarly
acted as a deterrent to those eligible for AFDC. See U.S.C. § 602(a)(13) & (14)
(1982). For discussion of these provisions, see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 250 (medical care residency requirements; right to travel); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618 (residency requirement for
welfare benefits; fundamental right to travel); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398 (unemployment benefits, free exercise of religion); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958) (exemption; free expression). But see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971). In Boddie, welfare recipients challenged a state procedure which
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from this pattern. 19 6 A look at the theories which justify responsibility conditions on benefits may disclose a way of reconciling
these cases.
At least three theories might justify the state's action in imposing responsibility conditions on benefits. First, one might employ a strong majoritarian argument which suggests that if the
proposed condition is legitimately processed through proper legislative channels, it is per sejustified. Second, (what one might call
the "rights vs. rights" argument), one could contend that benefits
like other rights must be conditioned in some cases in order not
to infringe on the rights of other citizens. Finally, as already indirequired the litigant to pay court fees and costs for service of process prior to
bringing an action for divorce. Id. at 372. In invalidating this requirement, the
Court stopped short of declaring a fundamental right to dissolve a marriage as
part of the protected right of privacy but it did affirm the centrality of the marriage relationship in American life. Id. at 376. Moreover, the Court failed to
directly recognize a constitutional right of access to the courts which it later did
recognize, particularly for prisoners. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
821-22 (1977) (prisoner's constitutional right of access to courts requires prison
authorities to assist inmates in preparation of legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or assistance from persons trained in law); see also
Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 914-19, 553 P.2d 565, 570-73, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 405, 410-13 (1976) (indigent prisoner's right to appointed counsel in civil
suit may not be abridged absent compelling state interest).
In Boddie, unlike the previous cases, the state had in essence taken away the
"means" of getting a divorce by prohibiting access to the courts by indigents
since no other means were available for exercising this choice. The Court relied
on the monopoly on means held by the state in invalidating the filing fee for
indigents. 401 U.S. at 372-76.
196. See Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 841 (sustaining requirement that students must have registered with Selective Service in order to be eligible for federal educational loans); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (sustaining
AFDC grant maximum regardless of size of family); see also Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309 (1971). In Wyman, an AFDC recipient challenged a New York State law
which required that a home visit be made upon the initial application for benefits, and allowed caseworkers to require subsequent home visits as a condition to
continuing aid. Id. at 313-14. James' challenge to the statute and implementing
regulations, on the basis that they violated her fourth amendment right against
searches of her home without a warrant upon probable cause, was rejected by
the Court. Id. at 318. The Court reasoned that welfare recipients could not
equate the home visit with a fourth amendment search because it was not done
by a criminal officer and it was not for the primary purpose of aiding in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 317-18. Ironically, the Court equated criminal evidence
which the caseworker might in fact seek and discover with evidence discovered
by any ordinary citizen. Id. at 323. The Court also held that it was reasonable
for the state to require such a home visit, within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, because of the purposes of the statute, so long as the investigation
was conducted at reasonable hours and without forcible entry or reprehensible
conduct. Id. at 320-21. Moreover, as in the abortion cases and in Selective Service
System, the Court pointed out that the recipient had a choice: she could choose
to forego welfare benefits and avoid the intrusion into her home which might
uncover evidence of a crime. 400 U.S. at 317-18, 325.
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cated, one might debate whether the harm caused to the exercise
of a fundamental right is outweighed by state interests other than
protection of individual rights. At least the majoritarian and
"rights vs. rights" arguments are, under current case law, insufficient to justify conditioning benefits in a way that infringes on
fundamental rights.
1.

The MajoritarianArgument

Given the thoroughness of its exposition elsewhere, this article will only quickly address the significance of the majoritarian
argument. In the simplistic version of this argument, the people
decide who will be the repository of their funds and how those
funds will be distributed. Government must then obey all directions, and recipients must comply with any conditions the people
put on distribution of their money-the pre-unconstitutional conditions theory writ large. Courts have no business questioning
those directions or invalidating those conditions.
Is the majoritarian argument any more valid in the public
benefits context than it is with any other governmental action
which potentially infringes on rights? Some writers have suggested that the public fisc is uniquely entrusted to legislative deliberation since the people explicitly and consistently have
delegated that power to Congress. 9 7 Thus, any Congressional
action related to fiscal expenditures is automatically entitled to
more deference by the judiciary, the rights-protecting arm of government. Aside from historical judicial acquiescence,' 9 8 there
seems to be no inherent reason why Congress' distribution of
benefits differs from any other legislative action which affects a
person's relationship with his or her government. This is particularly true when such responsibility conditions are not imposed to
save money or to attempt to fairly distribute money-two cases in
which legislative expertise might be said to be significantly
greater. When other legislative action affecting one individual's
financial situation, e.g., a tax or fine, intersects with that individual's exercise of a fundamental right, the courts have not bowed
to the majoritarian argument. Rather, judges have construed
their role as protectors of such rights as against the majority.
Furthermore, the majoritarian argument does little to clarify
how the abortion funding cases might be distinguished from the
197. See Hardy, Harris v. McRae: Clash of a Nonenmterated Right with Legislative Control of the Purse, 31 CASE W. RES. L REV. 465, 487-92 (1981).
198. Hardy, supra note 197, at 489.
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Court's previous holdings regarding infringement of fundamental
rights. The sole relevant procedural difference between those
cases protecting and those not protecting fundamental rights appears to be that in Harris, an enactment of Congress was challenged; in the other benefits/rights cases, state statutes were the
subject of dispute.' 99 Were this the only relevant distinction,
then clearly Maher should have been decided in favor of the recipients whose fundamental rights not to bear children were significantly affected by the state's action withdrawing or limiting
20 0
benefits.
2.

The Rights vs. Rights Argument

A second potential justification for the Maher/Harris conditions doctrine, which could set it apart from the Court's decisions
in cases such as Sherbert, might be based on the difference in the
rights involved in the government's decision to fund or not fund
abortion. In an attempt to distinguish the Sherbert line, one might
argue the following with respect to Roe, McRae, and other public
benefits recipients facing responsibility conditions: a) their right
has been ill-defined; it is merely a right to decide, not to the
means necessary to carry out the decision. Their right to decide,
and to be free from government interference in that decision, is
paramount to all other rights and side constraints involved;
b) their right to decide, or to implement their decision is a "side
right" or an unenumerated right, not as protected as other fundamental rights; c) others' right of conscience, which includes a
right not to pay tax money for morally repugnant activities, is paramount to the public benefits recipient's right to, inter alia, obtain
an abortion-presuming a right to abortion exists. On this view,
based on elemental rights theory, one's right to free action is limited only by another's right to free action. Only in this case, the
rights to have an abortion without intrusion into the decisionmaking process, and to implement that decision, are limited by
199. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 311. At issue in Harris was the constitutionality
of a provision of the Hyde Amendment. Id. at 302-03. For a discussion of the
Harris case, see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
200. Similarly, Wyman v.James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) would have to be decided in favor of the recipient if
the majoritarian difference which made a difference in outcome is whether Congress or the state passed the law. Dandridge is most closely analogous to Maher
because it involves the choice whether to bear children. Compare .11aher, 432 U.S.
at 464 (challenge to statute regulating funding of abortions) with Dandridge, 397
U.S. at 471 (challenge to statute regulating size of AFDC grant regardless of size
of family).
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others' right not to provide money to finance such abortions;
d) their right to have an abortion, without help, outweighs others'
rights (e.g., the fetus' right to life), but the right to abortion with
help from the government does not. There is a strong state interest in fetal life which, when added to the fetus' right, counters,
not their right to decide to abort, but their right to implement the
decision-at least with government help.
a.

The Nature and Importance of the Right at Stake

One of the ways to resolve the conflict in the cases involving
fundamental rights versus benefit conditions is to suggest that the
fundamental right involved in the abortion funding cases and
their progeny is sufficiently different than those in the Sherbert
cases to command a different result. Indeed, the Court has certainly employed, if not wholly relied upon, this approach to reconcile the cases. Perhaps the right in Maher and Harris, for
example, is not a right to abortion, but a right to choose an abortion. Perhaps it is not subject to as much protection because it is
merely a sub-right of the right of privacy, rather than a sub-right
of more important fundamental rights such as speech, association, and religion. Perhaps one could distinguish the cases on the
basis of the source of the right, that is, whether it is explicitly protected in the Constitution or whether it is merely penumbral. Another argument is that rights which facilitate the preservation and
growth of democratic government receive more judicial protection than those which are merely personal to the individual. That
is, even fundamental rights may not all be equal.
(1)

Defining the Right: The "Duty" of Privacy

In Maher and Harris, the Court emphatically announced that
lower courts were confused about the right recognized in Roe v.
Wade. As the court in Maher reiterated or recast it, the right which
emanated from the penumbral right of privacy was to make " 'certain kinds of important decisions' free from government compulsion... Roe did not declare an unqualified 'constitutional right to
an abortion' .. . but protect[ed] the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." 2 ' Note that this is a different issue than the
201. 432 U.S. at 473-74; cf. Bumpus v. Clark, 681 F.2d 679, 685 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding that closure of nursing home did not violate rights of privacy or
to be left alone).
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one posed by the liberty claim-rights argument.2 0 2 Here, the
Court intimates not only that the state's duty is not to interfere with
the liberty-right of the woman, but also that its duty is not to interfere with the woman's decision (as opposed to the implementation of that decision).
However, in the other cases striking down waiting requirements, 20 3 consent forms, 20 4 and even fetal protection provisions, 20 5 the Court has suggested that it is not just the decision,
but the implementation of the decision, which is protected by the
due process clause. In Maher and Harris, however, the Court's
clear focus is on the different nature of this right, a species of
Justice Brandeis' right to be let alone. 20 6 If the right is to be let
alone, the argument suggests, it would be as improper to require
a government to pay for an abortion as to permit government to
prevent one. Either action interferes with the right to be let alone
in making the decision.
Is there in fact something different about the right to privacy
which would justify the different result in this case? Surely, on
some level, one could not say that these state benefit conditions
interfere with the right to decide to obtain an abortion in the
same sense that physical coercion by the state would interfere
with the recipient's decision process. If, while the woman and
perhaps her partner sit in the living room contemplating her
choices, the state sends the police to convince or threaten her to
choose the "right" option, that action would be more directly intrusive to a privacy right than denial of benefits. However, none
202. For a discussion of the liberty claim rights argument, see supra notes
71-72 & 158 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983) (holding that no legitimate state interest was furthered by arbitrary and
inflexible waiting period).
204. See, e.g., id. at 439-40 (finding unconstitutional requirement that minor
under age 15 receive parental consent prior to physician performing abortion);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (invalidating requirement that woman seeking abortion during first twelve weeks of pregnancy obtain
written consent of spouse); cf Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
476 (1983) (holding constitutional statute requiring consent from parent or
judge so long as mature minor not required to obtain consent); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (sustaining constitutionality of state statute which required physician performing abortion on minor to notify parents).
205. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (requiring that doctor preserve live fetus if possible); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
83 (1976) (same); cf. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416, 451-52 (1983) (invalidating ordinance requiring disposal in "humane"
manner).
206. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Hardy, supra note 197, at 485-86.
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of the state's real potential actions-even criminal punishmentare so intrusive; they are merely more or less effective in deterring the action. The state's abortion funding denials provide the
most effective deterrent. They restrict the woman's range of options to three: to bear her child, find a charitable doctor or
friend, or perform an abortion herself. Such restrictions are so
severe as to preclude any reasonable choice or, as Justice Brennan
puts it, the state makes the woman an offer she can't refuse. 20 7 It
is clear that the Maher and Harris statutes are not less coercive but
rather more coercive than statutes in the cases punishing the
rights exerciser. Surely, more promising choices awaited the traveler in Shapiro, who could stay in state A and receive welfare benefits at a lower level than in state B, or emigrate to State B and
make do on odd jobs, food stamps, begging, shelters, theft, living
off relatives, etc., for a year. Surely the Sabbatarian in Sherbert,
who could move to another community where Saturday work was
not required, get assistance from her church, find a non-factory
job with different hours, even go on welfare, was less deterred
from exercising her right than Roe and McRae.
Is it correct to say that a right of abortion must be a right of
decision, a sub-species of the right to be let alone? At the most
elemental level, such a right does resemble other privacy rights.
If nothing else, the cases tackling the problem of minors having
abortions without their parents' permission,2 0 8 and women
choosing abortion who do not wish to notify their spouses,20 9
suggest that a key motivation for choosing abortion is to conceal
the fact of one's pregnancy from individuals or a society which
will not accept the consequences of that pregnancy. Whether the
woman's concern is the stigma of unwed parenthood or the rejection of a partner, certainly the desire to keep a secret is often cen207. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For the
quoted word of Justice Brennan on this point, see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
208. For cases dealing with minors and the abortion decision, see supra
note 204.
209. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); see also Wynn
v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (statutory requirement of spousal
and parental consent held unconstitutional); Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp.
534 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (statute provision requiring husband's consent before abortion held unconstitutional); Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973)
(statute requiring that physician obtain spousal or parental consent held unconstitutional), aff'd, 417 U.S. 281 (1974); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D.
Utah 1973) (invalidating state statute providing for father's consent); Jones v.
Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (same), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958
(1974); Rothenberger v. Doe, 149 N.J. Super. 478, 374 A.2d 57 (1977) (same).
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tral to the abortion decision. Charles Fried has argued that the
right of privacy is essentially the right to control information
about one's life-to give up that information as a token of trust to
one whom the person loves or with whom she wishes to cement a
trusting relationship and to withhold that information from those
to whom one does not care to form such intimate, vulnerable
relationships 2 10
With abortion, however, as with many other subspecies of
privacy right, there must inevitably be a non-private dimension.
Even if we posit the right to be a "liberal" one-that is, belonging
alone to one autonomous person-we must still recognize its impact beyond that person's life. While certain forms of intimacy
may be shielded from all view, often their consequences spill over
into the public space and the state takes some responsibility for
those consequences. So in Pierce v. Society of Sisters2 1 1 and Meyer v.
Nebraska,2 12 often cited as the first privacy cases, the Supreme
Court painstakingly refuted the notion that the State had no place
in the "private" upbringing of young children. Despite the
Court's invalidation of statutes which prevented the teaching of
certain subjects, areas said to be within the domain of parental
concern and control, the Court made clear that the state's need
for capable citizens gave it the right to make significant decisions
about the content of children's education. 2 13 Similarly, in Griswold v. Connecticut, where the right of privacy in sexual matters was
first recognized, the Court merely tempered rather than prohibited any state control over contraception. 21 4 The state could not
totally prohibit contraception because of the serious intrusion
into the most intimate matters of human life, but it could regulate
the distribution of contraceptives for public health and safety reasons. 2 15 Even in the abortion context, the Court has not remained true to the argument that the state is precluded from
entering into the abortion decision-making or implementation
processes because of the privacy right. In sanctioning protective
procedure requirements such as performance of abortions by
physicians,2 16 mandatory notification requirements for minors,2 17
210. See C.
PHILOSOPHY

FRIED, Privacy, in LAW, REASON,
53-61 (G. Hughes ed. 1969).

AND JUSTICE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL

211. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
212. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
213.
214.
215.
216.

See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
Id. at 486.
See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
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mandatory consent 21 8 and even pathology report requirements,2 19 the Court has merely required that the state's action not
unduly burden the woman's right to decide and to implement her
decision. Therefore, it seems somewhat inconsistent, to say the
least, for the Court to suggest that the woman's right is to secrecy
or to be let alone, a right that precludes proposed state action
which would enlarge a woman's options.
In the same vein, if the right of privacy is the right of control
over information about oneself and over one's actions, it would
mock that notion to suggest that the right of privacy necessarily
entails the duty of privacy. Admittedly, state interests, including
moral interests, may sometimes justify imposing a duty of privacy
where there is also a right. For instance, the state may prohibit
sexual intercourse in public on the grounds that it corrupts youth,
demeans family intimacy, constitutes a safety or health hazard, or
a number of other reasons. However, it is not clear that a state
could similarly prohibit all matters that are protected as private
from happening in a public manner and place if the rights-owners
chose to waive their rights of control. For instance, while the
state arguably might not be able to require parents to teach their
children about contraception, it does not follow that the state may
force parents to keep the subject private.
If the woman seeking an abortion agrees to breach the secrecy to which she is entitled by enlisting the state's help in implementing her decision, it is far from clear that the state will be
transgressing her privacy rights if it assists her. Nor does the woman's willingness to make her decision a partially public matter
suggest that she has waived the other aspects of her privacy, including the right to a decision with which the state does not interfere and the right to implement that decision without undue
burdens being placed in her way. Few would suggest that a nonindigent woman who used a public facility for her abortion but
(1983) (holding unconstitutional statutory provision relating to second trimester
abortions); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (sustaining unconstitutionality of criminal abortion statute as applied to non-physician performing
abortion).
217. For cases involving mandatory notification requirements for minors,
see supra note 209.
218. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67 (1976)
(sustaining constitutionality of requirement that woman undergoing abortion
certify her consent to procedure in writing and "that her consent is informed
and freely given and is not the result of coercion").
219. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (sustaining state requirement that pathologist examine and make report on tissue
removed during abortion).
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was able to pay for it herself would thereby open her actions up to
otherwise prohibited state interference in her choice. Nor would
a woman bearing a child, by seeking state funding for childbirth,
agree to give the state the right to decide that she should not bear
it, or control over the question as to how she should bear it (e.g.,
by natural childbirth or caesarian section), or whether she should
give her child up for adoption.
Furthermore, it is not always true that the right which such a
woman exercises is more private than other fundamental rights,
notably the right to association. In fact, many court battles over
that right concern the right of an individual to disclose his associations, rather than whether he will be allowed to associate in
the first place. 220 Just as Fried centers the privacy right on control
of information about oneself,22 ' one can argue that it is the control over one's speech which is important in the exercise of that
fundamental right. The privilege against self-incrimination is a
right to protect one's body and control one's thoughts against coerced disclosure by the state; the right of free association is the
right of control over the decision of with whom one joins; the
right to free exercise of religion is the right to control one's
conscience.
If the right of privacy, defined by the Court to include the
right to abort, is not unique because of the rights-exerciser's interest in controlling the action or in its non-public nature, can it
be said that the effect of state interference with the right to privacy causes less actual harm than interference with these other
rights? Certainly, on an everyday level, only scholars and politicians would argue that a state's decision to ban or to regulate
one's speech, one's ability to move freely within the country, or
one's ability to make acquaintance is more intrusive than the
state's decision to regulate reproductive choices which arise from
marital or other sexual relationships. Such relationships are central to human beings' basic needs for affection, for love, for being
accepted for what they are and trusting others; indeed, for creating new generations. The spectre of a policeman standing in a
women's bedroom, dictating whether or not she should have a
child, must loom larger for all of us than the prospect of being
carried off for verbal attacks against the government. Even using
220. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (teacher not required
to disclose all memberships in organizations); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960) (NAACP contributors); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (invalidating state demand for NAACP membership list during litigation).
221. See Fried, supra note 210.
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a milder example, few would imagine that government could regulate the time, place and manner of intimate relations in the same
22 2
way it has been given free rein by the Court to regulate speech.
One does not imagine that such action would be long studied to
determine whether its effect was sufficiently "chilling" to warrant
protection from the majoritarian processes.
(2)

Defining the Right: Is Privacy Merely a Liberty-Right?

An honest attempt to justify the Court's doctrine might reveal that what is not at stake is mere privacy; that when a woman
becomes pregnant, the vessel for nascent life, her choices are no
longer completely private in their consequences. In fact they may
affect not only the fetus, but her partner, her family, even those
adoptive parents who are waiting for children of their own, and
others in a very different way than her prior sexual decisions have
affected anyone. The woman's interest at stake may be, and has
been by feminists, appropriately recast as a liberty interest-the
right to do with her body and her life as she wishes, unconstrained by the state or any person. Indeed, such an interest,
renamed autonomy, is the darling right of the liberal state.
A Maher/Harrissupporter must be quick to point out the potential paradox which a positive claim-rights advocate confronts
when the interest is recast in this manner. How can the right to
liberty be anything more than a liberty right? That is, except for
the argument that the right to liberty entails a duty in the government not to interfere with what one chooses to do, it seems paradoxical to argue that if one holds a liberty right, government is
under an affirmative duty to assist one in exercising that right. To
be at liberty is to be free from government interference-one way
or the other, or so Maher/Harriswould suggest.
The liberal notion of personal autonomy has, however, not
ruled out the possibility that the state may be duty-bound to assist
in ensuring that one is both free and able to stretch to the limits
of one's imagination and powers. Indeed, as early as Brown v.
Board of Education,223 the Court has remarked how essential direct
state assistance in providing equal education must be to the creation of a truly autonomous citizen.2 24 Other cases, particularly
222. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941) (sustaining constitutionality of state statute prohibiting parades or processions upon
public streets without license since city must be able to regulate time, place and
manner of such parades for public convenience).
223. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
224. Id. at 493.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/3

68

Failinger: An Offer She Can't Refuse: When Fundamental Rights and Conditions

1986]

CONDITIONS ON GOVERNMENT BENEFITS

those involving education and institutionalized persons, have
hinted at the existence of a positive state duty to provide assistance to ensure individual autonomy especially where a person
may be completely deprived of the means to become a real citizen 2 25 or where the state has undertaken some guardian's role
226
over the individual.
Similarly, in the abortion funding cases, the woman's interest
at issue is not only freedom from being used as a vessel for another person for nine months; it is the constraint of responsibility
for a child which will last a good portion of her adult life. While a
woman is not necessarily a ward of the state, an indigent woman,
who depends on the state for her very livelihood, can be said to
be in the same precarious position as the school child in Brown or
the institutionalized person. Unless the state steps in, each is
condemned to severe limitation of life choices. That is particularly so in Harris, where the woman is condemned to serious short
or long-term health problems by continuing to carry her child. In
short, the right to liberty is not indisputably a liberty-right.
(3)

Protecting the Right: The Functions of Privacy
and Liberty

Is interference with the right to privacy less blameworthy
than interference with other fundamental rights in some other
relevant way than its effect on our daily lives? A "new" right, the
right of privacy has been extruded from the penumbral recesses
225. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 3637 (1973). In rejecting the equal protection challenge to Texas' method of
funding public schools, the Court stated that it could not be fairly alleged that
"the [Texas] system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire
the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and
of full participation in the political process." Id. at 37; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982). In Plyler, the Court considered whether a Texas statute
denying school district funds for the education of children not legally admitted
into the United States violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 205. In determining that the statute denied the class of children equal protection, the Plyler
Court stated that "education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of
our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our nation
when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon
which our social order rests." Id. at 221.
226. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317-19 (1982) (involuntarily committed person had liberty interest in safety, freedom from restraint
and adequate training); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977) (prisoner entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if physician finds such
treatment necessary under circumstances); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp.
575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that class of non-criminal children incarcerated by
court had right to treatment).
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of the Constitution, 2 27 from clauses such as the ninth amendment2 2 8 which have lost their intended meanings, and from notions of "natural justice" which Justice Black decried as merely
"personal preferences" of "civilized standards of conduct." 229
Black and others have argued persistently that privacy, while important, is not protected against government intrusion. 2 30 Perhaps privacy, as a penumbral right, is less entitled to protection
than other rights which are explicitly protected. A variation on
this theme is that the fundamental rights are crucial because they
enable democratic government to exist. 2 3 1 A privacy right, or
even a liberty right as delineated, is not such a crucial functional
right and therefore not as protected.
Perhaps the explicit/penumbral distinction in the present
context may only suggest that the courts protect explicit rights
more because they know what it is they are supposed to protect,
whereas with penumbral rights, the courts are always in the dark
and must therefore always exercise more deference to
majoritarian choices. Yet, as the last twenty years have demonstrated, demarcation of even explicit rights, such as free speech
and the right to peaceably assemble, has been fraught with ambiguity. We have learned that the Constitution protects those who
wear armbands23 2 or obscene jackets 23 3 or those who refuse to
wear flags, 23 4 but not others who wear their hair long. 2 35 We
227. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85 (finding that specific guarantees in Bill
of Rights have "penumbras" creating various zones of privacy).
228. Id. at 484. See generally, C. BLACK, On Readingand Using the Ninth Amendment in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EUGENE ROSTOW (1985).
229. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting).
230. Id.at 508-10 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1971) (criticizing Griswold and
Justice Douglas' derivation of "new constitutional right" of privacy).
231. SeeJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 74 (1980).
232. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (upholding right of students in public schools to wear black armband as a
means of expressing opposition to Vietnam war).
233. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (absent compelling reason,
state may not, consistent with first and fourteenth amendments, make simple
public display of obscene word a criminal offense).
234. See, e.g., Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299 (11 th Cir. 1983)
(holding that black policeman's dismissal for removing flag from uniform as
means of protesting discriminatory policies of department violated officer's first
and fourteenth amendment rights).
235. See, e.g., Gere v. Stanley, 320 F. Supp. 852 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (sustaining
school regulation prohibiting males from wearing long hair on grounds that hair
style is not protected as free speech under first amendment nor as fundamental
right under ninth amendment), aff'd, 453 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1971). But see
Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970) (school officials failed
to meet substantial burden of justifying hair-length regulation).
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have learned that those who sit quietly in public libraries are
"speaking" and assembling in a protected manner, 23 6 but those
who sleep quietly in public parks are not. 23 7 Yet, there is some
superficial glamour to this ambiguity as applied to "privacy" in
general. For instance, it is difficult to demarcate the constitutional circle protecting family integrity, which is continually being
revised in education, in child abuse and neglect, and even in sex2 38
ual privacy matters such as the minor's abortion cases.
Despite that fact, the matter at issue in the abortion cases, the
right to procreate, is fairly explicitly defined and has received extremely strong protection in cases where government has interfered with an individual's procreative control, such as in forced
sterilization 239 and contraceptive prohibition cases. 2 40 In the
context of the government benefit denial cases, it is surely true
that the contours of a woman's decision whether or not to bear a
child are better made out than the limits of the right to travel
which was protected in the Shapiro case, or the right to free association, especially as it has operated to selectively nullify political
patronage system practices. 2 4 ' Unlike those cases, protection of
the right to choose to bear or not to bear a child has only limited
consequences for the state even if the state is forced to provide
affirmative protection. Pregnancy can be terminated in only one
236. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (reversing "breach of
peace" conviction of blacks who refused to leave public library as part of peaceful demonstration).
237. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984) (holding that regulation which prevented protesters from sleeping in
"symbolic tents" in federal park was reasonable restriction on expression); see
also Tushnet, supra note 71, at 1370 (discussing Brown and Clark cases).
238. For a list of minor's abortion cases, see supra note 204.
239. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding state statute
permitting forced sterilization of "habitual criminals" violative of equal protection clause).
240. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
For discussion of Griswold, see supra notes 47, 206, 227 & 229-30.
241. Compare Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (protecting public defenders from discharge solely because of political affiliations) and Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347 (1976) (holding that patronage dismissals placed unjustified burden upon first amendment freedoms of political belief and association) with
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (sustaining federal statute
which prohibited certain employees in executive branch of federal government
from taking "any active part in political management or political campaigns")
and Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971) (municipal employee without
civil service status subject to discharge by new administration even if basis of
discharge is employee's refusal to change political parties), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1020 (1972); see also Illinois State Employees Union Council 34 v. Lewis, 473
F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972) (invalidating patronage system), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
928 (1973).
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of two ways: by birth, or by either spontaneous or induced abortion, each of the latter having finite financial consequences for the
state as well as finite consequences for the state's social system. If
we aid in the exercise of abortion, we know that it will cost only
about two hundred dollars. 2 42 By contrast, if the state must aid in
the exercise of one's right to travel or associate, the costs to government, as this article suggests in the Acapulcan welfare convention example, are unlimited. Clearly, too, if the right at issue is
the explicitly protected right of liberty, the "penumbra" rationale
for not protecting the woman's right fails.
What of the argument that privacy or even liberty rights are
less protected because they are less central to preservation of
democratic processes of government? John Hart Ely can be said
to give coherence to this argument when he suggests that our
constitutional structure, indeed those values which have the tradition of "fundamentality" behind them, are explainable as representation-reinforcing values.243 Such fundamental rights not only
prevent us from being captured by those whom we elect to serve
us, but also prevent systematic disadvantage to a minority because of hostility or prejudice. 24 4 Indeed, the right to privacy is
given short shrift by Ely, perhaps because he does not see it as a
24 5
strong case for his thesis.
Yet, it is unclear what it is about the bundle of rights we call
privacy that would lead to the conclusion that such a right is an
"extra" or "side" right that has little to do with our place as citizens in a democratic government. While these problems cannot
be discussed here at length, it seems strange to protect rights
which allow everyone to be involved in the process of governing
themselves, of creating the strictures as well as the benefits which
affect their lives, while denying protection to the exercise of those
242. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 659 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub
non., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Justice Marshall noted in Maher that
the cost of an abortion was estimated at less than $200, approximately the cost
of one month's AFDC benefits to the born child. Maher, 432 U.S. at 455 n.1
(Marshall,J., dissenting). There seems to be little debate that such costs are less
than the cost to the state of a woman's carrying a child to term and the costs of
bearing that child. See, e.g., Development, Doe v. Beak Abortion, Medicaid, and
Equal Protection, 62 VA. L. REV. 811, 831 (1976) (Medicaid care incident to abortion less expensive than care incident to full-term pregnancy) [hereinafter cited
as Development].
243. J. ELY, supra note 231, at 86-88.
244. Id. at 175-79.
245. Ely skims this privacy concern, probably because it cannot neatly fit
within his argument. See id. at 96-97. See also Michelman, supra note 158, at 67077 (engaging in critique of Ely).
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"rights" fundamental to the shape of one's personal life. Indeed,
as Hannah Arendt has forcefully argued, the conditions of family
life, of choosing to bear and raise children, of obtaining the
means to survive, of educating and loving, are the necessary preconditions of politics, and the exercise of political rights. 2 46 Exercise of these private rights provides the safe home, the darkness,
in which people are nurtured to become good citizens and to
2 47
which they retreat to rest after acting as good citizens.
In the abortion cases, we can, with little vision, understand
the effects of failing to scrupulously protect a woman's decision to
bear a child. Childbirth is not only a discomforting procedure; it
brings with it some of the most serious responsibilities and intrusions into one's life freedoms that any relationship does. For women, it has meant serious curtailment of professional
advancement, periods of personal incapacity and ill health, and
primary responsibility, indeed in some cases, total responsibility
for the well-being of the child. There seems to be little question
that the economic and power differentials between women and
men in today's society stem directly from the woman's traditional
role as caregiver. Moreover, women have been disfavored because this tradition is used to justify discrimination in non248
caregiver economic, political and social settings.
If we recognize the real importance of these rights of privacy
and liberty which allow for nurture and comfort, it seems flippant
to suggest that they need be less protected than the rights which
depend on those rights-the rights to give speeches, to join
groups, or to petition for redress. Even the worst cynic, if unwilling to go so far, will recognize the sanctity of an individual's mind
and body against state intrusion; a recognition which has limited
forms of torture, search, questioning, and administered "treatment" in our constitutional history in the name of individual integrity.2 411 Rather than denigrating the rights to privacy and
liberty as "penumbral" or "unnecessary to government" and
H.

246. See H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION, 45-46, 64-68, 71-72 (1958);
The Crisis in Education, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE, 185-87 (1961)

ARENDT,

[hereinafter cited as Crisis in Education].
247. See Crisis in Education, supra note 246, at 185-87; H. ARENDT, Reflections
on Little Rock, VI DISSENT 45, 55 (1959).
248. See generally Law, lVornen, Work, W elfare, and the Preservation qf Patriarchy,
131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249 (1983) (analysis of how legal system disfavors women).
249. As many have argued, what can be more analogous than a pregnant
woman's decisions about what she is willing to let happen to her body-a recognition of personal integrity which is in itself no denigration of the serious competing claims of fetus and/or state?
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therefore peripheral, it seems more honest to recognize these
claims for what they are: central to the liberal rights tradition of
what it is to be human and to make decisions for oneself. In fact,
they are central to the liberal understanding of government because protection of these rights ensures the pre-conditions for democracy as we know it. It seems more appropriate to give these
claims their due in the liberal rights tradition and then to suggest
that there are stronger claims to counter the woman's claims of
liberty or privacy.
If the options of redefining the right and of lessening the importance of that right are then unconvincing justification for the
outcome in Maher and Harris,one must turn to other options previously suggested. One option is that there is a strong individual
right with which the abortion right interferes so long as it rests on
the assistance of government.2 50 That strong right may be either
the taxpayer's right or the fetus' right.
b.

Rights Against Rights

It is not clear that much will be gained here by reiterating the
arguments regarding the fetus' right to life.2 5 1 If one believes
that the fetus is a person, or the moral equivalent of a person, it
seems implausible to deny the fetus a constitutional right not to
have his life taken by an act of state on utilitarian or economic
grounds (e.g., arguing inability to afford for the fetus to have such
a right) if we do not deny others such a right.2 52 To say that one
is a human being but, unlike other human beings, he is not entitled to be protected in the one quality (life) indisputably required
for humanness, is to rediscover the twisted constitutional magic
that made a black person a human being but not a person for
purposes of the Constitution. 2 53 To say that the fetus is not a
250. Indeed, a liberty-right proponent might even claim that recognition by
government of a positive right, e.g., to abortion or to welfare, presents an inherent conflict with the liberty rights of those who have the resources to meet that
right. See SHER, Government Fundingof Elective Abortions, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN MODERN MEDICINE 221 (Series on Ethics, Humanism, and Medicine No.
2, 1981) (arguing that on utilitarian principles, government funding of abortions
is proper, but on moral grounds, it may respect anti-abortionists' principles).
251. See, e.g., Stith, The World as Reality, as Resource, and as Pretense, 20 AM. J.
JURIS. 141 (1975) (arguing that refusal to recognize fetal life is pretense, endangering value of human life after birth).
252. For an argument that such a distinction is mere pretense, see id. at
436; see also DRINAN, The Inviolability of the Right to Be Born, in ABORTION, SOCIETY
AND TIlE LAw 123-37 (D. Walbert, J. Butler ed. 1973).
253. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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human being may or may not suggest the opposite conclusion,
namely, that it has no "right" to be born.
However, as we must often candidly admit, even to say that
one is a human being and entitled to life by the Constitution, is
not to say one is entitled to life under any and all circumstances.
As Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous example of the violinist
hooked up to an unwilling participant's kidneys suggests, we
often do not even require others to be inconvenienced to save a
life.2 54 Government policies regarding the death penalty and the
government's poor funding for nutrition, child health programs,
and treatment of diseases similarly attest to the fact that some values are placed higher than life itself by ourjurisprudence.2 55 The
"right to life" suggests merely that extraordinary care and attention will be provided the person whose life is threatened against
majoritarian decisions which would threaten it. It may well be unfortunate, even with the careful attention given the fetus' right to
life in Roe v. Wade, that the Court seems to have denied that its
right outweighs the woman's right. Yet, if one is precluded from
arguing fetus' rights are greater than women's rights, it is troubling to allow the opposite conclusion in the abortion funding
cases. This is particularly true because the social, economic, and
even medical arguments on the women's side are so much
2 56
stronger in these cases.
Even if the balance sheet read "state interest in fetus' life
plus fetus' right to life vs. women's right," the government interest in the fetus would not appear to be appreciably different in
either case, 2 57 despite Maher's suggestion to the contrary.2 58 If
the fetus is a person or person-like, then the government's re254. See Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 47, 59-62
(1971).
255. See G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBirr, TRAGIC CHOICES 21-27 (1978).
256. For a lengthy discussion of socioeconomic and medical arguments in
favor of abortion, see McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 668-89 (E.D.N.Y.),
rev'd sub nor., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see also Haris, 448 U.S. at
351-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Roe v. Wade explicitly held that a
woman's interest in avoiding serious health problems outweighs fetus' right to
life).
257. If abortion is somehow murder, Professor Sher has argued, then the
statement that government should not finance murder (indigent women's abortions) is likely to gain no more adherents than the statement that government
should not permit any murders (all women's abortions). SlIER, snpra note 250, at
224. Moreover, he argues that even if abortion is morally questionable, it is
tnclear why the burden of proof should fall on those who believe it is permissible rather than those who believe it is not, or why it should be legalized but not
financed. Id.
258. See 31aher, 432 U.S. at 478.
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sponsibility for civil rights would suggest that the government
protect that life, whether it is threatened by termination by women using private funds or by women assisted by government
benefits. Of course, one might respond that we have always differentiated between threats to one's important rights made solely
by private persons, and threats made by private persons with the
assistance of government. Blacks for years were the targets of racial discrimination in all areas of social life while the Supreme
Court muddled around trying to define what would be sufficient
state action to engage the protection of the fourteenth amendment. 2 59 Even if the distinction between the strictly private and
the quasi-public violator were valid in some cases, however, it is
difficult to imagine the Court sanctioning a law which would prohibit the taking of a human life by government or using funds
provided by government, but permit such taking by private persons. Yet, that is the only way to reconcile Roe v. Wade and the
abortion funding cases, that is, if it is still possible after Roe v.
Wade to argue that the fetus is a person or even that government
has an interest in the fetus as a person.
Indeed, in reviewing the other fundamental rights benefit
cases, one is hard pressed to find a comparable situation if one
takes seriously the idea of a fetal right to life. In none of these
cases was the state's condition on benefits which "penalized" an
individual's fundamental right backed up by something as strong
as a right to life. Thus, this would be the clearest argument for
distinguishing Maher and Harris from the Court's other cases involving the withholding of benefits-the state did not have the
right to life on its side! However, once Roe v. Wade removes this
"right to life" argument from the state's side of the balance, other
explanations appear to be bleak attempts to justify the Court's
turn in Maher and Harris.
Even if there is no fetal right to life to outweigh the woman's
right, there may arguably be a taxpayer's right of conscience
which outweighs the woman's right to seek and obtain an abortion. Under this theorem, the taxpayer's right of conscience, including her right not to have hard-earned money used to kill an
259. Compare Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (trespass
conviction of blacks for failure to leave lunch counter during peaceful protest
violates equal protection clause) and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961) (reftusal of restaurant leased from public entity to serve blacks
violates equal protection clause) with Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972) (state action not sufficiently implicated where state licenses private
club to sell liquor).
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innocent life (according to her moral, though not legally recognized, estimation) is paramount to the woman's right to obtain an
abortion, if any such right exists. 2 60 This appears to be an attractive theory, particularly if one subscribes to property notions that
one may give what she has under the conditions which she
chooses, subject only to some constraint by the state. To force
the taxpayer to give what is hers for an end which she hates, is to
force her to do what she hates. What more invasive action can the
state undertake than to force her to do what she conscientiously
believes is among the worst sins?
Unfortunately, such an argument can only be made if one is
willing to accept its consequences. If a person can withhold her
tax money so it does not go to killing a fetus on religious or ethical grounds, then surely a person can withhold her money so that
it does not go to killing people in a war, or by the CIA, or in the
electric chair. Thus far, neither our courts nor our legislatures
have been willing to protect this result. 2 6 1

Indeed, one cannot

distinguish the abortion cases from other taxpayer resistance
cases by arguing that the security of a nation is a paramount value
which justifies forcing people to contribute to war, or the CIA,
but not to other morally repugnant purposes. Those who have
withheld their taxes designated for "lesser" purposes than national security, such as the Amish' decision in United States v.
Lee 2 2 to withhold Social Security taxes, have been similarly
routed. As the Lee Court notes, its key concern is the tax system
which:
could not function if denominations were allowed to
challenge the tax system because tax payments were
260. To paraphrase Thomas Jefferson: "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions [actions] which he disbelieves
is sinful and tyrannical." I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: TIE NATIONALIST 354
(1948); see also Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1045 (D.D.C. 1979) (requiring individual to join National Rifle Association as condition of receiving
government benefit of right to purchase Army rifles at cost violates right of freedom of association).
261. See, e.g., Lull v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1979) (taxpayers not entitled to deductions for military expenditures on grounds of religious
objections to war and first amendment's protection of these beliefs), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1014 (1980); Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969) (taxpayers denied refund For percentage of tax used to finance Vietniam war), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970); see also SlHER supra note 250, at 225-26 (arguing
that most tax-sponsored government policies encounter substantial principled
opposition). Bu set,
Hardy, supra 197, at 506-08 (discussing taxpayer right of
conscience).
262. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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spent in a manner that violates their religious belief. Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound
tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for re2 63
sisting the tax. 5
Surely the pro-life person's argument that his conscience right is
more important than tax integrity, unlike that of others who oppose state-sponsored murder, is a tenuous one.
Similarly, the taxpayer rights rationale cannot be used to explain the conflicts in the decisions of the public benefits withholding cases. The particular issue which precipitated the legislation
in Shapiro, Sherbert or Elrod v. Burns 264 may not have held the same
moral importance to those who passed the legislation as the abortion issue was for Hyde Amendment sponsors. Yet, it is far from
clear that those legislative burdens on people's abilities to travel,
to exercise religious beliefs, or to freely associate were imposed
merely for financial reasons. Quite plausibly, legislators in those
cases held strong moral and possibly even religious convictions
about the entitlement of an out-of-state welfare recipient to aid,
or the right of a Sabbatarian as against all others to demand a day
of rest at taxpayer's expense, or the duty of a public employee to
be loyal rather than true to his conscience. Indeed, if the taxpayer conscience rule must be extended by Maher and Harris to
cover these cases, then the Lee Court is quite right in suggesting
that our entire tax system would become a mishmash of personal
2 5
predilection. 6
3.

Rights Against Government Interests

Of course, the problem posed in the abortion funding cases
is not the problem in Lee, for Lee only covers individual refusal to
pay tax money, which is not the problem of government withholding of funding.2 6" Individuals cannot realistically suggest that
their tax money goes to a particular purpose, since there is clearly
no way to earmark such funds. One taxpayer's actual money may
go to school lunches or Supreme Court salaries; hence, there is
justification for the tax system argument which the Court makes
263. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
264. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
265. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 260. For the relevant language fromILee, sec sul'a
text accompanying note 263.
266. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 254-55.
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in Lee. 2 6 7 By contrast, in the abortion funding cases, individual
taxpayers who did not want their tax money appropriated for
abortion became numerous enough to constitute a majority.
Through the majoritarian process they create&a collective value:
the value of fetal life which is protected at least in the way the
majority can protect it, by financially discouraging women from
taking that life. And so we return to the majoritarian process, this
time to ask what state interests may justify the majority's imposition of its moral or religious values upon the individual.
One might, of course, impose a purely utilitarian calculus on
the rights vs. rights question, i.e., whether the aggregate rights
(happiness) of the taxpayer majority outweigh the rights (happiness) of pregnant indigent women. Yet, it would be difficult to
determine whether the happiness created by the rights of roughly
327,000 indigent women to have abortions outweighs that created by the rights of 100 million citizens not to have their money
268
used for these abortions against their collective conscience.
Such a utilitarian model would prevent the use of a right as a
"trump card" to be pulled out against the "rules," that is, the
decision made by the majority. 26 9 However, the traditional constitutional model allows us to do more than count rights on either
side. We can find a legitimate state interest, one which belongs to
the people collectively. Since we deal with a recognized funda2 70
mental right, if it is compelling, it will prevail.
In a variation of a previous theme, the important state interest may be in protecting the civil rights of taxpayers, with govern267. See id. at 258-60.
268. Unlike a decision to aggregate and protect the similar right of many
people, this calculation requires an evaluation of the importance of a particular
right as against another right. This latter step may arguably denigrate the importance of the right and of the person. Cf Failinger and May, Litigating Against
Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 22-27 (1985)
(discussing equal opportunity and equal access to legal residences).
269. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 197-204 (1977).
270. It is particularly interesting that the Bowen Court, logically following
Maher and Harris, argued that the level of scrutiny levelled at the government's
claim will depend on whether there is a governmental compulsion, rather than
merely a condition on benefits. 106 S. Ct. at 2155. In the case of conditions,
which are not constitutionally suspect government actions, the plurality only required that the government show that the requirement "is a reasonable means
of promoting a legitimate public interest." Id. The O'Connor opinion, by contrast, argued that such government action is to be scrutinized like a penalty, so
that the appropriate test-strict scrutiny-must be applied since the free exercise clause is at issue. Id. at 216. However, the O'Connor opinion found that
the prevention of welfare fraud is a compelling state interest, thus putting the
emphasis on the nature of the state's interest and not on the nature of the state's
action. See id. at 2166.
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ment ensuring to the extent possible that rights of conscience are
not infringed at the expense of rights to privacy. That state interest in civil rights may be even stronger than the individuals' rights
combined. In fact, the abortion funding cases are better than
most for arguing a state interest in protection of conscience because state's interest in a right of conscience is not infringed by a
person who has an abortion with private funds. The state interest
is defined as an interest in protecting taxpayers' right not to participate, by use of their money, in the abortion decision. Thus,
withholding tax funds from abortion can protect the right of conscience without the government having to make abortion illegal.
However, such reasoning suggests that government's responsibility to protect rights of conscience against payment of tax would
be triggered only when those holding a particular "conscience
right" constituted a majority. If 49% of the people believed funding for war or abortion to be immoral, their "rights" would not
have to be protected by the state, but if 51% of them so believed,
their rights would have to be protected. Such a proposition takes
the notion of rights, which we have perceived as countering
majoritarian interests, and stands it on its head.
Furthermore, if we look at the government's responsibility as
protecting the civil rights of conscience of a majority, then we
must again judge the conscience rights which went into creating
the other benefit-withholding statutes which we have considered,
e.g., statutes withholding welfare benefits for non-residents, or
unemployment for people unwilling to take jobs on their Sabbaths. The practical problem of determining whether such
prohibitions were passed to protect conscience rights is enormous. Furthermore, we would be required to determine which
conscience rights are entitled to protection. Suppose a large minority of persons had a conscientious belief that only the strong
were morally entitled to life, and therefore opposed welfare benefits altogether. Yet, suppose further, that because they had to rely
on other coalitions with different points of view to pass legislation, they were only able to pass a one-year residency requirement as in Shapiro.2 7 1 Would these rights of conscience still be
entitled to respect? If so, how much? Or if a majority felt that
people should eat out of garbage cans for a year to strengthen
their moral fibre, is this a claim which should be taken seriously
by the state which serves them?
271. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630-31. For a discussion of Shapiro, see supra
note 17
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Finally, the state may assert a moral interest of its own in the
preservation of fetal life, different from its interest in protecting
citizens' conscience or even the fetus' civil rights.2 72 That is,
rather than refusing to fund abortions, or Sabbaths, or welfare
travelers on the basis that it must protect taxpayer conscience
rights, the state representing the community would determine
that it has certain moral responsibilities which counterweigh the
interest, even the right, of any individual to free exercise of religion, abortions, or travel. Quite properly, civil libertarians are
concerned that moral claims may be used by a homogeneous majority to stifle the diversity which individuals bring to our society,
and to invade their autonomy and thus denigrate their personhood. Yet, there is nothing in rights-parlance which would
prevent moral considerations by the state from triumphing over
even a strong right by an individual, unless we are willing to consider that right absolute.
In this context, perhaps the abortion funding penalty/withholding benefits distinction can be justified on a
rights/moral claim model. The state has the moral obligation not
to cause an abortion to take place. 27 3 If the state provides the
means for an abortion, then it has caused the abortion, particularly where the mode of provision is direct reimbursement for
specific services to physicians. 274 If, in addition to denying abortion funding, the state also removes all penalties on abortion,
then the state can keep peace with itself; it has not violated its
obligation not to cause an abortion to take place, but it has also
not violated the woman's right to decide.
By contrast, if the state has an affirmative moral duty to stop
272. Indeed, the Maher and Harris opinions have both been lauded and criticized precisely because of the claimed moral judgments that they validate. For
example, President Carter once commented that the government should not act
to make opportunities such as abortion "exactly equal, particularly when there is
a moral factor involved." Note, supra note 134, at 287, 302. Professor Perry has
argued that taking the position in Maher and Harris that the government may act
based on moral objections to abortion is inconsistent with the Court's holding in
Roe v. Wade. See Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly VVrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 117-18
(1980) (citing Harris, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
273. But see discussion supra note 297 and accompanying text; see also T.
BENDrrr, RIGHTS 66-67 (1982) (questioning whether a state can have more
rights than an individual in the state of nature).
274. By contrast, apparently, if the state gives every woman $500 and says,
"you may do what you want with the money, even if it is used for aborting your
child; we just don't want to hear about it," then the state cannot be said to have
caused the ahortion.
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an abortion which counterweighs the woman's right, one would
think that this moral duty should have triumphed in Roe v. Wade
because it was compelling. If the state's only moral duty is not to
cause an abortion to take place, the niggardly way of meeting that
duty is not to contribute financially to abortions. The more effective way is to remove social and financial obstacles which make
the bearing of another child an onerous burden for young, indigent, unmarried and minority women.2 75 The state can thus prevent more abortions than the Maher and Harris cases ever could.
Nor can other liberal tradition concerns about rights be used
to support Maher and Harris. By subsidizing a woman's abortion,
unlike subsidizing one's religious or associational or travel preferences, the state has not thereby created a condition of inequality
with other citizens. If we subsidize Catholics to go to Rome, for
instance, Protestants might have good cause to complain about
the relative deprivation as to themselves. By contrast, given the
current Medicaid financing scheme, if we subsidize one woman's
abortion, we will not automatically elevate her concerns above
those of the woman who chooses childbirth, or even the woman
who chooses abortion but has to pay for it. Similarly, affirmative
protection of a right to abortion does not infringe on another's
rights, in the way that, for example, subsidizing Hari Krishnas'
peripatetic work might expand on the privacy infringements their
practice creates. Except for the taxpayer conscience and the fetus-rights issues, one cannot legitimately say that she has been
harmed by another person's having had an abortion, except
speculatively-the child who was not born might have supported
her, or married her, or contributed taxes to ease her own burden.
A final possible justification for the difference in the bene275. It is generally conceded that the state's other economic or practical
interests, such as saving money and safeguarding the pregnant woman's health,
simply do not justify any abortion-related restrictions or refusals to fund abortion services. See, e.g., Development, supra note 242, at 831-32, 835. Apparently,
this is so even where such restrictions are not totally irrational. See id. at 826-28.
Even if government has a rational interest in increasing its population by
prohibiting abortions (again, as suggested by Maher), that interest would extend
to all pregnancies, whether they are potentially to be terminated by an individual
using private funds or one using public funds. If the interest is solely in having
more citizens, however, one would surely argue that there are more rational and
effective ways to meet that goal than refusing to permit or fund abortions and
thus abrogating the woman's important right to decide about bearing a child. If
one says that the state's interest is served by excluding funding for abortions but
not by criminalizing abortions, one must fall back on the penalty/withholding
benefits distinction previously discussed in order to make sense of this proposition-i.e., that somehow, criminal prohibitions interfere less with the woman's
right than does withholding benefits.
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fits/rights cases is that the sum of the recipients' explicit rights
and their "background" interests is more significant in Shapiro
and Sherbert than in Maher and Harris. In a way, this is merely a
variation on the argument that some fundamental rights are more
important than others, an argument which does not track the government benefit cases discussed in this article. However, the
"add-on" argument also suggests that in reviewing a case involving recognized fundamental rights, the Supreme Court properly
surveys the case for other strong, perhaps widely recognized, additional interests of the recipient which support the notion that the
government should act, even affirmatively, so as not to burden
the core fundamental right. 276 In the Shapiro and Sherbert line of
cases, for example, the significant rights to travel and to exercise
one's religious beliefs were entwined with the rights-exerciser's
strong interest in subsistence benefits, in medical care, in welfare,
or in unemployment benefits. 27 7 That strong interest, while not
rising to the level of a "right" in constitutional terms, gave sufficient weight to the rights-exerciser's case that the Court closely
scrutinized the impact of the government's action in revoking
benefits.
However, the burden of Harris for this rights-plus theory is
heavy. In Maher, this theory could be used to argue that a woman's right to decide for a non-therapeutic abortion, plus her
background interest in state subsidization of that abortion, were
not in the same league with the right to travel or the right to free
exercise of religion coupled with the recipient's strong interest in
subsistence benefits. Harris complicates the matter by adding the
woman's significant interest in her health to the calculus. It is difficult to show that the recipients' rights plus interests, in the right
to travel and free exercise cases, outweigh the recipients' rights
plus interests in Harris, or that the woman's abortion plus other
interests are less weighty compared to the state's interests. Unless one defines a person's strong interest in surviving extremely
276. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99,
124-26 (1973) (Marshall,J., dissenting); L. TRIBE, supra note 64, at 1127-28. Professor Michelman has argued that this "rights-plus" practice by the Court allows
us to justifiably say there is a right to welfare, or at least minimum protection
against economic hazard. See Michelman, supra note 158, at 659-65; see also
Jones, The Right to Health Care and the State, 33 PlIL. Q 279 (1983) (arguing
health care should be funded at least on the same basis and for the same reasons
as police and fire protection). But see Appleton, supra note 41, at 753-57 (arguing
that Alaher and Harris finally refute Michelman's thesis).
277. For discussion of this line of cases, see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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literally, a woman who stands to lose her health in significant
measure as in Harris would seem to have at least the same level of
interest as a woman in a Sherbert case who is going to suffer an
inadequate diet, or slum housing, or even sloppy medical care
due to state withdrawal of basic benefits.
Even if the above arguments regarding the Court's definitional assumptions or apparent bases for justifying imposition of
responsibility conditions in Maher and Harris are rebuttable, the
author hopes they have at least demonstrated the troubling results which occur when rights-talk is applied to a situation like the
abortion funding cases. In these cases, as in many cases involving
government benefits and fundamental rights, so much is at stake
for so many in terms of personal values, freedom, and even the
right to a healthy life. Whether the critique is centered on the
Court's description of the woman's right or the state's action, or
whether it goes to the balance which the Court strikes between
individual rights and state interests, rights-talk must eventually
result in disastrous decisions in such cases. Either the government or conscience-stricken taxpayers or fetuses win, and indigent women lose; or poor women triumph over serious concerns
about the sanctity of life. It is now appropriate to turn to the task
of describing some of these previously illustrated flaws in rightstalk.
IV.

SOME PROBLEMS WITH RIGHTS-TALK

As the preceding discussion has illustrated, traditional common law rights-talk is simply an inadequate framework to resolve
collisions between government policy and human belief, particularly in life-and-death matters. This article will only briefly touch
on some of the reasons for this. First, rights language depends
on certain factual-legal questions which must be answered by reference to a specific, shared moral universe, one which does not
currently exist. This is particularly so since the use of rights language, indeed its very weight, must be justified with reference to a
system of values. Second, rights presuppose duties; but rights of
"subsistence recipience," those "rights" on which all other rights
really hang for government-dependent citizens, generally do not
have presupposed duties, 2 78 at least in the American legal tradition. In addition, rights at the common law or by constitutional
278. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 72, at 352 (arguing for a right to basic needs);
see also infra note 286 (discussion of the right of recipience as a metaright or

entitlement).
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history have served allocative or protective functions, not the mediating functions they are called on to serve in the government
benefits cases at issue. Moreover, rights-talk has generally been
employed in settings which are abstracted from time and place
concerns. Rights-talkers have rarely recognized how individual
rights-holders and their opponents are embedded in a community
which by its nature suggests members' responsibility for each
other. Finally, the rights framework presupposes an adversarial
process, and a win or lose outcome. Where government-held resources are to be allocated, when sharply divided beliefs of conscience and the very means of life and of life-opportunity are at
stake, such conflict-based rights talk is surely inapposite.
As a lawyer, not a philosopher, permit me to suggest that the
recognition of legal rights, whether at common law or through
statutory or constitutional development, has followed a much different course than philosophical rights discourse. Not only does
the law recognize certain kinds of rights, such as powers or immunities, which cannot be explained as products of reason, but what
we mean by a "right" may be several different kinds of rights at
once. Commonly, legal rights are not derived, but rather acknowledged by courts, legislatures and even by lay people, much
as one might acknowledge a coming storm from gathering clouds
of precedential progression, public opinion, and reasoned
thought. Indeed, legal rights depend for their survival on the increasing confluence of these sources. Those rights which have
emerged or survived in our century, e.g., rights to racial equality
or personal privacy, are dependent on the deepening concord of
such sources. Other rights proposed for legal status, such as the
right not to be put to death by the state, 2 79 or the right to welfare,2 8 0 have been drowned in the dissonance of different groups,
279. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, the Court concluded that the death penalty does not per se violate the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 168-69. The Gregg Court found that the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" should be interpreted in light of the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
The Court further noted that this standard of decency may be construed, in part,
through legislative measures adopted by the people's representatives, and at
least 35 states had adopted death penalty statutes. Id. at 178-80.
280. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 32 (social importance
of education is not critical factor in determining whether state statute is subject
to strict scrutiny); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (rejecting argument that tenant's right to leased premises is fundamental for purposes of equal
protection clause); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (statute
placing absolute limit on amount of welfare regardless of need or family size did
not violate equal protection clause); infra note 290 (citing cases in which courts
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social beliefs, and actions.
The abortion controversy only illustrates the dissonance that
emerges from conflicting, deeply held religious and moral understandings about the nature of life and priorities of human beings'
responsibility for themselves and others, a dissonance that cannot
be removed by rights-talk. The debate over the legal status of the
fetus, like debates over euthanasia and test-tube children, represents more than an admission that science or even rational
thought has failed us in its attempt to provide definitive answers
to questions about what constitutes a human life. It is an acknowledgement that, in a pluralistic society, neither science, law
nor philosophy are currently able to create an acceptable moral
meeting-place for persons whose moral universes clash or are
even mutually exclusive. Rights theory developed into law cannot
exist in such an atmosphere of dissonance; rather, court-made or
legislatively created "rights" become merely skillful arguments,
often backed by gingerly wielded enforcement power. So we see
the inconsistencies in the abortion debate: the recognition of the
right to abortion in Roe v. Wade and the withdrawal of the means
to exercise that right in Maher and Harris; the initial protection of
the doctor-patient relationship, and its erosion through state regulations on abortion disclosures and procedures; the constitutional amendment struggles; 28 ' the one-issue politics; the "makean-example" cases involving women who "kill" aborted fetuses,
and variant regulatory procedures for doctors who do so. 2 82 Even
common grounds on which liberals and conservatives have traditionally met to form some consensus, such as the right to human
autonomy, disappear in such a debate. If there can be no common ground, then there can be no stable right or a non-right to
government benefits, or even to abortion.
Ironically, this very cacophony of values and beliefs, which
makes it almost impossible for courts in benefits cases to recoghave held that the constitution does not guarantee shelter, food and clothing to
poor).
281. See Jaffe, supra note 19, at 113, 122.
282. Compare Thornburgh v. Amer. College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct.
2169, 2183-84 (1986) (Pa. abortion statute proviso requiring presence of second
physician during abortion performed when viability is possible held unconstitutional since it failed to provide medical exception for situation where mother's
health was endangered by delay in second physician's arrival) with Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1983) (Mo. statute requiring presence of second physician in similar circumstances held constitutional
since proviso contained implicit exception for situations when second physician
arrived late).
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nize any enduring rights at any level of concreteness, also justifies
the necessity for rights in liberal theory. In order for each to be
truly autonomous, to be "separate, independent selves," as liberal theory would hold, we need a rights framework that does not
choose among competing purposes and ends, a so-called neutral
framework of rights. 2 83 Such a neutral framework would allow
each citizen to choose his own values, each being tolerant of
others' values. The types of rights employed toward that end are
primarily procedural in nature, with the appearance of neutrality:
rights such as equal treatment, due process of law and freedom of
28 4
expression.
As this article has striven to illustrate, with the discussions of
rights vs. rights and rights vs. government interests, the decision
to employ rights-talk in government benefits cases reflects an impoverished understanding of the dynamics involved. It is not
only that the decision to employ rights-talk is value-laden, e.g., we
must decide whether our reason for using rights is instrumental,
perhaps for utilitarian goals. 2 5 It is also true that the way in
which we fill the empty shell of the rights balance with meaning
sufficient to allow a legal decision is dependent on non-neutral
choices. If we argue that the woman's right is to autonomywhether it be termed privacy or liberty-we cannot avoid the fact
that such a "neutral" right will interfere with the life of another,
or at least with potential life. Similarly, recognition of a taxpayer's "neutral" right of conscience or the fetus' "neutral" right
to survival will not tolerate similar recognition of the mother's
"neutral" rights of autonomy. While one can imagine the possibility of mutual toleration of such rights where there is government or individual invasion of another's "rights-turf," where the
proposed right of one person is to affirmative action in choosing
allocation of a benefit, irreconcilable conflict exists.
Second, the "right of recipience," the term coined to suggest
that agreement exists on whether people are entitled to have their
basic needs met, illustrates the awkwardness with which rights

REV.

283. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73
1 (1959); Tushnet, supra note 71, at 1375-77.

HARV.

L.

284. Even the attempt to neutralize the types of rights which are necessary
for the liberal state is subject to discussion. Certain liberals support social and
economic rights, whereas others support a market economy on the theory that
redistribution of property interferes with individual autonomy. Set, Sandel, .Iorlit)' and the Liberal Ideal, IHw NEw REI'UBIIC 16 (May 7, 1984).

285. In such a situation we might indeed "add" rights on either side of the
balance to decide the government benefits condition case.
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language is used.2 8 6 Surely, such a right must be a claim-right:
the idea that one merely has a "liberty" or "power" right to have
one's needs met is absurd. Yet, a claim-right usually entails a
duty, e.g., if one has the right to own land, others have the duty
not to interfere with that ownership, the law defining what the
duty entails as well as the right. Even the more nebulous rights,
the so-called "human rights," such as dignity, have gained some
enforceable substance by international custom and convention.
International agreements against genocide 28 7 or statements
against the use of torture, 288 for example, suggest a core of
agreed content for such rights.
By contrast, the ("legal") "right of recipience" is said to exist
despite the lack of a corresponding legally enforceable duty in
government or in individuals to provide for those who have such
a right.2 8 9 Courts in this country have emphatically and consistently turned away claims by poor people that they have a constitutional or common law right to food, clothing or shelter. 29 0 They
have reasoned that while the government's decision to fulfill their
286. The "right of recipience" has variously been characterized as an abstract background right which provides a justification for political decisions of a
society abstractly but does not provide ajustication for a particular political decision; a metaright to have policies which genuinely pursue the objective of making the right to basic needs possible; or an entitlement, which is based on the
rules of the system which distributes goods. See SEN, The Right Not To be Hungry,
in 2 CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY, A NEW SURVEY, 343-47 (G. Floistad ed. 1982).
287. See, e.g., J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, N. LEECH, Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948, in THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM: DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 56-59 (1981) [hereinafter cited as.J.
SWEENEY & C. OLIVER].

288. See, e.g., Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of December 9,
1975, inJ. SWEENEY & C. OLIVER, supra note 287, at 151-53, Universal Declaration
of Human Rights Article 5, inJ. SWEENEY & C. OLIVER, supra note 287, at 61; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 7, in J. SWEENEY & C. OLIVER,
supra note 287, at 68. Interestingly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights recognize the right to "an adequate standard of living." J. SWEENEY & C. OLIVER,

supra note 287, at 64, 90.
289. See SEN, supra note 286, at 352. But see BENDi'rI, supra note 273, at 7380.
290. See Simson, supra note 1I, at 507-08; see also Caton v. Barry, 500 F.
Supp. 45, 48-52 (D.D.C. 1980) (Constitution does not guarantee safe or habitable housing; plaintiff did, however, have entitlement to minimal shelter that
could not be terminated without due process); Black v. Beame, 419 F. Stipp.
599, 606-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (no constitutionally mandated obligation of state to
provide plaintifs with welfare or housing benefits, or to insure given type of
familv life); Bastardo v. Warren, 332 F. Stipp. 501, 503 (W.D. Wis. 1971) (no
right to minimum wage).
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basic needs is not exactly largesse after Goldbergv. Kelly, 29 1 it is not
a necessary result of a government duty under some higher law or
precedent. Similarly, a brief survey of various state and federal
government public benefits programs, particularly since 1980,
will belie any argument that the other branches of government
are willing to be bound by such a mandatory duty. If there is not
a legally enforceable right of recipience, then it is difficult as an
abstract matter to understand how the poor have any fundamental claim-rights, even negative ones. If indeed a poor person has
no right to the means to live, the value of her right to prevent
government interference with her life-right is minimal. If government has the power to impose any responsibility condition on her
means of survival, how then can she ever exercise any right as
trump against government? 29 2 Indeed, how can one suggest that
a poor person, as against government, has a right to decide
whether to procreate (or a right to engage in any human activity
deemed fundamental) if she invariably needs at least some beneficence, however indirect, to exercise any such right and she may
2 93
not claim such beneficence from government?
Perhaps the preceding discussion has also illustrated the poverty of rights-talk in compelling human dilemmas, such as the
abortion problem, because of its apparently deliberate separation
from the concrete case and the specific level of discourse, and because of its failure to recognize that rights-holders are embedded
in a community which claims moral response on their part. Professor Tushnet has made the first point clearly. Because of the
level of abstraction at which meaning is poured into a "right", or
at which a right is recognized, it is almost impossible to determine
2 4
whether that right will be protected at law in a given situation. 11
Whether we denominate the woman's right as one of privacy or
liberty, we have not solved the abortion funding dilemma. Indeed, depending on how we line up both abstract factors such as
the state's interest (in population or in protection of fetal life) and
concrete factors such as the state of the woman's health, the right
appears to shift. Rights-talk abstracts real situations, apparently
for the sole purpose that like cases be treated or that logical
processes be applied to the solution of the particular problem291. 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970).
292. For a further discussion of the utilitarian model's utilization of a
"trump card," see supra note 269 and accompanying text.
293. See H. SHuE, BASIC RIGHTs 22-34 (1980).
294. See Tushnet, supra note 71, at 1375-82. Tushnet criticizes this tendency on the basis of fundamental indeterminacy. Id.
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even though no cases are alike, and even though no logic in the
world can decide whether a fetus is a life which we ought to
protect.
By labeling proposed liberties of action as rights, rights-talk
also lends credence to the liberal notion that every man is an island, that a human being's life can be lifted from the community
in which he finds himself and be dissected. Once a person obtains
a right, we do not normally ask whether other obligations she may
owe, or relationships she may have, transform the propriety of
her exercise of that right. Rights theory does not consider the
idea of a communal right, one which belongs to an entire group
of people by virtue of their relationships with each other and si29 5
multaneously to each individual as a member of the group.
Rights-theory posits that an individual is severable from the life
she shares with others.
Additionally, the government benefits/fundamental rights
cases are inept vehicles for rights terminology, terminology which
has traditionally been employed either to allocate and protect
scarce goods available or to protect against the encroachment of
government. Where the question of "rights" comes up in procreative or other fundamental rights decisions which turn on the
availability of government funding, neither the allocative nor the
protective function of "rights" is involved. In the Maher/Harris
cases, the issue is not allocative: the question is not how a scarce
medical resource should be divided among those who want abortions and those who want other medical care. We do not decide
these cases by an allocation that gives a right to the resource to A
rather than B. Nor is the abortion funding debate about whether
dollars should go to Jane Doe for "related basic needs" through
the AFDC program, or should stay in the taxpayer's pocket,
rather than go to Mary Smith for abortion services. The conscience-stricken taxpayer objects to medical care for Mary Smith
even though the taxpayer will be (resource-wise) poorer for her objection because he will subsidize Mary Smith's child through
AFDC. Moreover, Jane Doe will, if anything, have fewer resources to draw on if Mary Smith is denied an abortion because
the AFDC benefits which Mary's child will soon be receiving may
pressure the legislature to reduce the benefit levels for Jane and
other recipients.
295. See, e.g., Lynd, COMMUNAl. RiciITS, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417. 1419-23,
1438-41 (1984) (communal rights, unlike individual rights, belong to connminnitv
as a whole and may not Ie given tip by individual or current majority).
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The use of the term "right" as a protection against government encroachment, the so-called liberty right, is similarly inapposite where government-dependent citizens are concerned.
Such persons do not and cannot seek the shelter of some private,
insulated realm from which government is excluded. They are,
without choice, members of a larger community. Their claim is
that government should accomplish (for them particularly) those
purposes for which government was created, to fill the terrible
voids in the "general welfare" that the "state of nature" created.
The right they claim is the right to be governed, a positive claim
right. Their demand is precisely a demand that government act
as government, not a claim that government has overreached.
Similarly, the claim of abortion-funding foes is that government
act as government to enforce a moral stance, not that it has no
business involving itself in pregnant women's, fetus' or taxpayers'
lives. In such a context, verbs used in rights-talk-government is
"violating"
"intruding" or "infringing on" rights-are
inapposite.
Nor is the term "right" in its protective sense a useful concept in public benefit cases prior to Maher and Harris, as evidenced by the difficulty the Court has with suggesting that the
right of a Sabbatarian to worship must be protected by forcing the
government to give her unemployment benefits. There is no
prospect of the anonymous raid, the constriction of free action,
which comes to mind when we discuss the right of an accused to
be protected against a warrantless search of his home, or the right
of a married couple to be protected against intrusion into their
procreative choices. What is not at stake is protection against the
massivity and arbitrariness of collective power, or prophylaxis for
the adage, "absolute power corrupts absolutely." What is at stake
is empowerment of the individual through government action to
choose meaningfully and to act freely in certain protected realms
of human life.
Moreover, the structural dynamic in the government benefits
cases discussed does not parallel that of a rights structure in relationships among people, or even between people and the state.
In the individual rights against rights model, one person is the
winner and another the loser: he who wins obtains the right, he
who loses, the duty; even if it is a duty to refrain from interfering
with exercise of that right. Similarly, when an individual or group
of people win rights against the state, only they and the state are
directly impacted, only their actions and the states' are directly
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governed by the outcome of that decision. By contrast, it may be
more appropriate to argue that in the fundamental
rights/government benefits controversy, government stands as a
neutral third party whose actions but not "rights" are affected by
the outcome of the controversy. For instance, if the abortion
funding controversy can be recognized as a rights vs. rights problem, the right of a fetus to life or a taxpayer to conscientious tax
dodging versus the right of a woman to obtain an abortion, the
government does not "win" or "lose" anything, but merely
rechannels benefits in a different direction. By contrast, in liberty
rights cases, e.g., the fourth amendment rights, the state actually
loses some power or potential it previously had available.
Even if the question is not purely rights vs. rights but state
interests against individual rights, it is difficult in many of the fundamental rights/government benefits cases to come up with an
interest of the state qua state. One can imagine the state as a corporate entity having an interest in ensuring that its coffers are not
depleted, and therefore requiring a Sabbatarian to take any available work and relinquish unemployment benefits, even if such
work must be done on Saturday. One can similarly envision a
state having an "interest" in administrative convenience, security,
organization, of an optimal population size. It is difficult, however, to imagine this entity called the state having a moral interest. It is the people, after all, who control the state who have
consciences-who feel impelled to call or even to compel others
to moral behavior, as in the abortion cases. Thus, these cases are
exposed as the 511% rights cases in which government acts not for
itself, but as either conduit or mediator for effectuating the conscience rights of the majority as against others who have "lost"
the political battle.
The mere fact that rights-talk inevitably suggests a winner
and loser causes even more problems in the public benefits/fundamental rights context. Such use of rights-talk incorporates a view of human responsibility which cannot resolve the
deep-seated conflicts which occur between those who act on conscience. As Professors Churchill, Siman and others have pointed
out, rights-talk allows rights-holders to view their rights as pieces
of property-things to which they are entitled, things which they
may morally claim must be fulfilled before any other person's
competing interests and concerns are met. 2 6 Indeed, rights-lan296. See Churchill and Siman, Abortion and the Rhetoric of Individual Rig/hts, 12
(Feb. 1982). The authors suggest that rights are

HASTINGS CENTER REP. 9, 11

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/3

92

Failinger: An Offer She Can't Refuse: When Fundamental Rights and Conditions

1986]

CONDITIONS ON GOVERNMENT BENEFITS

925

guage has more and more assumed an egocentric morality in the
common vernacular. 29 7
Such language, as currently used,
presumes that self-preservation and self-aggrandizement are normatively superior and may be morally limited only to the extent
2 98
others' rights are significantly affected by one's own actions.
Rights-language assumes the necessity of protecting one's self
from others, individually or collectively, because of a distrust for
their concern about one's needs, individuality or autonomy.
Whether such rights have tangible or intangible foci, e.g., the
right to property or the right to free speech respectively, they
serve to improve the position of the rights-holder at the expense
of those whose interests or competing rights are insufficiently im2 99
portant to merit a "rights" designation.
This dynamic of battle, this market-like struggle to prevail for
one's own interests which rights-talk conjures up, simply will not
fit the government benefits cases comfortably. There is no abstract, neutrally valued, logical way to resolve the tragedy of souls
and lives that the abortion controversy has become. A new framework is not only desirable, it is necessary.
V.

CONCLUSION

Legal rights-talk suggests a language and structure of realism
for law, an ordering of human relationships based on a recognition of human weakness and the failure of human aspiration to
guide much behavior. To the extent that rights are needed to
guard against human frailties, such as those of greed, selfishness,
and power-lust, legal rights-talk is useful, particularly since rights
serve certain protective or allocative functions. Legal rights-talk,
however, ignores a whole world of ethical choices which must inform both the political and the legal debate about distribution of
government-held resources, particularly in the abortion funding
cases.
miscast in this role, that they are actually based on a social sense of self, and that
they imply the reciprocity of responsibility for others which the counterethic described herein would imply. Id.
297. By contrast, the purpose of rights as conceived in liberal political theory is to prevent individuals from being conflated by a mere utilitarian calculus,
and to allow them to be respected as independent, choice-capable persons. See
CASSELL,The Refusal to Sterilize Elizabeth Stanley is Not Paternalism, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN MODERN MEDICINE 148-50 (1981); Sandel, supra note 284, at
15.
298. See GOLDWIN, RIGHT VS. DUTIES: No CONTEST, ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN
HARD TIMES 124-34 (Caplan ed. 1981).
299. Cf id. at 134-37.
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Dispute resolution founded on rights ignores a counter-tradition of human response based on the importance of the other,
which recognizes that each of us is intimately tied with the history
and action of others. In that history, assertion of rights is a disruptive rather than a conciliatory force. Carol Gilligan has partially described this ethic centered in women's experience,
elucidating how it is used to make moral decisions.3 0 0 Contrary
to a rights ethic, the counter-ethic of responsibility assumes that
one's needs and wants are subordinate to the needs and wants of
those with whom one has relationships, that one places herself
not first (by asserting rights) but, if necessary, last (by taking on
responsibilities). Even the dynamic of this counter-ethic is diametrically opposed to that of rights-talk. One does not solve a
problem of conflicting human needs and wants by abstracting
those needs and wants into principles which are measured against
each other with one factor gaining precedence through logic,
analogy, or even power. A person using counter-ethical methods
for deciding would be concerned, not with which principles
predominate, but with care for the web of human relationships
which are at stake, such as the abortion problem. 3 0 '
One example which Gilligan uses clearly illustrates the poverty of rights-talk as it responds to affirmative human need. 30 2
She gives the Kohlberg moral choice example3 0 3 to a twelve year
old boy and girl: a man has a dying wife who needs a drug which
he cannot afford to give her. The question she poses to them is:
should the man steal the drug from the pharmacist? The legal
answer, which the boy gives, abstracts the individual needs which
are conflicting by framing the problem as whether the woman's
right to life predominates over the pharmacist's right to property.
Unconfused by legal precedent, the boy answers with perfect
lawyerly logic that the right to life "beats" the right to property,
so the man should steal the drug.
The girl, who represents the counter-ethic, recognizes the
question not to be an abstract but a concrete one, and the dynamic of her response depends on the recognition that the
human relationships involved are what is worth saving, not the
300. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVEI.OPMENT (1982) (study comparing moral development of men
and women through psychological description).
301. See, e.g., id. at 51-63 (discussion of case studies illustrating women's
focus on protecting relationships).
302. See id. at 24-39.
303. See id. at 27-36.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/3

94

Failinger: An Offer She Can't Refuse: When Fundamental Rights and Conditions

19861

CONDITIONS ON GOVERNMENT BENEFITS

927

principle of property or the principle of life. If the man steals the
drug, he may go to prison and be separated from the wife who
needs his support. Their relationship with the druggist will be
severed as well. If he does not steal the drug, he and his wife will
be torn apart by death and by his selfishness. The girl's solution
is not a principled one, nor one limited by the rights framework of
the question: she would have the man go to the druggist and convince him to give the wife the drug she needs to live. The man's
and wife's relationship are preserved; the druggist's relationship
with the couple is preserved. Her solution, while not "enforceable" in the sense that rights are, is, as a realistic matter, as likely
to be successful in real life as the boy's.
Such a counter-ethic is not just a moral decision-making
framework but may usefully provide a new framework for legal
analysis which is not rights-based. The dynamic of such a framework, rather than recognizing and responding to demand, struggle, acquisition, and consolidation of power, is one of
responsiveness, settlement, giving up, and sharing. It is traditionally liberal in its recognition of the worth of the individual. Yet, it
recognizes the concurrence of human responsibility and human
want, the need for communion rather than rights battles among
individuals, and between the individual and the larger community. Nor is it foreign to already developed notions of individual
prerogative under the Constitution; the seeds of such a counterethic already inform basic legal principles in many respects.
The problems of defining and justifying a counter-ethic that
would replace a rights-based ethic are difficult ones which deserve
more than a few pages of reflection. Yet, a legal framework based
on the counter-ethic would provide a very different result in the
abortion funding cases. As this article has suggested, the rightsbased perspective which currently informs both the political and
legal debate on government funding for abortion has hopelessly
failed to provide any happy, or even just, resolution. When the
question is posed to as which right-the right to conscience, the
right to life, or the right to autonomy and control of one's body
and destiny-is paramount, the question is only superficially soluble. Additionally, the rights framework provides an appropriate
excuse for advocates on either side to ignore fundamental needs
at stake: only rarely does one see a pro-life advocate even recognize that there is some responsibility to care for an unwanted
child or her mother whose situation is worsened by the child's
birth, much less actively take any responsibility for them. Pro-
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choice advocates are equally guilty of ignoring the effects on the
fetus of the actions of those who abort (i.e, they could campaign
for preservation of a viable aborted fetus). As importantly, rarely
do pro-choice advocates recognize any responsibility for the third
persons affected by the decision: putative fathers, those who cannot have children except by adoption, family members whose
lives may be changed in a myriad of ways by the decision to abort,
or even community members who see in abortion a discouraging
rejection of community moral values about life-taking.
Similarly, the Court and the commentators have rarely conjoined discussions of the rights at stake and state or individual
responsibilities inherent in such a decision. The strongest "duty"
which the Court has posited for the state, in Roe v. Wade, is the
duty not to interfere. By contrast, not once has the Court suggested that the state which decided that unwanted children were
to come into the world by its funding denials has any subsequent
duty to those children or mothers to care for their needs. 30 4 The
Harrisdecision suggests that the state need not make reparations
or even provide medical care to the poor woman whose health is
significantly worsened or whose life is endangered by the state's
refusal to provide abortion funding. While this refusal to impose
responsibility is egalitarian-neither does the state have to aid
women who choose childbirth nor care for their young, despite
the state's pro-birth policy-it deepens the despair caused by existing wealth inequalities in tragic, unnecessary ways. Nor has the
Court posited any duty by the mother of responsible decisionmaking created by the freedom which the Constitution gives her.
If we reinterpret basic source law in accordance with this
counter-ethic of responsibility, the discussion shifts from "rightstalk" to focus on the responsibilities of the parties to decide
whether or not to provide funding which will affect the exercise of
a fundamental human concern. If indigent mothers are asked not
only what they want for themselves but whether they have acted
responsibly toward others affected, and if those others affected,
collectively or individually, are asked whether they have acted
responsibly toward this woman and her unborn child, solutions
which represent an instinctively appropriate compromise seem
possible. For the woman's part, on one extreme, those who wish
to abort simply because the fetus has interfered with their life
plans must, with great difficulty, justify their decisions, whether or
304. In fact, the Court has held that there is no constitutional obligation to
provide medical care for any indigents. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 469.
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not they need government assistance to carry out their decision.
By contrast, women who will inevitably suffer serious physical or
emotional injury or death unless they can abort may legitimately
argue that they have considered their responsibilities to others
against their own lives. They may also claim responsible action
by the state in ensuring their ability to abort, whether through
non-interference, regulation, or direct funding. In the cases between these extremes, mutual responsibility by both parties may
eliminate the need and desire to choose abortion. The mother
will not be economically or socially forced to the choice; nor will
the state or its citizens be forced to subsidize what they philosophically or morally reject.
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